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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.1.1 A differential opportunity structure as a political problem 
On Thursday August 9, 2012, the Belgian financial newspaper De Tijd published a very 
interesting opinion article written by Manu Claeys. Claeys is the president of the pressure 
group Straten-Generaal that mobilizes against the construction of a new highway in the 
city of Antwerp and for more attention for the health and wellbeing of local residents in the 
design of mobility policy and infrastructure in and around the city of Antwerp. In his article 
the author reacted to the political debate that had arisen in Antwerp and the surrounding 
municipalities concerning the expansion of tramway connections between the suburbs and 
the city center. Local politicians in the suburban municipalities arose against the idea, 
arguing that the introduction of a tram connection to the city would harm the rural charac-
ter of their municipality because it would stimulate former city dwellers to move to their 
suburb. Jan Jambon, MP for the conservative Flemish nationalist party N-VA, stated that 
Antwerp had to solve the problem of its population growth on its own territory. According 
to Claeys, the debate points to a fundamental difference between the inhabitants of central 
cities and of less urban areas. Urban dwellers are supposed to be more left-wing oriented 
and progressive. They favor investments in public transport over investment in motor-
ways, are supportive of welfare state arrangements, behave more tolerant towards ethnic 
minorities, etcetera. Inhabitants of less urban areas tend to be more right-wing and con-
servative. This assumption is not only conventioinal wisdom, but has also been formulated 
in the scientific literature ánd has found some statistical support (De Maesschalck, 2011; 
De Maesschalck & Luyten, 2006). An important question arising is: what is it that makes 
city dwellers so different? 
On the one hand there is the classic answer of what we call a self-selection process: mid-
dle class families with relatively high salaries move out of the city to go and live in large 
houses with a garden. Because they are relatively well-off and somewhat older, they will 
be more conservative and right-wing oriented. However, Claeys seems to believe that 
there is more going on. De Maesschalck, who’s work we cited above, argues that city 
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dwellers are on a daily bases confronted with urban problems such as unemployment and 
poverty, drug-abuse and pollution by traffic congestion. As a consequence they have an 
interest in (expensive) politics aimed at fighting the root causes of these problems such as 
investments in public transport and all kinds of social policy – even if they are relatively 
well-off themselves. Inhabitants of the suburban and rural areas only have an interest in 
politics that fight the consequences of these problems: more highways for faster connec-
tions and more police to protect them and their property from criminal offenses. Of course, 
we are formulating things a bit sharp here and the reality is less black and white, but our 
point is that both conventional wisdom and some scientific work claims that city dwellers 
and rural dwellers are not only different because they have different personal characteris-
tics (age, income, …), they are different because the environment in which they live makes 
them different. If a person with a certain level of education, having a certain kind of job 
and family background is living in a big urban place, he is confronted with different daily 
problems than he would be when he would be living in a small village on the countryside. 
As a consequence the city dweller whom, apart from his place of residence, has exactly the 
same background as the rural dweller will develop different interests, attitudes and behav-
ior. On a more abstract level, the idea is that urban residence represents different oppor-
tunities for individual goal attainment than does rural residence, and that these different 
opportunities are eventually reflected in political taste. The fundamental premise that
urban versus rural residence represents a different opportunity structure in con-
temporary society, is exactly the premise that will be examined in this dissertation. 
We believe that this issue, i.e. the inequality in the opportunity structure between rural 
and urban areas, is fundamentally a political problem. Politics – at least in our opinion – is 
in essence about what Lasswell (1936) has called the Who Gets What, When and How-
question. Politics is about power, it “concerns the production, distribution and use of re-
sources in the course of social existence” (Heywood, 2002, p. 10). When we are talking 
about inequalities in the opportunity structure, or different opportunities for goal attain-
ment, we are talking about the distribution of resources (material and immaterial) and 
therefore of the distribution of power in society. When actors in urban environments have 
differential access to resources as compared to actors in rural environments, the rural-
urban divide becomes political. As a consequence, the issue of rural–urban differences in 
the distribution of resources becomes a domain of study for the political sciences.  
1.1.2 A focus on social capital 
In order to be able to arrive at a useful research question we must make our central 
research topic more specific. After all, urban-rural differences in opportunities for indi-
vidual goal attainment is a very broad issue, covering a wide range of different topics. We 
could be looking at such things as inequalities in income levels (Sicular, Ximing, 
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Gustafsson, & Shi, 2007), differential access to education (Boone & Van Houtte, 2012) or 
state offered social services (Booysen, 2003). In this dissertation we will focus on 
differential opportunities in accessing resources through one’s social network. In 
other words, we are concerned with differences in social capital. Why social capital 
is such an interesting concept for investigating rural-urban differences will be addressed 
later, first we want to make clear to the reader what we mean with the term. 
During the last two decades social capital has become widely used both in scientific as in 
non-scientific writing. The most famous author in this concern is without any doubt Robert 
Putnam (1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993). Putnam and his followers define 
social capital as an attribute of a collectivity (be it a town, city or an entire nation) and 
focus on the consequences of dense networks and feelings of trust for those collectivities, 
in particular with regard to overcoming problems of collective action. Despite its populari-
ty, the writings of Putnam and those following his footsteps suffer from some serious defi-
ciencies such as internal circularity and poor theoretical development of the central con-
cepts. Our own contribution fits in with another tradition in the social capital literature that 
draws heavily from the seminal work of Pierre Bourdieu and Nan Lin. For Bourdieu, social 
capital should be defined as “l’ensemble des ressources actuelles ou potentielles qui sont 
liées à la possession d’un réseau durable de relations plus ou moins institutionnalisées 
d’interconnaissance et d’interreconnaissance” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 30). Contrary to Put-
nam, Bourdieu explicitly defines social capital as one of the different forms of capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). In general, capital arises from the investment of valuable goods aimed 
at generating a return (Marx, 1912). Social capital arises when an individual (or group) 
invests resources in its relationships with others hoping that these social ties will on some 
later point in time proof valuable for him (N. Lin, 1999). 
Investing in social relationships is a semi-unconscious process that constantly happens 
around us. For instance, imagine two friends (we call them Eline and Eva). Eline helps Eva 
by informing her about a vacancy or by recommending her for a certain position. This 
action can be regarded as the investment of time, effort and influence by Eline in the rela-
tionship with Eva. The important thing is that while helping her friend, Eline builds up the 
right to ask something in return. (e.g. sometime later she might ask Eva to help her close 
an interesting business deal with Eva’s new employer). In general, we can say that by 
investing resources in their relationships, people accumulate credit slips (i.e., the right to 
ask something in return).  
These credit slips are what really constitutes social capital. The value of the credit slips is 
determined by the return they can produce. Rational individuals will only invest in relation-
ships when they believe they will be able to realize an added value. This means that, in 
general, the return the investor will get, will be worth more than the resources he or she 
initially invested. Returning to our example, the effort Eline puts in recommending here 
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friend for the vacancy is worth less than the advantage she takes from closing the inter-
esting business deal. 
Now why should social capital be such an interesting concept for studying differences in 
the urban and rural opportunity structure? Well, the big difference between social capital 
investments and market related capital investments is the larger amount of uncertainty 
associated with the transaction. Whereas classic market transactions are characterized by 
binding contracts that can (in theory) be enforced by a formal legal system, social capital 
transactions are completely build on trust and social control. It is here of course that the 
importance of the urban-rural divide comes along. The traditional critique on city life, both 
in the scientific literature as in popular culture, has accused large urban settlements of 
being places that produce distrust, and are harming the functioning of social control (e.g. 
Tönnies, 1970; Wirth, 1938). If this hypothesis holds, a city environment would be very 
unfavorable for social capital accumulation. This classical view has not been left unchal-
lenged in the literature. Theories of the liberating city argue that urban life creates oppor-
tunities for social networking (Fischer, 1975b), while still others believe that the rural-
urban divide doesn’t matter at all (Gans, 1962a). In other words, the social capital concept 
is at the heart of the discussion on the urban-rural divide. 
1.1.3 Contributing to knowledge of the community question 
The results of our research should contribute to what in the literature is known as The 
community question. Actually, the community question as it was originally defined by 
Wellman and Leighton (1979) is much broader than the question about rural-urban differ-
ences in access to social capital. In general, it concerns the effect of modernization on “the 
formation of interpersonal networks and the flow of resources through such networks” 
(Wellman & Leighton, 1979, p. 365). Next to the effect of living in large urban settle-
ments, it also has to do with for instance the impact of the welfare state or of modern 
communication and transportation technology (Wellman published extensively on the last 
subject). However, in many publications the community question has been equated with 
the rural-urban divide (e.g. Lupi & Musterd, 2006). According to Fischer (1982), this has 
especially to do with the fact that in western culture cities are seen to exemplify modernity 
while the countryside exemplifies the ancient times. In any case, although the community 
question touches more subjects than just the effect of living in large settlements, it also 
touches this particular team and therefore our research should definitely contribute to the 
scientific knowledge on the matter. 
In the literature, three different kinds of answers have been formulated to the community 
question. First of all, there are the ideas of the isolating city, which are based on both a 
structural and a psychological argument. In a nutshell, the structural argument states that 
4
the increasing differentiation of social roles or the lack of overlap of these roles in modern 
urban settings affects social control, making it more likely for city dwellers to behave in an 
anti-social manner, e.g. by not reciprocating help offered by others. The psychological 
argument states that cities are so busy and crowded that people partly have to withdraw 
from social life to restore their mental equilibrium. This withdrawal in turn cuts off some 
routes to social capital exchange. 
The theory of the isolating city has been challenged by Claude Fischer (1975b) among 
others. For Fischer, the major difference between city and countryside has to do with per-
sonal freedom. He echoes the argument of the isolating city that in urban environments 
social control is less restrictive, making urban dweller experience less pressure to include 
certain persons in or exclude other persons from their network. Additionally, because in a 
city such an enormous pool of different potential network partners are present, people are 
much more to find the network partner that is just like the one they were looking for. It is 
in line with this theory of the liberating city to argue that self-chosen networks will be 
better networks and therefore provide more access to social capital. 
Finally, an important number of scholars has stated that the rural-urban divide is irrele-
vant. Some of them have defended their position arguing that human beings are in es-
sence gregarious animals that will socially exchange in the same way under all circum-
stances. Others have argued that differences between urban and rural areas that existed 
in the past have disappeared in the presence, mainly because modern transportation and 
communication technology makes it possible to be friends and exchange resources with 
people living very far away. 
Our own contribution to the literature is in first instance empirical. We want to find out 
whether, all other things being equal, the urban or rural character of an individual’s living 
environment has an influence on his or her opportunity for accumulating social capital. The 
empirical work associated with the community question that has been performed until now 
is unsatisfactory for a number of different reasons. First of all, most of it has not dealt with 
the “flow of resources through […] networks”, but concentrated on “the conditions under 
which solidary sentiments can be maintained” (Wellman & Leighton, 1979, p. 365). Re-
searchers have examined such issues as the attachment to the local community (Kasarda 
& Janowitz, 1974), the frequency of social interaction (Tsai & Sigelman, 1982) and socia-
bility in general (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). While these issues are related to social capital 
accumulation, they cannot be equated with it. First of all, close knit, locally bounded net-
works might stimulate the exchange of some resources under some circumstances, but be 
detrimental in other situations (Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1973). And although a certain 
amount of trust and social contact between network partners are necessary before ex-
changes can take place, trusting relationships are not a sufficient condition for accumulat-
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ing access to social resources and the frequency of contacts does not tell us anything 
about the frequency of exchanging resources.  
Second, most studies focus on access to a specific resource such as exchange of financial 
aid (Hofferth & Iceland, 1998). In this dissertation, we will offer an empirical test of rural-
urban differences on the general concept of social capital. We can do this by making use of 
two recently developed measurement instruments, i.e. the position generator (Lin, Fu & 
Hsung, 2001) and the resource generator (van der Gaag, 2005). The position generator 
maps the occupational prestige of a respondent’s network. According to its creators, this 
should be a good indication of the valuable resources present in a network. The resource 
generator offers survey respondents a list of social resources on which they can indicate 
whether or not they have access to them. With IRT-methods (or other scaling methods), 
the answers can be turned into a scale measuring social capital in general. However, be-
cause these instruments measure only potential access to social resources and not the 
actual mobilization of such resources, we extent our research with an analyses on the 
mobilization of one specific resource, i.e. childcare. 
Third, a lot of studies have worked on data gathered from a specific social group such as 
patients with a permanent need for assistance (Alamo Martell et al., 1999) or the elderly 
(Thomése, 1998). In an ideal situation we would have gathered data from a (large) sam-
ple of the general population to which we would then be able to present the questions we 
desired – i.e. the questions of the resource generator and the position generator. Howev-
er, gathering high quality information with such a sample is extremely costly, so it was out 
of our reach. Fortunately, the student barometer, an internet survey organized with the 
students of Ghent University contained the questions we desired and was made available 
to us. An important part of our empirical work will therefore also be done on a specific 
social group, i.e. on university students. This was not a deliberate choice, but one that was 
taken in the light of constraints of time and especially money. However, working with 
university students also has a number of advantages. First of all, a student population has 
never been examined before (at least not for urban-rural differences in social capital). 
Second, because we can expect that in our group of students the effects of coming from 
an urban or rural environment will be smaller than in the population in general (for in-
stance because all students are to some degree exposed to the city), we are in fact doing 
a very conservative test of our hypotheses. But above all, we do not rely entirely on data 
from a student population, but will also examine our research question on the Belgian part 
of the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). The SILC-
data are gathered through face-to-face interviews with more than 10 000 respondents 
sampled from the general population of Belgium. The SILC does not contain questions 
from the position generator, but includes a small number of question that can be used as 
resource generator items. The questions from the SILC are suboptimal in comparison to 
the ones that were used in the students barometer, but the quality of the data are very 
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good. As such, the analysis of the SILC-data are very complementary to our analysis of 
the students barometer data.  
Fourth, most empirical work has not paid much attention to the definition of urban and 
rural and to the procedures for delineating these different areas. A lot of studies are case-
studies that simply compare one larger city with a few small towns or villages. Others have 
simply used cut-of values of the number of inhabitants per municipality to determine 
whether a certain place is rural or urban. In this study we will make us of a more sophisti-
cated delineation of rural and urban areas that departs from a well-developed theoretical 
idea of an urban place as “a large and permanent concentration of people in a bounded 
area” (Zenner, 1996, p. 103). Because the delineation is done at the level of the munici-
palities, multilevel modeling techniques will be used. 
Finally, the bulk of the research has been performed in a North-American context, espe-
cially in the United States. This is problematic since the urban structure is shaped by the 
specific political, cultural and economic history of a country, and therefore differs a lot 
between those countries. As a consequence, this raises questions on the comparability of 
the results from one country to another. As we will explain in more detail later, the urban 
structure of Belgium is very idiosyncratic, existing out of a lot of relatively small but very 
dispersed cities and a strong urbanization (both functionally and morphologically) of the 
countryside. Therefore, we decided to replicate a part of our research in another country of 
which the territorial dimension of the urban structure was very different. Spain constitutes 
such an ideal contrasting case because its urban structure is characterized by very large 
and dense cities combined with a very deserted countryside. Since in Spain we were able 
to count on a specialist in urban and rural studies that was very willing to cooperate in the 
project, the country was selected as the best option. We would have been very pleased to 
be able to use the data from the Spanish version of the SILC-database for that purpose. 
However, the information on social capital appeared only to be available in the Belgian 
version. For that reason, we decided to replicate the student barometer survey at the 
UGR. To our knowledge, our study is the first one to use international comparative data for 
investigating urban-rural differences in social capital. 
In second instance, our contribution is also theoretical. The theories formulating an an-
swer to the community question were not specifically designed to make predictions about 
urban-rural differences in social capital but are middle range theories with a much broader 
scope. In what follows we try to apply the reasoning of these theories to the concept of 
social capital as it was defined by Bourdieu and Lin. Or differently put, we try to merge the 
vocabulary and reasoning of the social capital literature with the theories concerning the 
community question, an undertaking that has until now been absent from the literature1.
                                                    
1 Hofferth and Iceland’s article in Rural Sociology (1998) comes closest to such an endeavor but is far 
less elaborate and profound than ours. 
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Additionally, and probably more importantly, starting from the confrontation of theory and 
empirical results we propose an adaptation to the current theoretical models.  
To sum up, the central concern of this dissertation is to what extend rural and urban envi-
ronments constitute constraints and opportunities for individual goal attainment. Because 
an examination of the full reach of this issue would be impossible in just one study, we 
decided to concentrate on urban-rural differences in social capital. This central research 
question is in fact a part a broader issue that in the scientific literature is known as the 
community question. Our study aims at realizing both an empirical and a theoretical con-
tribution to the literature. It improves the rare previous empirical studies dealing with 
urban-rural differences in the exchange of social resources by using innovative measure-
ment instruments specifically designed to quantity the value of an individual’s stock of 
social capital and a sophisticated delineation of rural and urban areas, by simultaneously 
analyzing data from two (European) countries with a very different urban structure and by 
combining an analysis of data on students and data on the general population. It also 
constitutes a theoretical contribution because it explicitly brings together insights from the 
social capital literature and the literature on the community question and because it pro-
poses an adaptation to the current theoretical models based on the confrontation of theory 
and empirical results. 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the following chapter we elaborate on the central concept of this dissertation, i.e. social 
capital. Because in the course of history social capital has been given different meanings 
by different (famous) authors, we start by drawing a rough sketch of the historical devel-
opment of the concept. We indicate why we are convinced that the conceptualization of 
Bourdieu and Nan Lin is superior to the one of Putnam, at least for the sake of this re-
search project. We continue by explaining how social capital is related to other forms of 
capital and how it is produced and accumulated. We end the chapter by formulating an 
operational definition.  
In chapter three we examine how the operational definition can be put into practice. First 
we transform the theoretical definition into a mathematical definition. Second, we glance 
through three different ways of determining a unit of measurement.  
In the fourth chapter we sketch the different theoretical stories that try to give an answer 
to the community question. We expound the theories of the isolating city, the liberating 
city and theories predicting no difference between city and countryside and apply them to 
the concept of social capital as we have defined it in the previous chapters. We further 
deduce a number of specific hypothesis from those theories regarding the accumulation of 
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social capital. We conclude the chapter by summarizing the empirical research results that 
have been published in the literature so far.  
The final chapter of the first part examines some theoretical and practical issues regarding 
the rural-urban contrast. A suitable definition of rural and urban and a practical way to 
demarcate these areas is discussed. The chapter is concluded with a clarification on the 
specificity of the Belgian and Spanish urban structure and the reason why they are excel-
lent contrasting cases. 
The second part of this dissertation concerns the empirical research. It is introduced by 
elaborately presenting the data sources, measures and statistical techniques that are em-
ployed. The results of the analysis of the Student Barometer data (both in Belgium and in 
Spain) are presented in chapter 7, the ones of the SILC-data in chapter 8.  
Finally, in the concluding chapter we begin by summarizing our findings. Subsequently, we 
confront the theories outlined in the first part of this work with the empirical findings and 
present an interpretation of their significance. From that confrontation we develop an 
adopted theoretical model regarding how urban and rural environments present different 
constraints and opportunities for mobilizing social capital. We conclude the dissertation 
with some additional considerations. We reflect on a number of assumptions underlying 
our work. We discuss the added value for society and end by pointing to some strengths 
and weaknesses of this undertaking. 
The relevant questionnaire items of the SILC and the students barometer (in Dutch and 
Spanish) are added in Appendix. 
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PART 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Chapter 2
 Social capital 
As we mentioned before, the popularity of social capital has risen tremendously over the 
last two decades, both in the scientific world as outside of it (Prendergast, 2005; 
Woolcock, 2010). The term has been applied in many divergent contexts, such as the 
explanation of mortality-rates (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997), the 
social integration of immigrants (Zhou & Bankston, 1994), and the functioning of modern 
democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). However, the extended usage of the 
term did not lead to a generally accepted interpretation, let alone a general definition or 
operationalization (Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009). On the contrary, when reading the litera-
ture one gets the idea that everything that is ‘social’ and can be regarded as something 
positive, must have once been labeled social capital. This conceptual stretch seriously 
harms the value of social capital as a scientific tool (Bjørnskov & Sønderskov, 2009; 
Portes, 2000). Every scholar that still decides to use the term must therefore thoroughly 
describe what is meant by it, and what is not. 
In the first part of this chapter we try to sketch the conceptual history of social capital. 
Many reviews are available in the literature, but because they all sketch a very different 
picture, their existence does not make our task an easy one. There are two main reasons 
for this disagreement. First of all, the amount of articles and books published on social 
capital make it physically impossible to review all the literature available (Woolcock, 
2010). Second, some of the definitions of social capital are so broad that a thorough re-
view of the main idea (that the behavior of individuals and collectivities is influenced by 
their relations to others) would imply discussing nearly all of the contributors to contempo-
rary social theory. As a consequence, every discussion of social capital has to make a 
small selection of the large amount of material available. This overview therefore does not 
aim at completeness, but at critically reviewing the main contributions that shaped con-
temporary understanding of social capital and influenced our own position in the debate.  
Through the description of this conceptual history we want to clarify our own stance in the 
debate on the definition of social capital. We elaborate further on that particular definition 
in the second part of this chapter. We show how social capital is related to other forms of 
capital and what exactly makes it different from those other forms. Finally we develop an 
operational definition that should allow us to perform empirical studies. 
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2.1 A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY 
2.1.1 The early bird: Lyda Judson Hanifan 
Lyda Judson Hanifan (1916) is often mentioned as the first author to use the term social 
capital (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock, 2010). Hanifan was a state supervisor of rural schools in 
early twentieth century America, and published on rural education. In his work, he ex-
plored ways of improving the education provided by the schools of small rural communi-
ties. Hanifan believed that the quality of the schools in small communities could only be 
improved if the functioning of the entire community improved. For that purpose, the 
members of the community had to be brought together in social centers where all kinds of 
activities were organized. In The Rural School Community Centre (1916) the author de-
scribes how the organization of such a social center inspired people to dedicate themselves 
to the improvement of the local community, which in turn had a positive effect on the 
education provided in the local school. The introduction of the community center helped 
build social capital, defined by Hanifan as “good will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and 
social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit” 
(1916, p. 130). 
Hanifan was a typical exponent of the Progressive Movement that flourished in the United 
States between 1890 and 1920. The progressives wanted to modernize government and 
society in order to ban corruption, promote social justice, and improve democracy. Social 
reform, based on scientific knowledge and methods, would help Americans become good 
citizens that collaborated for the common good. Hanifan’s ideas drew heavily on those of 
the social center movement. Supported by Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt 
among others, this movement was convinced that bringing community members together 
would improve the capacity of the entire community to oppose corruption and fight for 
better roads, education, health care, and so on. (Farr, 2004)  
For decades, Hanifan’s writings remained largely unnoticed until Robert Putnam mentioned 
his work in his influential book Bowling Alone (2000). Because of the big interest in Put-
nam’s work (cf. infra), Hanifan’s texts are now much wider disseminated than they were 
when the author was still alive. After Hanifan a number of other scholars (Homans, 1961; 
Jacobs, 1961; Seeley, Sim, & Loosley, 1956) independently invented and applied the term 
(Woolcock, 2010). These works have however had a limited influence on the later devel-
opment of social capital, in contrast to the work of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Rob-
ert Putnam and Nan Lin that will be described beneath. 
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2.1.2 Social capital as a form of capital: Pierre Bourdieu 
Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization of social capital should be understood as a part of his 
larger intellectual work from witch a full theory of human practice can be deduced 
(Jenkins, 1992; Ritzer, 2000; Wacquant, 2006).  
Bourdieu’s work can be characterized as an attempt for agency-structure integration, or an 
attempt to overcome the opposition between objectivism (or structuralism, the school that 
interprets the action of individuals as determined by invisible larger structures of society 
existing independent of the will and consciousness of actors) and subjectivism (or con-
structivism, regarding social reality as created by the thoughts, interpretations and actions 
of actors). To transcend this opposition, Bourdieu developed a number of central concepts 
around which most of his oeuvre is build. One of those is the habitus, or the collection of 
dispositions through which an individual interprets the world and that guides his actions. 
The habitus has a dialectical relationship with the outside world. On the one hand, the 
mental structures are produced by socialization processes and can therefore be regarded 
as the internalization of social structures. On the other hand, the habitus guides the way 
people interpret the world and the way in which they act in the world. And because the 
social world is created through the practice of the people, the habitus is both a creation of 
the social world as it contributes to the creation of that world. Important is that although 
the habitus guides peoples actions and the way they interpret reality, it does not deter-
mine them: “The habitus operates as a structure, but people do not simply respond me-
chanically to it” (Ritzer, 2000, p. 535). Although Bourdieu’s calls his own work constructiv-
ist structuralism or structuralist constructivism and indicates he wants to overcome the 
opposition between them, some scholars (such as Ritzer) state his work has a clear struc-
turalist bias. 
Bourdieu’s social world is made up out of several interrelated fields. Every sphere of life, 
such as religion, academia, etc., has its own field with its own amount of autonomy, the 
most important one being the political field because it can influence the structure of the 
other ones. A field is a network of positions that are occupied by agents or institutions. 
The positions are, however, independent from their occupants and the relationships be-
tween the positions are not interpersonal relationships, but create a hierarchy: some posi-
tions are better than others2. As a consequence, in the field there is a constant struggle for 
the conquest and defense of these positions. The conduct of people can be explained by 
the struggle for the occupation of positions – and thus the struggle for capital – and by 
their habitus that co-dertermines their practice, or the actions they will engage in.  
                                                    
2 They are better in the sense that they give more access to recognition (or fame, status). For Bour-
dieu, the ultimate aspiration of people that forms the base of their behavior is “the thirst for dignity, 
which society alone can quench. For only by being granted a name, a place, a function, within a group 
or institution can the individual hope to escape the contingency, finitude, and ultimate absurdity of 
existence.” (Wacquant, 2006, p. 4) 
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It is here that the concept of capital comes up, because in order to successfully participate 
in the struggle for positions, people need to mobilize resources. There are three main 
kinds of capital that can be useful in this struggle: economic capital (money and material 
goods), cultural capital (educational certificates and familiarity with the dominant culture3)
and social capital. According to Bourdieu, the idea social capital enforced itself upon him as 
the only way to point to the social mechanism at play when “different individus obtiennent 
un rendement très inégal d’un capital (économique ou culturel) à peu près equivalent 
selon le degrée auquel ils peuvent mobiliser par procuration le capital d’un groupe” 
(Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 2). Bourdieu defines social capital as “l’ensemble des ressources 
actuelles ou potentielles qui sont liées à la possession d’un réseau durable de relations 
plus ou moins institutionnalisées d’interconnaissance et d’interreconnaissance” (Bourdieu, 
1980a, p. 2). In order to be able to access social capital, one has to have relationships. 
Those can be heavily institutionalized, such as the relationship between a professor and a 
student, or much less institutionalized, such as the relationship between two students who 
accidentally met in the classroom. If an individual can get access to the cultural or eco-
nomic capital possessed by another person with whom he has a relationship, if he can use 
that capital for his own good, and if this transaction is not a market transaction (i.e. when 
there is no contract and no immediate payment), the individual has access to social capi-
tal. Imagine a student coming from a poor rural milieu (as Bourdieu did), starting a friend-
ship with another student from a richer urban milieu. The richer friend might during their 
time at the university teach his poorer friend some of the mores, the habits and maybe 
even the language used in his parental milieu (a typical example of the cultural capital 
possessed by the richer friend). This might help the poorer friend when he does oral ex-
ams or later on, when he goes looking for a job. However, not every relationship gives 
access to capital, since there has to be “mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 
1986, p. 21). Thinking about the relationship between a professor and student, if the stu-
dent is a freshman in a group with 800 other students the professor will not really know 
him. Without this mutual acquaintance the student will not be able to get much capital out 
of the relationship4. Also, when the richer student out of our previous example only toler-
ates the poorer friend, in other words, when there is no mutual recognition of the friend-
ship, he will not give the poorer student access to his cultural capital. 
For Bourdieu, the possession of a network giving access to social capital does not come 
about spontaneously: “The existence of a network of connections is not a natural given, or 
even a social given, constituted once and for all by an initial act of institutions” (Bourdieu, 
1986, p. 22). On the contrary, such a network is the result of investment. Other forms of 
                                                    
3 See chapter 1.2.1 for an elaboration on cultural capital.  
4 Of course, in his classes the teacher will give the student access to his cultural capital. Only, this 
transaction takes place in a market context: there is a labor contract between professor and university 
and a learning agreement (that could be regarded as a kind of a consumer contract) between student 
and university. The fact that the market is here to a strong degree muzzled by the state does not make 
a difference as far as our theoretical interest is concerned. 
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capital have been put in the relationship in order to receive social capital as the return. To 
go back to our example, the poorer student will also have to invest in the relationship to 
keep it going. For instance, he might teach the richer one how to seduce the lovely rural 
girls they meet when going out, thus giving his friend access to his cultural capital. The 
continuous exchanges in a relationship establish mutual obligations that are “subjectively 
felt (feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights)” 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 22). 
The mutual investment in social relationships does not imply equality. For starters, the 
capital necessary for investment is unequally distributed in the population. Those pos-
sessing more capital have more means to invest. But the inequality in social capital goes 
further. Because the social capital an individual can access through a relationship is larger 
when the person on the other end possesses large amounts of economic and cultural capi-
tal, the well-off will be able to choose from a large amount of candidates that want to 
become their friends. “They are sought after for their social capital and, because they are 
well known, are worthy of being known (“I know him well”); they do not need to “make 
the acquaintance” of all their “acquaintances”; they are known to more people than they 
know, and their work of sociability, when it is exerted, is highly productive” (Bourdieu, 
1986, p. 23). In other words, not only do some people have more capital to invest in their 
relationships, their investments are also more productive. Our example of the rich and the 
poor students must therefore be considered, at least in Bourdieu’s philosophy, as an ex-
ception. 
The emphasis of inequality is one of the things that sets Bourdieu’s work aside from that 
of Hanifan. Social capital stands here for the access individuals have to resources through 
their ties with others. Those resources are not equally distributed over the population, 
they are not equally available for everyone in the community. On the contrary, they rein-
force existing inequalities: social capital “exerce un effet multiplicateur sur le capital 
possédé en propre” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 2). Whereas for Hanifan, social capital is about 
cooperation in a community between all its members (the rich and the poor, the well-
educated and illiterate alike), Bourdieu’s concept is clearly situated within an analysis (to 
be more exact, a critique) of inequality (Ritzer, 2000; Wacquant, 2006). 
2.1.3 Starting the conceptual stretch: James Coleman 
At about the same time Bourdieu developed his ideas, the American economist Glenn C. 
Loury (1977, 1981) makes use of the term social capital. Loury was doing research on 
racial income inequality between the black and white population of the United States. In 
his work he criticized the idea that the elimination of discriminatory practices against black 
people alone would lead to the end of the socio-economic inequality between black and 
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white. According to Loury, classical economic theories do not sufficiently take into account 
that wealth is to a large extent inheritable: it reproduces itself in consecutive generations 
because of different reasons. One of those reasons is that poor parents have less means to 
help their children get the necessary skills to be competitive in the economic world. Anoth-
er reason is that young people originating from disadvantaged environments have less 
information about opportunities on the labor market, as well as fewer and weaker relation-
ships to employers. In this context, Loury describes social capital as the differential access 
to opportunities for majority and minority groups. Opportunities that are available to peo-
ple through their relationships with their parents, siblings and others. Inequality in access 
to that kind of relationships results in further economic inequality. 
Loury didn’t develop a deep theoretic understanding of the concept of social capital, but 
his work was a source of inspiration for James Coleman (1987; 1988, 1990). Other au-
thors Coleman draws from are Nan Lin and Marc Granovetter, but he does not mention 
Pierre Bourdieu. He probably wasn’t aware of Bourdieu’s work because most of it was 
written in French. Coleman introduces the concept of social capital in his attempt to devel-
op a theoretical orientation in sociology that includes components from the two main intel-
lectual streams concerning the explanation of social action. On the one hand the idea of 
the homo sociologicus whose actions are determined by socialization, norms, rules and 
obligations, and on the other hand the one of the homo economicus, acting rationally 
towards “goals independently arrived at” (J. S. Coleman, 1988, p. S95). Both orientations 
are not satisfactory to Coleman, as the vision of the homo sociologicus creates an 
oversocialised image of reality, whereas that image is undersocialised in the tradition of 
the homo economicus. Coleman wants to analyze human behavior starting from the ra-
tional action theorem, but introducing social structures through the concept of social capi-
tal. This endeavor drives the author to define social capital in a very broad way: “Social 
capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, 
with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and 
they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the 
structure.” (J. S. Coleman, 1988, p. S98) 
The major problem concerning this definition is that it is very broad, and as a consequence 
allows for many essentially different processes to labeled social capital.  As Sophie 
Ponthieux states “without any ex ante perimeter which would at least exclude some fea-
tures of a social structure, one cannot be sure of what is an what is not social capital” 
(Ponthieux, 2004, p. 5). This creates the risk for social capital to lose all of its heuristic 
value (Ponthieux, 2003; Portes, 1998). However, Coleman further enlightens us about 
what elements of social structures he believe might constitute capital. First of all, he men-
tions credit slips “If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this 
establishes an expectation in A and an obligation in the part of B. This obligation can be 
conceived as a credit slip held by A for performance by B. If A holds a large number of 
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these credit slips, for a number of persons with whom A has relations, then the analogy to 
financial capital is direct”. However, not only the credit slips constitute the capital, also the 
trust inhibited in the relationships. To further illustrate this point, Coleman gives the ex-
ample of the Kahn El Khalili market in Cairo, where merchants pass clients onto other 
merchants creating mutual obligations. These obligations form an extensive body of social 
capital in which the merchants must invest time and effort, but which in turn secures ben-
efits for them. A second element of social structures that according to Coleman might be 
conceived of as social capital are information channels. Because information gathering is a 
costly activity, some people rely on their social relationships in order to keep themselves 
up to date. Many examples can be thought of, going from employers using their foremen 
to get information on the qualifications of their workers, to voters asking advice from a 
friend interested in politics, rather than reading political parties electoral programs. Finally, 
norms and effective sanctions to enforce them are for Coleman an important form of social 
capital. This final point can be illustrated by Coleman’s example of a family moving from 
suburban Detroit to Jerusalem (a small town in Ohio). Once installed in rural Jerusalem, 
the parents are not afraid anymore to let their children play in the neighborhood park and 
walk around town without parental supervision. According to Coleman, the difference be-
tween Detroit and Jerusalem can be described as a difference in social capital available to 
the family. 
We believe that Coleman mistakenly mixes social capital itself (access to resources trough 
others, i.e. the credit slips and information channels that would easily fit into Bourdieu’s 
framework) with the circumstances that allow for social capital transactions to take place 
(such as the trust inherent in the relationship between individuals). Also, Coleman creates 
confusion about whether social capital is an attribute of an individual or a collectivity. 
Some reviewers (e.g. Portes, 1998, 2000) state that Coleman clearly defines social capital 
as an attribute of an individual, while others (Manza, 2006; Ponthieux, 2004) believe he 
focuses on the collective nature of the concept. We believe that for Coleman social capital 
is both individual ánd collective. And that is exactly the main problem with his contribu-
tion. Because social capital can be many things at many levels, the concept start losing its 
heuristic value. 
Some might argue that Bourdieu also makes an opening towards an interpretation of social 
capital as a collective concept. As we talked about in chapter 1.1.3, Bourdieu defines social 
capital as “l’ensemble des resources actuelles ou potentielles qui sont liées à la possession 
d’un réseau durable de relations plus ou moins institutionnalisées d’interconnaissance et 
d’interreconnaissance” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 2), after which he goes on “ou, en d’autres 
termes, à l’appartenance à un groupe, comme ensemble d’agents qui ne sont pas 
seulement dotés de propriétés communes (susceptible d’être perçues par l’observateur, 
par les autres ou par eux-mêmes) mais sont ausi unis par des liaisons permanents et 
utiles” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 2). Membership of a group gives an individual the right to 
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make use of the capital that is collectively owned by the group. Constant exchange of 
resources within groups reinforces their internal solidarity, moreover, it is the main reason 
for a group to stay together. Bourdieu himself was especially concerned with selective 
social groups, such as service clubs or rich families of which the members especially make 
use of the power, influence and wealth of the other members in the fight for the occupa-
tion of the highest positions in the different fields of society. But his conceptualization can 
be applied to any group, including also trade unions or poverty self-help groups. The no-
tion of group is very present in Bourdieu’s elaboration of social capital, but the groups he 
refers to must be situated at the meso level (households, families, clubs, …) and not at the 
macro level (entire societies). Moreover, the basic focus of analysis remains on the indi-
vidual level, for it are the individual members of the groups (cf. “ensemble d’agents”) that 
possess the drawing rights on the collectively owned capital, and it are the individual 
members of the group that contribute to that collectively owned capital. Although, it is not 
in oppositions with Bourdieu’s ideas to allocate social capital at the meso level, especially 
when small cohesive groups such as households are concerned, Bourdieu’s social capital is 
not a collective concept since it cannot be attributed to the level of a society. 
Because of the broad definition, the inclusion of causes and effect of social capital as part 
of the term, and because of the obscurity about the level of analysis, the writings of Cole-
man are to a large extend responsible for the confusion about the exact meaning of social 
capital (Portes, 1998). However, for Coleman, social capital is more of a broad idea, a tool 
that can be used for theorization about social phenomena, than it is a tangible concept 
ready to use in specific research: “social capital constitutes an unanalyzed concept, it 
signals to the analyst and to the reader that something of value has been produced for 
those actors who have this resource available and that the value depends on social organi-
zation. It then becomes a second stage in the analysis to unpack the concept, to discover 
what components of social organization contribute to the value produced” (Portes, 1998, 
p. S 101). 
2.1.4 The development of the collective school: Robert Putnam 
A. Italy and Bowling Alone 
Coleman’s broad definition was picked up by Robert Putnam in his analysis of the function-
ing of Italy’s regional governments (Putnam, et al., 1993). The creation of independent 
regions in Italy in the 1970’s was used by Putnam as a kind of natural experiment to in-
vestigate what factors drive democratic governments to perform good or bad. Although 
the institutional arrangements were the same for all regional governments, some were 
almost textbook examples of well-functioning democracies, while others were faced with 
inefficiency and pork-barrel politics. According to Putnam, the explanatory factor was so-
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cial capital: “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, et al., 1993, 
p. 167). Putnam’s argument is that, when many people participate in social networks, 
generalized trust and norms of reciprocity come into being. With ‘networks’, Putnam refers 
mainly to voluntary associations such as football clubs, neighborhood organizations and 
reading societies. An environment characterized by a high level of participation in that kind 
of organizations, leads to a high level of generalized trust and adherence to norms of reci-
procity, which in turn helps people to overcome collective action problems (Stolle, 2007). 
In such a society governments do not need to build out enormous control mechanisms to 
make people pay their taxes or install speed camera’s to make them obey the speed lim-
its. Obviously, politicians elected in such a society are more inclined to develop policies 
that contribute to general well-being instead of simply their personal power and wealth. 
Moreover, because most people can be trusted to live by the rules, the implementation of 
policies will be less costly and more effective. The result is an efficient and effective gov-
ernment and therefore a well-functioning democracy.  
A few years after Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1995) published a famous article in 
The Journal of Democracy, in which he claimed that American society was plagued by a 
serious drop in social capital. In Bowling Alone, the author’s general thesis is that at the 
end of the twentieth century, the United States are confronted with a serious decline in 
membership of voluntary associations, church attendance, political participation, union 
membership, informal social connections, contribution to charity, the observance of stop 
signs, and so on. Using the image of a bowler practicing his favorite sport all by himself, 
Putnam wants to warn his fellow Americans that they are getting increasingly disconnect-
ed. Because this diseased American society needs to be cured, and because every good 
cure needs some knowledge about the causes of the illness, the author starts exploring 
the sources of this social change. First of all, the increased time Americans spent working 
outside of the family (especially because women have become active on the labor market) 
took away a part of the time available for social activities. Another part of that time has 
been taken away by a rise in commuting (caused by the process of suburbanization) and 
by the hours spent watching television. But the most important cause, according to Put-
nam, is simply generational change. The ‘civic’ generation, raised in the spirit of “belong-
ing, of pride, the need to participate, to be involved in collective things” (Ponthieux, 2004, 
p. 9) brought about by the unusual circumstances of the second world war, is getting 
replaced by more selfish generations, raised in the wealthy sixties, seventies and eighties.  
The fall in social capital, Putnam continues, might have serious consequences. This power-
ful societal resource doesn’t only support the functioning of democracy, it also makes 
people more healthy and more happy. However, in the book version of Bowling Alone
(2005), Putnam also acknowledges that there is a possible dark side to social capital. If 
people’s relationships are dominated by close ties to similar others (coming from the same 
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family, class, religious or ethnic group), social capital can decrease tolerance and increase 
intergroup hostility. Putnam call this kind of the social capital stemming from close ties 
with similar others ‘bonding’ social capital. What is needed to solve the problems bonding 
social capital can bring about, is another kind of social capital (= ‘bridging’ social capital) 
build up out of relationships crossing the frontiers of family, class, religion and race. The 
difference between bonding and bridging social capital, to a large extend based on Mark 
Granovetter’s idea of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), is the most important 
conceptual change introduced by Putnam (Ponthieux, 2003). It was further developed in E
Pluribus Unum, an article published in Scandinavian Political Studies (Putnam, 2007). 
B. Critique 
Putnam received a lot of praise for his work, also outside of the academic world: “the idea 
that ‘good government comes from singing choirs and soccer clubs’ has been shown to 
have a lot of appeal for both political reformers and political scientists” (Dekker & Uslaner, 
2001, p. 2). Of course, attention only increased when Putnam warned that those clubs and 
choirs were losing members on a massive scale, an evolution that could seriously harm 
democracy – not to mention health and happiness (Putnam, 2000). As a result, Putnam 
was even invited by former US president Bill Clinton to personally enlighten him on the 
subject (Woolcock, 2010). However, his theory also provoked a lot of criticism (Stolle, 
2007). We go into the most important problems, but the reader should know that the 
critics are not restricted to the points we mention here. 
As we have written elsewhere (Devos, 2011), one of the most fundamental problems is 
that Putnam never really formulated his theory about social capital and democracy as a 
clear causal chain. In an attempt to rewrite the theory as a series of logically sound causal 
statements, Alejandro Portes notices that Putnam’s reasoning is circular5, or for the least 
takes the form of a truism: “For every political system (city, nation, ect. …), if authorities 
and the population at large are imbued with a sense of collective responsibility and altru-
ism; then the system will be better governed and its policies will be more effective” 
(Portes, 2000, p. 4).  According to Portes, this problem is strongly interwoven with Put-
nam’s questionable definition of social capital and is at the basis caused by his analysis 
strategy. Starting with the latter, in Making Democracy Work Putnam wants to explain all
of the difference in performance between Italy’s independent regions. He first demon-
strates that economic development, education and political preference cannot account for 
all of the variation in democratic functioning he observed. The opposite would surprise us 
of course, if only for the measurement error involved in this kind of research. But because 
Putnam keeps on looking for this all-explaining factor, he ultimately ends up with a refor-
mulation of the concept of a good functioning democracy. And that reformulation is called 
                                                    
5 A critique also formulated by e.g. Boix and Posner (1998). 
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social capital: “the search for a prime determinant [of a well-functioning democracy] grad-
ually narrowed to something labeled (following Machiavelli) vertu civile (civic virtue). It is 
present in those cities whose inhabitants vote, obey the law, and cooperate with each 
other and whose leaders are honest and committed to the public good […] The theory then 
goes on to assert that civic virtue is the key factor differentiating well-governed communi-
ties from poorly governed ones. It could hardly be otherwise given the definition of the 
causal variable” (Portes, 1998, p. 20). 
As Portes also notices, these serious theoretical problems have partly be addressed by the 
attempt to measure social capital. Because the empirical researcher cannot measure his 
main explaining factor by its consequences, indicators of social capital had to be devel-
oped. As we have seen before, Putnam suggests things such as participation in voluntary 
associations, expressions of trust in surveys etc. The operational definitions of social capi-
tal allow for the formulation of non-circular, sometimes interesting and definitely testable 
hypotheses. One of those hypotheses is that membership of voluntary associations pro-
motes the trust that its members feel towards the generalized other (which in turn could 
be positive for democracy). The cause of this mechanism would be that in these associa-
tions people learn to cooperate, which in turn strengthens their trust in others (Stolle, 
2001). A lot of research has established a positive correlation between associational mem-
bership and generalized trust. However, the reason for this correlation could also be that 
more trusting people happen to be more inclined to join associations, for instance because 
they have more trust in the other members. According to Putnam, associational member-
ship and generalized trust are interwoven concepts that cannot be separated from each 
other (Putnam, 2000, p. 137; Putnam, et al., 1993, p. 177 and 180). That is however a 
serious underestimation of the capacities of the social sciences. Intelligent research de-
signs succeed in revealing a part of the puzzle. For instance, Sønderskov (2010) demon-
strated that a causal arrow could be drawn from generalized trust to membership of asso-
ciations producing collective goods (such as trade unions, …). At least a part of the corre-
lation between membership and trust can therefore be explained in terms of trust causing 
membership. 
The central thesis of Putnam’s Bowling Alone is that associational activity has been declin-
ing in the second half of the twentieth century. Although we read on the cover of the book 
that the author’s statements are founded on “vast new data”, this claim is widely chal-
lenged in the literature (Ladd, 1999; Lemann, 1996; Minkoff, 1997; Paxton, 1999; 
Schudson, 1996). Putnam states social participation is declining, but concentrates on the 
‘classical’ types, such as active membership in locally based formal associations. If Putnam 
would include these new forms of social participation into his analysis he might come to 
another conclusion, as does Ladd (1999) who claims that for every declining association a 
new one sees the light of day. However, for Putnam new styles of social participation (such 
as passive membership of Greenpeace or participation in online communities) cannot com-
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pensate for the disappearance of the classic voluntary organizations. Especially because 
they do not provide the face-to-face contact that would be necessary for building real 
social capital (for Putnam, associations such as Greenpeace only connect bank accounts, 
not persons). Other authors are convinced that the less stringent organization of social life 
associated with these new forms of civic involvement might have positive consequences as 
well. In the words of Barry Wellman: “The cost is the loss of a palpably present and visible 
local community to provide a strong identity and belonging. The gain is the increased 
diversity of opportunity, greater scope for individual agency and the freedom from a single 
group’s constrictive control” (Wellman, 2001, p. 237). If the consequences of modern 
forms of social interaction are especially positive or negative remains to be seen. But the 
important role online communities and modern forms of communication seem to play in 
the Arab Spring suggest that democracy, and the wider society in general, doesn’t neces-
sarily have to fear these new developments. Finally, it is quite interesting to notice that an 
important (but implicit) shift in Putnam’s understanding of social capital has taken place 
between the publication of Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone. In Italy, social 
capital was still regarded as a very stable characteristic of the regions. The base for the 
abundant reserve of social capital in the north and the lack of it in the south was attributed 
to historical events dating back to the fourteenth century. In the US however, this re-
markably durable characteristic had undergone a remarkable change in only one genera-
tion time (Ponthieux, 2003). 
C. The collective school 
Whereas Coleman was a bit vague about whether social capital should be situated at the 
level of the individual or of the society, for Putnam, social capital is definitely a collective 
good. If I volunteer in a neighborhood organization, I am building social capital. The fruits 
of this endeavor are, however, not restricted to myself and my fellow volunteers, as my 
lazy TV-addicted neighbor will also benefit from the flourishing democracy I have been 
working on.  The collective nature of social capital also follows from the fact that his defini-
tion of social capital is a kind of a reformulation of the concept of a well-functioning de-
mocracy.  
After the publication Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone, many other researchers 
began exploring the concept of collective social capital. An important theme within this 
research tradition, was the link between collective social capital and economic perfor-
mance. Francis Fukuyama (1995) first published on the topic in his book Trust: the Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. As did Coleman, Fukuyama criticizes economists for 
forgetting the important role that social customs and norms play in explaining human 
behavior. Classical economics (although already ‘better’ economics as compared to Marx-
ism and Keynesianism), using rational models of action, can only explain about 80 percent 
of human behavior. The other 20 percent should be explained by culture. Every nation or 
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region has its own culture. Rooted in that culture is the capacity of the people to trust 
others outside of the inner circle of family and relatives. Trust in turn creates social capital, 
i.e. the capacity of the society to from larger groups. This capacity has a direct and an 
indirect impact on economic development. Directly, social capital lowers the costs of doing 
business (costs of making detailed contracts, of taking insurance against non-payment by 
customers, etc.). Indirectly, trusting people outside of the inner family is necessary for big 
private companies to emerge, which are a prerequisite for innovation and competitiveness, 
and therefore for sustainable economic growth. Examples of very trusting countries are 
Japan, Germany and the United States (until the sixties, since then their trust has been 
declining). France, Italy and China are examples of very distrustful countries.  
Although many aspects of Fukuyama’s theory have been deeply criticized in the literature 
(e.g. Fedderke, De Kadt, & Luiz, 1999; e.g. Ponthieux, 2003), the idea about the link be-
tween social capital and economic development was picked up (and heavily promoted) by 
the Word Bank. The organization set up a special committee on social capital (of which 
Robert Putnam was a member) launched a website and published an important volume of 
literature on the subject (e.g. Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000). According to several observes, the enthusiasm for social capital displayed 
by the Bank was the combination of the critique on the Washington Consensus6 that had 
been formulated both inside and outside the organization, and the will of non-economists 
inside the Bank to draw the attention on the importance of non-economic factors for well-
being. As a consequence, in the conceptualization of the WB social capital became synon-
ymous for every non-economic thing that could be of interest for economic development. 
The result was that the meaning of social capital was further broadened to the point that 
“le capital social est dans tout, et il sert à tout” (Ponthieux, 2003, p. 60).  
However, also some interesting empirical studies have been published on the subject. In a 
comparative study of 21 countries Knack and Keefer (1997) show that the average level of 
generalized trust and agreement with norms of cooperative behavior (condemning fraud, 
being honest when having caused damage to someone else’s car, …) a countries popula-
tion showed positively influences the economic growth and investment rate of that coun-
try. The average number of associations people belong to had a negative, although insig-
nificant, effect. According to the authors, rather than being an indicator of social capital, 
the number of associations can be regarded a measure of a people’s preference for leisure 
activities. In a study by World Bank researchers Narayan and Pritchett (1999), the average 
income level of a number of Tanzanian villages is linked to a composite measure of social 
capital. The results indicated a positive, statistically significant and substantively important 
correlation between the average income and the social capital index. 
                                                    
6 The Washington Consensus is the name for the policy of the World Bank, the IMF and other organiza-
tions to urge developing countries with economic problems to cut benefits, deregulate, privatize and 
open borders for international trade (Gore, 2000). 
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The empirical results of Knack and Keefer and Narayan and Pritchett are very interesting, 
but they also illustrate one of the largest problems with this interpretation of social capital. 
As we have mentioned before, Putnam has picked up Coleman’s broad definition of social 
capital. But whereas Coleman sees the concept as a broad idea nurturing theoretical de-
bate, but in need of further analysis when applied to practical research, Putnam (as do 
many of his followers) consider the concept as a coherent entity. Critics (e.g. Bjørnskov & 
Sønderskov, 2009; Durlauf, 2002; Ponthieux, 2003, 2004; Portes, 1998, 2000; Sobel, 
2002; Uslaner, 2002) have argued that it is not a very good idea to collapse norms, net-
works and feelings of trust into one index “Non seulement la définition du capital social ne 
sépare pas ce qu’il est de ce qu’il fait, mais aussi elle crée un brouillard conceptuel en 
agglutinant indifféremment réseaux, normes, valeurs et confiance, c’est-à-dire d’un côté 
des comportements objectifs et de l’autre des perceptions et des opinions” (Ponthieux, 
2003, p. 34). Whereas the problem of the circularity in Putnam’s theory was partly solved 
in the operationalization process of empirical studies (cf. supra), the problem of the 
blurred definition is not. As the studies of Knack and Keefer and Narayan and Pritchett 
illustrate, almost every researcher creates a completely different measure for social capi-
tal. This makes comparability very difficult, obscures the search for causal mechanisms 
and therefore prevents scientific advancement.  
To sum up, the research tradition of collective social capital defines the concept as an 
attribute of a collectivity (be it a town, city or an entire nation) and focuses on the conse-
quences of dense networks and feelings of trust for those collectivities, in particular with 
regard to overcoming collective action problems (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). This school draws 
on the theoretical work of Coleman and especially Putnam, and fits in with the early writ-
ings of Hanifan (Manza, 2006). The most important problems associated with this line of 
thought are the circularity of some of the theories (Portes & Landolt, 2000) and a vague 
definition combining a number of very distinct concepts (Ponthieux, 2003). Its most im-
portant merit, Michael Woolcock (2010) claims, is that is has drawn attention to some 
‘salient features of the social and political world’ (p. 47). However, even this merit can be 
challenged. Many of the questions apparent in the literature on social capital have already 
been addressed before (Portes, 2000). The application of concept and theory of social 
capital to these research questions might as well have hampered instead of stimulated 
scientific progress (Ponthieux, 2003, 2004). 
2.1.5 Social capital as a theoretic tool for network analysis 
In his most famous article, Marc Granovetter (1973) stated that having a lot of weak ties 
(i.e. ties with acquaintances, with people one knows only superficially) can be more ad-
vantageous than having a lot of strong ties (ties with close friends and family members). 
The idea is that within the circle of close friends and relatives, people are interrelated 
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(your friends are also friends). Therefore, the information that is provided to you by differ-
ent close friends is often redundant, i.e. different friends provide you with the same infor-
mation. On the contrary, because the people to whom one is only weakly connected are 
mostly not interrelated (your acquaintances don’t know each other), every weak tie gives 
access to new and different information. As a consequence, people with a personal net-
work containing many weak ties have an advantage for such things as finding a job 
(Granovetter, 1974). 
Granovetter is one of the most important exponents of network studies. Network re-
searchers conceive of the social world as made up out of nodes (individuals, groups, or-
ganisations) and ties (connections between those individuals, groups and organisations). 
They study the characteristics of such networks and how they are related to differences in 
behavior, attitudes, opinions, ect. Unfortunately, the ideas and findings of network re-
searchers such as Granovetter remained somewhat unrelated. A lot of work was performed 
in a theoretical vacuum and the field was for a long time dominated by methodological 
questions. The only thing that was holding the field of network research together, was the 
idea that networks seemed to matter. But a general theoretical framework related to ques-
tions on why and how people form networks, why some disappear and others survive, and 
why some networks features are advantageous over others remained absent. (Flap, 1987, 
2002; Granovetter, 1979) 
A part of the solution to this problem came from giving more attention to agency in theo-
rizing about the creation and effects of social networks (Flap, 1987, 2002). Very important 
in that regard were the writings of network theorist Nan Lin. Since the early 1980’s, Lin 
has been making theoretical and empirical contributions to the field of network analysis, 
with a focus on how people use social connections for individual goal attainment (Midgley, 
2003). He developed the social resources theory (N. Lin, 1982, 1983, 1995) in which he 
states that there are two kinds of resources available to individuals: personal resources 
that are possessed by the individual himself and which he can disposed of at his own dis-
cretion, and social resources that are the property of his relatives, friends and acquaint-
ances, but which he can also make use of for individual goal attainment, e.g. because he 
can borrow them (N. Lin, 1992, 1999a). In his empirical work Lin investigated among 
other things how people use these resources for social mobility (Lai, Lin, & Leung, 1998; 
N. Lin, 1991, 1999b). Drawing on insights from his own work and that of Bourdieu7
(Bourdieu, 1980a, 1980b, 1986, 1988), Flap (Flap, 1987, 1991, 2002; Flap & De Graaf, 
1986), Burt (Burt, 1997a, 1997b, 2001), Fisher (1977, 1982), Granovetter (1973, 1974, 
1985) and many others, he published the monograph Social Capital: A Theory of Social 
                                                    
7 Lin states he independently developed the idea of social capital before reading the work of Bourdieu. 
However, Lin’s approach has a lot in common with Bourdieu’s and the conceptualization he works out in 
his monograph of 2001 is clearly influenced by his writings. 
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Structure and Action (2001b), by which he delivered the most rigorous and most profound 
elaboration of the concept that is up to now available in the literature.  
The strength of Lin’s contribution lies in two points. First of all, he wants to avoid that 
social capital becomes the “handy catch-all, for-all and cure-all sociological term” (N. Lin, 
2006, p. 604) it has become in Putnam’s collective school. Therefore, the terms’ relation-
ship to social networks and social ties should be clarified, and it should be made clear that 
social relations are not social capital per se. Also, the concept should be set apart from its 
possible causes and effects. Second, social capital should be defined as a form of capital, 
in the sense that “it shares an affinity with other forms of capital, such as human capital 
and cultural capital” (N. Lin, 2006, p. 604). That affinity lies in the fact that social capital 
as a scientific concept should help us understand why for some people individual goal 
attainment is easier than for others. 
Lin defines social capital as resources invested in social relations generating returns. His 
conceptualization therefore closely matches that of Bourdieu. Social capital as defined by 
Lin and Bourdieu is clearly demarcated and theoretically well developed. As such it stands 
in sharp contrast to the rather messy concept offered by Putnam and the collective school. 
Because it immediately refers to goal attainment, it provides us with an interesting tool to 
examine whether living on the countryside versus in the city has consequences for the life 
chances of individuals.  
2.1.6 Summary 
In the course of history, two main visions on the meaning of the concept social capital
have arisen in the scientific literature. One of those visions defines social capital as being 
made up out of attitudes (trust), behavior (reciprocity) as well as structures (networks, 
groups). All these elements have in common that they produce positive outcomes for soci-
ety because they help overcome collective action problems. It was especially Robert Put-
nam that popularized this definition, building further on the work of James Coleman and 
Lyda Judson Hanifan.  
The other vision has defined social capital as resources invested in social relations aimed 
at generating a return. Pierre Bourdieu and Nan Lin are the most important contributors to 
this line of thought.  
The most essential difference between both approaches is the function social capital has in 
society. Putnamian social capital is a collective good that can be consumed by everyone on 
equal grounds. Social capital can therefore never been possessed by an individual, but by 
a large group, preferably an entire society. That is the reason we have called Putnam and 
his followers the collective school. On the contrary, the social capital of Bourdieu and Lin is 
28
a private good. It is possessed by individuals and small groups (such as households, may-
be even extended families), but never by an entire society. The amount of social capital 
one can mobilize determines one’s life chances. As such, social capital is a source of ine-
quality within a society – whereas Putnamian social capital can only be a source of ine-
quality between societies. We could call the concept of Bourdieu and Lin the individual 
school, although this kind of social capital can also be possessed by small groups. 
The biggest problem of the collective concept is that is mingles very different elements of 
society that should preferably be analyzed separately. On the contrary, ‘individual’ social 
capital is very well defined and situated within a broader theory of inequality. As a conse-
quence, we believe this concept is the most suitable for investigating rural-urban differ-
ences, and it is this conceptualization that will be used in the remainder of the disserta-
tion. 
The main ideas associated with this conceptualization of social capital have already briefly 
been introduced in this developmental history. In the next chapter we will bring these 
ideas together in a detailed picture of what we mean when we use the words social capital.
This in-depth exploration is to a large extend based on the ideas of Nan Lin (1999a). 
2.2 AN IN-DEPTH EXPLORATION 
In the following pages we start with shedding some light on the general idea of capital 
itself. This first chapter aims at introducing the main ideas of capital theory and illustrating 
how social capital theory is related to economic, human and cultural capital. Important for 
this chapter is the fact that capital is both concept and theory. As a concept it defines 
which aspects of reality should be considered capital or not, as a theory it is a system of 
ideas and hypotheses about the way capital is produced and accumulated. In chapter 1.2.2 
we describe the theory of social capital, go deeper into the question what distinguishes 
social capital transactions from non-social capital transactions, and discuss how the theo-
retical definition of social capital can be made operational.  
2.2.1 Capital 
A. Classic capital theory. 
The first systematic treatment of the notion of capital was written by Karl Marx (1912). For 
Marx, capital is created during the production of and trade in commodities. The commodity 
is in essence produced by the laborer, using the means of production owned by the capi-
talist. The fusion of labor and means of production results in the creation of merchandise, 
29
which is sold by the capitalist on the consumption market. For the merchandise, the capi-
talist receives the utility value. However, the laborer receives from the capitalist only the 
socially necessary value, i.e. the value of food and shelter, necessary for the worker to 
survive so he can come back and work again. The difference between the utility value and 
the socially necessary value is the added value or profit. Part of the added value is used 
for food, shelter and luxury for the capitalist, another part is used for the maintenance of 
the means of production (raw materials and what we would now call depreciation of ma-
chines, buildings, etc.). What remains is reinvested in the production process by buying 
additional means of production with the aim of realizing more profit. “Deze drijfveer van 
het verrijken als zoodanig, deze hartstochtelijke jacht naar waarde heeft de kapitalist met 
den schatvergaarder gemeen, maar, terwijl de schatvergaarder slechts de dwaze kapitalist 
is, is de kapitalist de verstandige schatvergaarder. De rusteloze vermeerdering der 
waarde, welke de schatvergaarder nastreeft door het geld voor de cirkulatie te redden, 
bereikt de wijzere kapitalist door het geld steeds opnieuw aan de cirkulatie prijs te geven”8
(Marx, 1912, p. 138). As such, the capitalist accumulates capital, which is defined as the 
money and commodities invested in this process of production and trade. Because the 
value of a commodity is determined by the average human labor that was necessary for its 
production, and because money is the representation of the value of different commodi-
ties, capital can be regarded as the accumulation of labor (Bourdieu, 1986). In short, for 
Marx capital is the accumulation of labor which, in the form of commodity or money is 
invested in the production process. 
As a concept, capital means valuable goods and money invested in the production process 
of commodities in order to realize a return. Marx’ vision on production and accumulation is 
described in the previous paragraph. The return that is mentioned in the definition of capi-
tal, is of course not guaranteed. A particular capitalist in a particular case can obtain an 
exchange value that is lower than the socially necessary value plus the cost of mainte-
nance of investments, so he realizes a loss. Capitalists that make losses to often will lose 
control over the means of production and join the proletariat. In the long run, this process 
leads to a polarization of society and eventually to a revolution. After all, the rewards the 
workers receive for their labor only allow them to survive, but not to invest in the produc-
tion process themselves. Workers can never possess labor, so upward mobility in the 
Marxian scheme is impossible. 
                                                    
8 This motive to enrichment as such, this passionate quest of value is typical for both the capitalist and 
the hoarder, but, while the hoarder is only the foolish capitalist, the capitalist is the clever hoarder. The 
restless increase in value, which the hoarder seeks after by withdrawing his money from the circulation, 
is achieved by the capitalist by committing it to that circulation. (own translation) 
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B. Human capital theory 
The core of the human capital theory (G. S. Becker, 1964; Johnson, 1960; Schultz, 1961) 
is that the knowledge and skills of workers (or more generally: employers) also have to be 
regarded as a form of capital. This human capital represents an investment by the worker 
in education, training, work experience, etc. The skills and knowledge of the workers yield 
a return for the capitalist because it increases the productivity of labor. However, it also 
represents a return for the worker because it makes it possible for him to sell his labor at 
a higher price. In addition to the socially necessary value, the laborer is now paid a part of 
the added value. Through a higher wage, the worker realizes a return on the investment 
he made and thus has become a capitalist himself. (N. Lin, 2001b)  
As is apparent from the previous paragraph, the conceptualization of human capital is not 
at odds with Marx general idea of capital. There is an investment aimed at yielding a re-
turn. The domain is somewhat broadened, because not only goods and money can be 
invested, but also intangible assets (skills, experience and knowledge) are attributed a 
place in the process of production and trade in commodities. Capital can now more gener-
ally be defined as the investment of resources with the intention of yielding a profit. 
Although the definition of capital remains the same, the theory concerning production and 
accumulation of capital contradicts two core issues of the Marxian scheme. First of all, 
there is a completely different vision on social structure. For Marx, mobility from the prole-
tarian class to the bourgeoisie is impossible because wages do not exceed the necessary 
costs for subsistence, and therefore never allow workers to initiate the capitalization pro-
cess. In the human capital theory however, workers can accumulate capital in two ways. 
First, they can accumulate human capital by getting educated, by getting experienced, etc. 
Second, because workers are attributed a part of the added value, their wage exceeds the 
expenditures for survival, and they can use that value as capital (i.e. they can invest it). 
Without assuming equality, the human capital theory allows for social mobility, and there-
fore contradicts the static two-class social structure of classic Marxism. 
Not only does the idea of the configuration of social structure differ, there is also a differ-
ent view of how structure influences individual behavior. In Marx’ analysis, human action is 
completely determined by the question whether one belongs to the bourgeoisie or the 
proletariat. Workers are seen as a large pool of interchangeable competitive laborers who 
have no choice but to go working for the capitalists in order to survive. Eventually, the 
social structure will induce them to revolt and take over the state, giving birth to a new 
social order. In other words, their actions are completely determined by social structure 
and an understanding of society rests completely on an understanding of macro-level 
processes. Inherent to human capital theory is the notion of free will: “human capital en-
tails purposive actions in the labors’ self-interest, the simple investment-return calculus is 
now applied to the laborers themselves” (N. Lin, 2001a, p. 11). Attention shifts from the 
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macro relationships of exploitation between the possessing class and the working class, to 
the micro relationship of collaboration between a worker and an employer. When analyzing 
low wages Marxist think about the surplus value that is completely appropriated by the 
capitalists. Human capital theorists will think about the lack of skills and knowledge of the 
employers. 
C. Cultural capital theory 
The cultural capital theory was originally formulated in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and 
Jean-Claude Passeron (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970, 1971; Bourdieu, Passeron, & Eliard, 
1964; Bourdieu, Passeron, & Saint Martin, 1965) and was later taken up by a large num-
ber of different scholars. Central to the cultural capital theory is that the dominant and 
dominated classes in society have, to a certain extent, a different culture, defined as a 
system of symbols and shared meaning (N. Lin, 2001b). This difference expresses itself in 
divergent tastes for music, movies and food, other clothing styles and a particular lan-
guage. Knowledge of the culture of the dominant class plays an important role in the 
struggle for the occupation of high positions in the different fields of society (cf. chapter 
1.1.2). 
The system of formal education is a very important institution in this process. In textbooks 
and in the classroom the language and symbols of the dominant culture are used to get 
the material across. This gives a great advantage to the children of the privileged classes, 
because they will understand better what teachers are talking and writing about. In addi-
tion, teachers are suspected to have a preference for children that demonstrate to have 
knowledge of and to participate in the dominant culture. Being able to express these “high 
status cultural signals” (Lamont & Lareau, 1988, p. 156) also results in advantages in later 
life, for instance when applying for a job, closing a lucrative business deal or wanting to 
join an interesting service club. 
Knowledge of the symbols, language, mores and values of the higher class is in Bourdieu’s 
conception of the social world an indispensable resource. Higher class parents invest a lot 
of time, effort and money to impart cultural knowledge to their offspring. The return on 
their investment is the advantage their children enjoy in education (and in later life). Chil-
dren of the dominated classes can also acquire this cultural capital, however they will have 
to work a lot harder for it. As a consequence, educational credentials are easier to acquire 
by elite children. Through these cultural capital processes the educational system is very 
important in the reproduction of existing inequalities. In addition, because educational 
achievement is generally conceived of as an individual’s own merit, the educational system 
does not only reproduce existing inequalities, it also legitimizes them. 
Here Bourdieu identifies another investment process. The dominant class invests in peda-
gogic action, especially through formal education of its own children ánd those of the dom-
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inated classes. In this way, the dominant class imposes its own culture and values on the 
rest of society with the intention of justifying, and therefore strengthening, its position. 
Members of the dominated classes internalize the aggregate of meanings of the dominant 
class (in Bourdieu’s terminology it becomes a part of their habitus). A higher degree of 
knowledge about and acceptance of the dominant culture, will allow an individual member 
of the dominated class to sell his labor at a higher price, enlarging in that way the share of 
the surplus value he can obtain for himself. In this way there is a double investment pro-
cess. The dominant class invests in pedagogical action, getting the objectification of its 
own culture as a valuable return. Members of the dominated class invest in the internaliza-
tion of the dominant culture, getting access to a share of the surplus value in return. 
Cultural and human capital theory are both concerned with education and training, but 
look at it from a completely different angle. For human capital theory, education results in 
the acquirement of skills and knowledge, making labor more productive and therefore 
allowing the laborer to demand a higher wage. Cultural capital theory believes that it is 
knowledge about the dominant culture that makes the difference in the struggle for ob-
taining an advantageous position in society. The big difference between both views is that 
the knowledge of the dominant culture does not make labor more productive. Cultural 
capital resources are about knowing how to taste good wine or using a specific vocabulary. 
The resources only serve to pass by the gatekeepers, not to produce more or better com-
modities9. (Kingston, 2001; Sullivan, 2001) 
As mentioned above, one of the big differences between the classical capital theory and 
the human and cultural capital theories, is that for the latter the possession of capital is 
not restricted to the dominant class. This does not mean that the human and cultural capi-
tal theories deny the existence of social inequality, but they reject a black-and-white vi-
sion. Whereas the classical theory only focuses on structure in order to explain inequality, 
the human and cultural capital theories bring agency into the center of the analysis. In 
turn, the difference between cultural and human capital theory is that human capital theo-
ry tends to give a higher weight to agency, whereas cultural capital theory stills emphasiz-
es structural effects. (N. Lin, 2001b)  
This divergent view on the accumulation of capital originates in the divergent definition of 
the domain of capital. For Marx only money and commodities can be regarded as capital, 
whereas the human capital theory broadened the domain to non-tangible assets such as 
skills and knowledge. Nevertheless, the core of the definition of capital remains the same: 
capital consists of invested resources. (N. Lin, 2001b) 
                                                    
9 We must mention, however, that some authors also consider productive skills to be cultural capital 
resources (e.g. Leopold & Shavit, 2011). However, we believe that this goes against the central claim of 
cultural capital theory that the knowledge of dominant culture has a gatekeeper-function. If this claim is 
abandoned, cultural capital theory cannot be distinguished from human capital theory. 
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2.2.2 Social capital 
A. Production and accumulation 
So what is investment all about? Investing means putting valuable goods at the disposal of 
others in order to realize a profit. When a person buys a house with the intention of letting 
it out, he puts the house at the disposal of another person, who in return will pay the 
owner a rent. The aim of the investor is that the rent will be higher than the costs of 
maintenance for the house so a profit will be realized. Investing in a company follows the 
same logic: the means of production of a company are used to produce commodities for 
other persons than the owners of the company. The means of production are, so to speak, 
put at the disposal of the consumers. The aim of the investor is that the price he will get 
for the commodities produced will be higher than the depreciation of the investments (plus 
the additional costs for labor and raw materials). If one invests in education, one invests 
time, effort and money in accumulating skills and knowledge. Later on these will be put at 
the disposal of the employer. The aim of the student is that the return, e.g. in the form of 
a higher wage, will be worth more than the time, money and skills invested. 
The first and second example are examples of economic capital. The third example is 
about human capital. The central idea of social capital is that one can also invest in social 
relationships. For instance, imagine you help a friend to find a job by informing him about 
a vacancy or by recommending him for a certain position. This action can be regarded as 
the investment of time, effort and influence in the relationship with your friend. In other 
words, you have put time, effort and influence at the disposal of that friend. An example of 
the return you (might) get, is that one day, your friend will help you close an interesting 
business deal with his employer. The added value that is realized is that the return you get 
will be worth more to you than the effort you have invested in the relationship. 
The return on social capital investment materializes in a number of different ways (N. Lin, 
2001b). One example is information. Knowing people who can inform you about interest-
ing vacancies can help you get a good job. Knowing someone in the real estate business 
might help you find a good house. Talking to someone who knows a lot about the view-
points of the different political parties might save the effort of going through electoral 
programs yourself. Coleman (1988) also mentions information as a form of social capital. 
However, he makes a clear distinction between information channels and credit slips. Be-
cause we define social capital as investment in social relations, every return should be 
regarded as a credit slip, including information. When illustrating why information channels 
are a form of social capital, Coleman gives the example of a social scientist that can make 
use of every-day interactions with his colleagues to keep up to date about related fields of 
research without having to read all of the work published on the different subjects (J. S. 
Coleman, 1988, p. S104). Coleman’s example might actually be used to illustrate how 
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giving information creates a drawing right for the supplier vis-à-vis the receiver, and 
therefore can be regarded as the creation of a credit slip as well. After all, if the social 
scientist continues making an appeal on the knowledge of his colleagues without informing 
them about the research field he is a specialist in himself, the information flow towards the 
social scientist might rapidly run dry. 
Next to information, social ties can also give access to influence or power. Through certain 
political contacts getting a construction permit can become much easier. The odds for 
getting hold of an import contract with a multinational might be seriously improved if the 
CEO is also a member of your service club.  
Thirdly, social capital returns materialize as social prestige: connections with high-status 
others can improve the own standing in a community. And finally, ties to others provide us 
with emotional (a shoulder to cry on, …) and instrumental support (a van to lend, a help-
ing hand for moving furniture, … ) (P. P. Verhaeghe & Van de Putte, 2010). 
Just as was the case for the other capital theories we discussed, the social capital theory is 
embedded in a specific vision on structure and agency. Lin paints a neo-Weberian10 picture 
of social stratification, very similar to the one of Bourdieu we discussed in chapter 1.1.2. 
At the base of its vision is the notion of resources, both material and symbolic, which are 
attributed value through the economic process of demand and supply. Some resources are 
valued more universally (e.g. gold, energy, …), while others only have value under specific 
circumstances, in specific eras or specific places (e.g. the paintings of Van Gogh that were 
only worth money after his death). Value is therefore not only determined by scarcity, but 
also by socio-cultural processes. The social structure itself is made up out of a set of posi-
tions that can be ordered hierarchically based on the control of access to the resources 
associated with them. Because there are different dimensions of resources (wealth, power, 
reputation), the structure is complex and has to be thought of as a series of interrelated 
networks (cf. Bourdieu’s semi-independent fields). In the structure there are rules and 
procedures determining what is the appropriate way of using the resources linked to the 
different positions. However, the agents occupying the positions have a relative freedom in 
the interpretation of these rules and procedures. Through these different interpretations 
actors reshape the social structure. When an actor leaves a position, he loses the control 
over the resources linked to that position. However, the structure remains stable as long 
as the resources linked to a position remain unchanged. 
                                                    
10 It is neo-Weberian in the sense that it departs from the idea that social hierarchy is based on differ-
ential access to the resources necessary for individual goal attainment, that the hierarchy is much more 
complex and diversified as compared to the Marxian view (it is a network of positions instead of a two-
class structure) and that next to economic resources (wealth), also political (power) and social (reputa-
tion) resources are taken in to account. (Breen, 2005)  
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Resources do not only shape the structure of society, they are also the driving force of 
individual agency. People pursue resources because they need them to promote and main-
tain an individual’s self-interest for survival and preservation (Lai, et al., 1998).  
Structure and action jointly determine the production and accumulation of social capital. A 
first prerequisite for that accumulation is the formation of ties between ego and some 
alters. Ego’s and alters are embedded in an opportunity structure, i.e. “physical and or-
ganizational requirements for network formation” (Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005). We 
are talking about such things as the kind of job people have, whether or not people are 
member of some type of voluntary organization, whether they live on the countryside or in 
the city, etc. The opportunity structure determines to a large extent who we meet. For 
instance, a farmer will meet other and different people as compared to a salesman. Alt-
hough the opportunity structure is first and foremost a structural phenomenon, it is open 
to influence by individual agency. Being born on the countryside is out of ego’s individual 
control, but through individual agency he can change his opportunity structure by moving 
to a more urban environment.  
Of course, we do not form relationships with everyone we encounter. It is argued that 
interaction between agents (a necessary condition for the establishment of a relationship) 
takes place more often between people that have similar tastes and lifestyles (Homans, 
1950).  Because lifestyles and access to resources tend to be highly correlated, egos pos-
sessing more resources will be tied to alters also possessing more resources. In other 
words, people in general have a preference to start relationships with others who are simi-
lar to them – as well socially, culturally as economically, a phenomenon which is called 
homophily. Therefore, they do not only possess more resources to invest in social relation-
ships, but their investments will also, in general, yield greater returns.  
Research has shown that people in general are inclined to prefer others with slightly higher 
statuses as network partners (Laumann, 1966), because such a tie gives access to more 
and better resources. Most people don’t prefer to invest in relationships with others that 
have much higher statuses, because they believe (or have experienced) that those people 
are much less accessible. In other words, the odds that the investment will be in vain are 
too high.  
While it is clear what drives people with lower statuses to want to interact with others with 
higher statuses, it is unclear why those with higher statuses would want to form relation-
ships with those with lower statuses. Moreover, it is obvious that if everyone would have a 
preference for others with higher statuses and if everyone would keep to that preference, 
no networks would be formed. Following Blau (1964), Lin argues that “when an actor 
(ego) is unwilling or unable to reciprocate transactions of equal value in an exchange with 
another actor (alter), one choice available to ego to maintain the relationship with the 
36
alter is to subordinate or comply with the alter’s wishes – the emergence of a power rela-
tionship” (N. Lin, 2001b, p. 145). 
Not all of ego’s ties are formed by himself. The first alters people are generally connected 
to are parents, brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, etc. These relationships with kin are 
as it were inherited, and can be called ascribed ties. They are contrasted with achieved
ties that are formed by ego himself. Ascribed ties do not only connect ego with his rela-
tives, also non-kin relationships of the parents can be inherited by ego. Therefore, access 
to social capital, like access to economic and cultural capital, can be inherited or acquired 
through investment. Inheritance is of course completely determined by social structure, 
and although investment is a purposive action, it also is to a certain extent determined by 
structure. After all, one needs resources to invest, and those born out of parents higher in 
the social hierarchy have more resources available.  
It is clear that ascribed ties are to a large extend out of ego’s control, whereas that per-
sonal control is much larger as far as achieved ties are concerned. However, a black and 
white vision on the subject should be avoided. Whether or not ascribed relationships will 
continue in the future is to a certain extend influenced by ego’s behavior. For instance, 
some people have a lot of contact with their brothers and sisters and very frequently en-
gage in exchanging resources between them while for others brothers and sisters are not 
located in the core of their personal network. On the other hand, what kind of achieved 
ties ego will have is also to a large extend influenced by structural processes. The principle 
of homophily (cf. supra) already predicts that people will form relationships with others 
that are more or less at the same spot on the social ladder. Moreover, building up and 
maintaining relationships with others demands the investment of a lot of individual re-
sources. Those people possessing more resources (in terms of more wealth and education) 
are therefore typically those possessing more ties to others (Fischer, 1982). 
B. The specificity of social capital 
Central to the functioning of social capital as an investment process is the idea of reci-
procity, i.e. the idea that it is “unacceptable to receive or take from others without offering 
something in return” (Van Der Gaag, 2005, p. 4). There is always a risk of course, but 
actors who provide access to their resources to other actors will only do so when they can 
be fairly certain that the favor will someday be returned. Helping someone creates a kind 
of a credit slip: the actor that has provided access to his resources is given the right for 
compensation at a later point in time. 
As a consequence, it should be clear to the reader that social capital transactions are not 
characterized by an imbalanced exchange. Analogous to transactions of human and eco-
nomic capital, both parties are expected to contribute more or less equally to the deal.  
But how can we than distinguish social capital transactions from non-social capital transac-
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tions? Whereas the difference between economic and human or cultural capital is about 
the domain of the concepts (money and commodities versus skills and knowledge), the 
specificity of social capital transactions concerns the delayed exchange (Van Der Gaag, 
2005). When there are transactions concerning human and economic capital, exchanges 
are made (almost) immediately. If you buy meat at the butcher shop, you pay before 
leaving. If you work for an employer, you are paid at the end of the month. But when 
social capital transactions take place, the return is delayed. If I help a friend renovating 
his house I give him access to my resources (time, effort, skills). However, it is unclear 
when he will return the favor and under what form. He might bring me to the airport 
someday, give me legal advice, etc.  
But what if my renovating friend goes out with me the night after I have been helping him, 
and he buys me some drinks as an acknowledgement for my help? Now there is a return 
that is not delayed, so can we still speak about a social capital transaction? The central 
point is that social capital transactions don’t function in normal market circumstances. As 
long as the payment that is received is symbolic (because it is much lower than what the 
market price would be), the transaction can be considered a social capital transaction. The 
value of the few beers is much lower than what a construction worker would have charged, 
so the help I’ve given to my friend is not completely compensated by it. My help still cre-
ates a credit slip on his behalf. Once I will need a helping hand, the principle of reciprocity 
will force my friend to help me back. Delayed exchange and absence of commodification 
are characteristic for social capital transactions. 
Recognizing social capital becomes even more complicated when the exchange process is 
in fact a mixture of a social and economic capital transaction. Imagine ego11 knows some-
one (we call him alter) working in a pharmacy who can get you baby food at wholesalers’ 
prices. In this example there is a economic transaction between ego and the wholesaler, in 
which ego pays the wholesaler the market(wholesale)price for baby food. On the other 
hand, there is a social capital transaction between alter and ego, whereby alter’s work as 
the middleman, is not paid for, but opens a credit slip in respect of ego. 
The very principle of credit slips actually poses an important restraint on the employment 
of social capital in daily goal attainment. Demanding help creates a debt, and most people 
don’t like having debts. Of course, when the resources that are invested by the supplying 
actor are limited (for instance because he only gave access to information he possessed 
anyway, so the cost made is very small), the debt created is also limited and the probabil-
ity that the transaction will take place increases. Also, when alters have very supplemen-
tary resources they can generate a habit of exchange. The debt will be less of a burden 
because both parties know there will be reciprocity in the near future. Finally, an important 
                                                    
11 In the social capital and social networks literature the focal actor is often called ego. Other actors in 
ego’s network are the alters. Ego is connected to the alters through ties. Networks considered from the 
perspective of one focal actor are called ego-centered networks.
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facilitator of social capital transactions is expected time the relationship will be continued 
in the future (often referred to as shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984)). How longer the 
relationship is supposed to last, how greater the odds that there will be a moment of recip-
rocation. This is one of the reasons that many social capital transactions take place in the 
context of kin relationships. 
C. Towards an operational definition 
In the previous pages we tried to make clear that social capital means “resources invested 
in social relations aimed at realizing a return” (N. Lin, 2001a, p. 19). We remember the 
reader that the fundamental goal of this dissertation is to ascertain whether or not living in 
an urban or rural environment prevents constraints and opportunities for accumulating 
access to social capital. If we want to carry out this kind of empirical research, we must 
find a way to measure individual social capital. We must find a valid way to determine how 
much social capital A and B possess respectively, so we can judge whether A has more or 
less than B. 
In order to determine how much economic capital is owned by a family, firm or govern-
ment, we look at the different capital assets they possess (Diewert & Schreyer, 2008). 
Image a construction firm A possessing two trucks as it’s only capital goods, and firm B 
possessing four (equivalent) trucks. Determining how much capital the respective firms 
possess basically comes down to counting. Based on that count, we can now say that firm 
B possesses twice as much capital as does firm A. When firm A also possesses a crane, 
determining whether A has more or less capital as compared to B becomes more compli-
cated. We are now looking for a way to determine the relative value of a truck and a 
crane. We must find a way to value how much trucks a crane is worth, or how much 
cranes a truck is worth. In other words, we are looking for a common unit of measurement 
that will allow us to objectively determine the size of a firm’s stock of social capital. In 
economic theory, “this can be done by multiplying the prices of the various underlying 
capital goods times their respective quantities” (R. A. Becker, 2008, p. 671). Through the 
functioning of a market process, these prices (it is assumed) represent the value of the 
returns the investment is expected to generate. If the construction firm out of our earlier 
example invests in a crane, the crane represents the (economic) capital it possesses. If 
the crane speeds up the construction work so fast that the wages saved are higher than 
the depreciation of the crane, a profit is realized. The value of the crane is eventually de-
termined by its capacity to generate this kind of returns.  
As we have mentioned before, it are the ties that connect ego to alters possessing re-
sources (and willing to give ego access to those resources) that constitute social capital 
goods. The question here is how to determine the value of those capital goods. As the 
analogy with economic capital has shown, counting the ties of ego to alters would be a 
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poor approximation of his social capital if we do not determine the value of these ties. 
Also, the resources invested in the relationships are a poor approximation of the value of 
my social capital. For instance, when I buy an airplane ticket to go to a conference in order 
to meet people that can help me to get the results of my dissertation research published, I 
am investing in my social capital. The airplane ticket represents my investment. If I get 
help for publication, I get a return. The value of my investment is determined by the help I 
get, not by the cost of the ticket. Imagine nobody wants to help me, then my investment 
has no value. Or imagine another scholar coming to the same conference, but with a more 
expensive airline. He will have invested more resources than I did, but if we get the same 
kind of help at the conference our investment will be worth the same.  
The returns from the investment in social capital are called social resources. In general 
resources are “valued goods in a society, the possession of which maintains and promotes 
an individual’s self-interest for survival and preservation” (Lai, et al., 1998, p. 160). In 
other words, every asset with a utility value is a resource. As we have mentioned before, 
Lin makes a distinction between personal resources, possessed by the focal individual 
himself (called ego in network jargon) and social resources, possessed by the members of 
ego’s network (called the alters). Of course, resources possessed by the alters are only 
ego’s social resources when the alters are prepared to give ego access to them. The value 
of the social capital investments somebody has made (or has inherited), must be deter-
mined by its capacity to provide access to social resources. Therefore, social capital should 
be made operational as “a sum of resources, actual (i.e. mobilized) or virtual (e.g. per-
ceived or accessed), embedded in enduring networks” (N. Lin, 2006, p. 605).  
The operational definition introduces the difference between accessed and mobilized social 
capital. When we talk about mobilized social capital, we are talking about the effective use 
of social resources. Accessed social capital is about the potential use of social resources. 
Imagine two people, one employed, the other unemployed. The employed person can have 
access to a lot of information about vacancies and a lot of influence on potential employers 
through his social networks. However, if that person is pleased with his job and doesn’t get 
fired, he might never actually mobilize this potential social capital he has access to. On the 
other hand, the unemployed person might have very limited access to information and 
influence about jobs, but still mobilize the full social capital he has access to. When inves-
tigating social capital, both access and mobilization must be considered (Hurlbert, Beggs, 
& Haines, 2001). If we would only look at mobilized social capital, we would decide that 
the unemployed person has more social capital compared to the employed person, if we 
would only look at accessed social capital we would conclude the opposite. The full picture 
is, however, more complicated. 
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2.3 SUMMARY 
In this first chapter we introduced the concept of social capital. We sketched a brief history 
of its development with special attention for the inception of collective and individual 
schools. We argued that the individual school, which defines social capital as resources 
invested in social relationships, provides us with a concept that is theoretically well devel-
oped and can offer us a veritable insight in how the rural versus urban character of an 
individual’s living environment influences his opportunities for individual goal attainment. 
Figure 1 represents a graphical summary of the idea of social capital as resources invested 
in social relations as we have specified in the preceding pages. 
As is the case with economic social capital, the value of a stock of social capital should be 
determined by its capacity to generate future returns. Social capital should therefore be 
made operational as the sum of social resources an individual can mobilize. Both potential 
access to these resources and actual use should be considered. We will elaborate further 
on the measurement issue in the next chapter. 
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Figure 1: Investment, accumulation and mobilization of social capital 
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Chapter 3
Measuring individual social capital 
3.1 THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTING SOCIAL CAPITAL12
3.1.1 From a theoretical to a mathematical definition 
In chapter two we have extensively introduced the concept of social capital. We have 
made clear that for us social capital means resources invested in social relations by actors 
that want to generate a return. Measuring social capital means determining the value of 
the stock of social capital goods possessed by an individual. That value is in turn deter-
mined by the capacity of the stock to generate returns. Therefore, as we argued before, 
social capital should be made operational as “a sum of resources, actual (i.e. mobilized) or 
virtual (e.g. perceived or accessed), embedded in enduring networks” (N. Lin, 2006, p. 
605). 
A mathematical definition of social capital, directly derived from this operational definition 
could have the following form: 
ܵܥ௘ ൌ ෍෍ݒ௜௝ כ ݌௜௝
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 3.1.1—1 
In which ܵܥ௘ stands for ego’s social capital, ݒ௜௝ for the value of social resource ݅ available 
through alter ݆ and ݌௜௝ for the probability that alter ݆ wil put resource ݅ at the disposition of 
ego. In words, this formula tells us to sum up over all alters the value of all resources 
multiplied by the probability the resource will be made available. 
3.1.2 From volume to diversity 
However, this formula supposes that the aggregation of different units of the same re-
sources over different alters is additive, an assumption that is rather questionable. Often, 
having one unit of a certain resource available is enough to attain a certain goal. For in-
stance, imagine ego wants to move a piece of furniture, but has no transportation availa-
                                                    
12 Our ideas about the principals of counting social capital are to a large extent based on the disserta-
tion of Martin van der Gaag (Van Der Gaag, 2005). The formulas shown under this heading are based 
on the same publication. 
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ble. It will be sufficient for ego to lent one van from a friend to move the piece of furni-
ture. Being able to dispose of several vans does not really add to his possibilities for indi-
vidual goal attainment, and therefore does not represent a greater value of his total collec-
tion of social capital. In certain other cases, being able to consume multiple units of a 
certain resource has an added value. Imagine ego is going to live in another house and 
has to move all of his stuff. If he can dispose of two vans, the work of moving might speed 
up seriously and therefore the second van can also be of worth to him. However, it is clear 
that the value of the additional van is much lower as compared to the first one. In other 
words, the law of diminishing marginal utility definitely applies to this example. Taking all 
of this under consideration, it might be a better idea to take different kinds of help (or 
kinds of resources) as a starting point instead of individual resources possessed by differ-
ent alters. This new starting point leads us to the following definition: 
ܵܥ௘ ൌ෍ ௝ܾ כ ݏ௝
௠
௝ୀଵ
 3.1.2—1 
In which ௝ܾ represents the value of resource ݆ and ݏ௝ represents the probability that any 
alter ݅ will put the help ݆ at the disposal of ego. Formula 3.1.2—1 is only valid if ௝ܾ is inde-
pendent of alter ݅, i.e. if it doesn’t matter for ego who puts the resources at his disposal. 
We assume here that this is the case13. If the probabilities for all alters to put resource ݆ at 
the disposal of ego (݌௜௝ from formula 3.1.1—1) are stochastically independent, ݏ௝  can be 
calculated as follows: 
ݏ௝ ൌ ͳ െෑሺͳ െ ݌௜௝ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 3.1.2—2 
To continue our previous example, imagine ego knows three alters possessing a van. Alter 
1 uses his van for his work and therefore can only let ego use it on Sundays, so ݌௜ଵ ൌ ͲǤͳͶ.
Alter B hardly ever uses his van, ݌௜ଶ ൌ ͲǤͻͷ. Alter C doesn’t really like ego, so ݌௜ଷ ൌ ͲǤͲͷ. The 
probability that ego will be able to dispose of a van in a certain moment of need can be 
calculated as follows: 
ݏ௝ ൌ ͳ െ ሺͲǤͺ͸ כ ͲǤͲͷ כ ͲǤͲͻͷሻ 3.1.2—3 
ݏ௝ ൌ ͳ െ ሺͲǤͲͲͶሻ 3.1.2—4 
                                                    
13 A few realistic situations that lead to a violation of this assumption can be imagined. For instance 
when alter has a high social status and the exchange of resources with this alter adds to the social 
status of ego. In another situation, ego might have a special liking for a specific alter so exchange with 
this specific alter gives him an extra pleasure (e.g. in a romantic situation). However, we could also 
argue that through the exchange with the alter ego accesses two resources: the specific resource that 
is exchanged plus status in the first situation and the specific resource plus caring in the second situa-
tion. Therefore, one could argue that in such a case one should simply count two resources. If we take 
the later position we can say that the assumption is not violated. 
44
ݏ௝ ൌ ͲǤͻͻ͸ 3.1.2—5 
Although in theory formula 3.1.2—1 provides us with a very solid base for the creation of a 
measurement instrument, we still have some important problems. First of all, as calcula-
tions 3.1.2—3 until 3.1.2—5 illustrate, determining ݌௜௝ for a large number of ego’s (and 
therefore an even larger numbers of resources) can be extremely burdensome. Moreover, 
it is unclear how the probability must be determined. Although we can reasonably assume 
that alters have quite a good idea about the different social resources that could be at 
their disposal, it would be very difficult for them to determine, with a sufficient degree of 
accuracy, the odds that they will be given access to all these resources. Therefore, we 
argue with Tom Snijders and Martin van der Gaag (Snijders, 1999; Van Der Gaag, 2005; 
Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005; Van Der Gaag, Snijders, & Flap, 2009) that setting ݏ௝
equal to 1 when ego is able to access a certain resource and equal to 0 when he is not 
able to access it, will be a good realistic alternative. Formula 3.1.2—2 should therefore be 
replaced by the following rule of thumb: 
ݏ௝ ൌ ͳ֞ ܧ݃݋ ݄ܽݏ ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏ ݐ݋ ݎ݁ݏ݋ݑݎܿ݁ ݆
3.1.2—6 
ݏ௝ ൌ Ͳ֞ ܧ݃݋ ݄ܽݏ ݊݋ ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏ ݐ݋ ݎ݁ݏ݋ݑݎܿ݁ ݆
When accepting this definition, we have evolved from the assumption that the value of 
ego’s social capital should be determined by counting the total volume of his social re-
sources, to one that states that we should measure the diversity of those resources. Ac-
cepting this paradigmatic change also makes the measurement issue somewhat less com-
plicated. Whereas formula 3.1.1—1 would still oblige us to map complete ego-centered 
networks so we could register the available resources, formula 3.1.2—1 makes it possible 
to start with a list of resources and check whether they are available or not. As we will 
explain into more detail later, this makes the development of more parsimonious meas-
urement instruments possible, to the extent that they can be included in large standard-
ized social surveys. 
3.2 DETERMINING A UNIT OF MEASUREMENT 
Another central problem with formula 3.1.1—1 is not solved by using formula 3.1.2—1. 
Because all formulas want to sum up the value of all social resources available to ego, 
these formulas assume there is a common unit of measurement for all social resources 
under consideration. As we have explained under the heading 2.2.2C, the value of eco-
nomic capital assets is expressed in a monetary unit because the expected capacity to 
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generate returns is reflected in the price attributed to a capital good on the market. But 
because social capital transactions by definition do not happen under market circumstanc-
es, this option is not available for us. Related to this problem is the fact that it is practical-
ly impossible to determine whether ego has access to all social resources that exist in the 
world. Therefore, some selection has to be made. 
Three options are available to overcome this problem. One strategy could be to restrict 
attention to a specific domain of social resources. We could for instance only try to gather 
information on social capital transactions of childcare. The aggregation of different forms 
of help could then for instance be expressed in time. Another option could be to follow a 
theory of social measurement such as classical test theory and item response theory. 
Classical measurement theory presupposes that a number of items from a questionnaire 
that highly correlate together form an indicator of a certain phenomenon. Applied to social 
capital measurement, this would mean that a limited list of social resources could be con-
sidered as a representative sample from all possible resources. Techniques such as factor 
analysis or Rash analysis (cf.  could afterwards supply us with the weights that can be 
used to add up those resources in order to form an indicator of social capital. Finally, Nan 
Lin and Mary Dumin (1986) came up with an original idea to overcome the problem of the 
unit of measurement when they developed the position generator methodology. Basically, 
their solution comes down to equating access to social resources with access to job posi-
tions and using occupational prestige as the unit of measurement. 
In the following paragraphs we further examine the different options somewhat more 
profoundly and evaluate their respective advantages and disadvantages. 
3.2.1 Counting within one specific domain 
If the researcher restricts attention to one specific domain of social capital interaction it 
might be quite self-evident to find a common unit of measurement to sum up access to or 
mobilization of several social resources. 
For instance, Sandra Hofferth and John Iceland (1998) investigated differences in patterns 
of financial support. They asked the respondents whether they had received any loans, 
gifts or support from relatives, friends or acquiantances. Logically, the different resources 
that have been gathered could be summed up in dollars. Hofferth and Iceland also investi-
gated domestic help and summed it up using time as the unit of measurement. The exact 
wording of the questions was the following: “People sometimes need help from others – 
either time or money. Let’s start by talking about help in the form of time, either in an 
emergency or with everyday activities such as errands, housework, small repairs to a car 
or baby-sitting. In 1987, did (you/your family living there) spend a lot of time helping your 
(your wife’s) parents/father/stepfather/mother/stepmother? About how many hours in  
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1987 did (you/your family living there) spend helping them?” (Hofferth & Iceland, 1998, p. 
581). 
Restricting research to a specific domain has as an advantage that the researcher can aks 
straightforward questions that are easy interpretable by respondents, and therefore prob-
ably will result in high quality answers. Additionally, measurement units are meaningful 
and therefore research results will be easier interpretable by the researcher and his public. 
Finally, results will be more ‘pure’. We can imagine for instance that living in an urban or 
rural environment differently effects access to or mobilization of job search resources on 
the one hand and food resources on the other. The obvious drawback is that one only 
looks at a very limited part of the whole world of social capital exchanges, and findings 
cannot easily be generalized to other domains of social capital. Limiting attention to a few 
restricted domains of social capital is therefore not sufficient to answer the research ques-
tions on social capital in general. 
3.2.2 Counting access to a sample of social resources: the Resource Genera-
tor 
A. General methodology 
The Resource Generator (Van Der Gaag, 2005; Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005) departs 
from the idea that one can present a list of social resources to the participants of a survey 
who in turn have to indicate whether they can access those resources or not. Contrary to 
chapter 3.2.1, the idea is not to measure all social resources applicable to one specific 
domain of social capital, but to measure the access to a number of specific resources that 
could be regarded as representative for all possible social resources. Afterwards, scaling 
techniques can be used to generate weights to sum up these different resources. 
The methodology of the resource generator is based on that of the name generator 
(Marsden & Campbell, 1984). A name generator is an instrument that is constructed to 
gather a lot of in-depth information on ego-centered networks. Name generators start with 
mapping ego’s personal network (or at least the core of it). Subsequently, questions are 
asked about the nature of the ties with the alters and about the alters themselves. Some 
questions can concern resources accessed through those ties. Information from such a 
Name Generator can be used to create a resource generator, which has already been done 
by van der Gaag (2005) and Degenne et. al. (Degenne, Lebeaux, & Lemel, 2004). The 
name generator produces much more information than the resource generator. However, 
the instrument is very burdensome for respondents and interviewers, and therefore also 
often very expensive to administer. Moreover, form a social capital perspective, the Name 
Generator produces a lot of information that is in fact redundant. Therefore, in many cases 
resource generators are preferred. 
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B. Selecting resources 
The most delicate part of the construction of a resource generator is to put together a 
number of social resources so they are a representative sample of all possible social re-
sources in society. Because no exhaustive list of such resources is available, and because 
generating such a list seems like a practically impossible assignment, it is not possible to 
just draw a random sample. The choice of the different resources must therefore be based 
on theoretical arguments. 
When building his Resource Generator, Martin van der Gaag  imposes three theoretical 
requirements upon his list. First of all, the list should contain resources that can be charac-
terized as both wealth, power and status, the three fundamental resources Nan Lin (1982) 
identified in his resources theory. Second, the different kinds of capital goods that are 
distinguished in the literature (human, cultural, financial, political and physical capital) 
should be present. Finally, the resource items should be productive for the six cognitive 
domains in goal attainment that were identified in the dissertation of Van Bruggen (2001). 
The latter requirement needs some more explanation. In his dissertation Van Bruggen 
investigates what are the different domains of individual goal attainment that people iden-
tify themselves. In other words, Van Bruggen wants to find out what are the different 
collections of activities that people define themselves through which they want to achieve 
well-being (the ultimate goal in life according to the author). The first domain consists of 
private productive activities: housekeeping, raising children, etc. The second one are per-
sonal relationships: making friends, finding a partner, doing things together with 
friends/partner, … The third domain are private recreational activities, i.e. the private 
activities that are not comprised under the first and second domain, such as practicing 
one’s favorite sport, watching television, traveling, etc. The fourth domain are public pro-
ductive activities that consist of paid work, voluntary work in official organizations and 
education. Finally, there is the domain of public non-institutionalized interactions: interac-
tion with strangers in the public domain (fellow travelers on the train, the box office girl at 
the theater, etc. (Van Der Gaag, 2005; Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005). 
C. Empirical dimensions 
Van der Gaag and some others have reported on the different empirical dimensions they 
have found in their respective resource generator instruments, based on cumulative scal-
ing or factor analysis. Van der Gaag and Snijders (2005) identified four sub dimensions of 
social capital. Their first scale was called prestige and education related social capital. It 
contained items knowing someone that has knowledge of literature, owns a holiday home 
abroad and has good contacts with the media. The second one was called political and 
financial skills social capital, containing items that refered to knowledge about government 
regulations, politics and financial matters. The resources in the Personal skills social capi-
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tal-scale referred to knowledge about foreign languages, computer skills, owing a car etc. 
Finally, Personal Support social capital referred to giving a good reference when applying 
for a job, giving advice about conflicts with family members, and so on. However, the 
substantive delineation between the empirical scales is not always very clear. For instance, 
intuitively one could easily classify knowledge about a foreign language as education relat-
ed social capital. Moreover, it is not very clear why owing a car should be regarded as a 
personal skill. (cf. knowledge about a foreign language). The correlations between the 
different scales are also very high. The reliability of the scale made up of all the items 
together was sufficient, but the internal homogeneity was rather low. 
Martin Webber and Peter Huxley (Webber & Huxley, 2007) tested their own version of the 
resource generator in the United Kingdom using the same methodology as Van der Gaag & 
Snijders. They identified four empirical dimensions that substantively more coherent as 
compared to the ones of van der Gaag. Their first scale (Domestic Resources) contained 
items such as knowledge about DIY, help with small jobs around the house, help for get-
ting cheap goods, etc. The second scale was called Expert Advice and contained items 
such as knowledge of government regulations, contacts with local media, legal advice, et. 
Personal Skills was the third scale and contained items such as knowledge about repairing 
a car, about gardening, etc. Finally, Problem solving resources was identified as a separate 
scale and was made up out of items such as knowledge about a foreign language, doing 
shopping when ego is ill, lending a small amount of money, etc. The authors report also 
sufficient homogeneity and reliability for the scale containing all of the different items. 
Matous and his colleagues (Matous, Tsuchiya, & Ozawa, 2011) have built a resource gen-
erator to investigate the influence of the introduction of mobile phones in a remote rural 
area in India. Some resources they listed were very comparable to the ones used by van 
der Gaag & Snijders and Webber & Huxley. But because their instrument was specifically 
designed for their research purpose, also some very peculiar resources were included. The 
authors report that their scale measures only one trait. In this non-western location, using 
this specific instrument, social capital seemed to be a one-dimensional concept. 
A limited resource generator (8 items) was also introduced in the Community Advantage 
Program panel survey, a survey administered with a sample of the participants in a social 
mortgage program in the United States. Manturuk and his colleagues (Manturuk, Lindblad, 
& Quercia, 2010) investigated the relationship between social capital and home ownership. 
They do not report on scale analysis, but use their resource generator as a one-
dimensional scale. 
49
3.2.3 Counting access to occupational prestige: the Position Generator 
A. General methodology 
The logic of the position generator (Lin, Fu, & Hsung, 2001) is based on Nan Lin’s social 
resources theory (N. Lin, 1982). As we have mentioned before, Lin states that the tree 
fundamental resources people can use for individual goal attainment are wealth, status 
and power. Access to these resources is supposed to be reflected in the occupational pres-
tige structure of society. To put it concretely, people that have a job with a higher prestige 
will have access to more resources as compared to people who have a job with a lower 
prestige. As a consequence, if your network is made up out of people with a higher pres-
tige, you will (on average) have a higher (potential) access to social resources, and there-
fore the value of your social capital will be higher. 
In order to build a position generator, one must first randomly select a list of professions 
that forms a representative replication of the occupational prestige ladder in the society 
under study. Through occupational prestige research, such lists are made available for a 
lot of societies (CBS, 2001; ILO, 1990). Afterwards, that list of occupations is presented to 
a number of research participants who can indicate whether they know someone personal-
ly who practices that profession or not. In most cases respondents are asked to indicate 
whether that person is a friend, a family member, or an acquaintance. The latter categori-
zation is used to determine the tie strength and should give an indication about the proba-
bility that the resources the alter possesses will someday be put at the disposal of ego. 
B. Calculating different measures 
The position generator methodology can be used to calculate a number of different 
measures of social capital. Based on equation 3.1.2—1 the total accessed prestige of a 
respondent can be calculated as follows: 
ܶܣ ௘ܲ ൌ෍ܱ ௝ܲ כ ݏ௝
௠
௝ୀଵ
 3.2.3—1 
In this formula, ܶܣ ௘ܲ stands for the total accessed prestige of ego, ܱ ௝ܲ stands for the occu-
pational prestige of alter ݆. ܱ ௝ܲ can be measured on the SIOPS-scale or one of the other 
frequently used scales of occupational prestige (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). The factor 
ݏ௝ can, according to rule of thumb 3.1.2—6, be set equal to ͳ if ego has a tie with ݆ and to 
Ͳ when ego has no tie with ݆.
It could however be argued that there is a problem with this way of calculating. Unlike the 
Name Generator, the Resource Generator is not a good indicator of the size of one’s net-
work. Respondents are asked to indicate whether they know someone that has a certain 
profession. If they know more than one person with the same profession, this will not be 
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signaled through the measurement instrument. So, the total number of occupations one 
indicates to know is a function of both the size of one’s network and the occupational14
diversity of that network. As a consequence, ܶܣ ௘ܲ is not a valid indicator of the total ac-
cessed prestige, but a function of (1) the size of one’s network, (2) the occupational diver-
sity of one’s network and (3) the average prestige level of one’s network.  
Another measure that can be calculated based on the Position Generator is the following: 
ܣܣ ௘ܲ ൌ
σ ை௉ೕכ௦ೕ೘ೕసభ
௝
3.2.3—2 
In this formula, ܣܣ ௘ܲ stands for the average accessed prestige of ego. As the reader can 
notice, formula 3.2.3—1 is repeated in the numerator and divided by the total number of 
alters ݆ in the denominator. In orther words, we have just taken the average of the ac-
cessed prestige. 
Another kind of measures that can be derived from the position generator are indicators of 
resource diversity. The ideas of these measures is that occupations with higher prestige 
levels do not necessarily lead to higher access to social prestige. Occupations with lower 
prestige levels can also give access to valuable resources. For instance, a farmer has a 
lower prestige as compared to a university professor, but knowing a farmer might give 
access to cheaper and safer food, a very valuable resource. Analogously, knowing an em-
ployee of a real estate firm might give access to valuable information on the housing mar-
ket. The idea is that knowing people with very different levels of occupational prestige 
might give the best access to social resources. 
One measure based on this reasoning can be calculated by taking the variance of the pres-
tige values of the different accessed occupations: 
ܸܣ ௘ܲ ൌ ෍൫ܱ ௝ܲ െ ܱ ௘ܲതതതതത൯
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
 3.2.3—3 
Another strategy for measuring the diversity of social capital based on the position genera-
tor is to calculate the range of accessed prestige (e.g. Lin & Erickson, 2008): 
ܴܣ ௘ܲ ൌ  ܱ ௝ܲ െ  ܱ ௝ܲ 3.2.3—4 
                                                    
14 Mind that it is not directly dependent on the status diversity of the network. Someone can know a lot 
of different occupations that are all in the same status category. Another person might especially know 
a lot of people with the same profession. Both persons will have low status diversity of their network. 
However, the first person will have a greater occupational diversity and the odds that he will indicate to 
know more different profession as the second person are higher. 
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As formula 3.2.3—4 shows, the range is calculated by subtracting the prestige level of the 
accessed occupation with the smallest prestige value from the prestige value of the ac-
cessed occupation that is the highest on the prestige ladder. 
We prefer to measure diversity by calculating the standard deviation of the average pres-
tige level over the range because the standard deviation takes information on all the ac-
cessed professions into account (and not only the two most extreme cases). 
Finally, sometimes the measure upper reachability is used. This simply means that the 
prestige value of the occupation with the highest prestige is used as an indicator of social 
capital. The reasoning behind this measure is of course very different. It is supposed that 
higher statuses always give access to more resources. The importance of high status is so 
important that, according to the reasoning behind this measure, it makes access to lower 
statuses redundant. 
C. Advantages and disadvantages 
The biggest advantage of the resource generator is that it comes closest to the idea of 
measuring general social capital. A list of professions probably gives a much better repre-
sentation of the multitude of social resources available in society than would any fixed list 
of resources usable in a social survey (and therefore restricted in length). This is especially 
so because there is no really objective way to generate a representative list of social re-
sources because there simply is no fixed list available from which a random sample could 
be drawn. As we mentioned before, for professions such lists are available. Another ad-
vantage is definitely that the position generator allows us to value resources through a 
clear unit of measurement, i.e. occupational prestige measured on the scale of the classifi-
cation scheme used. 
The biggest disadvantage of this methodology is that it rests very heavily on its theoretical 
underpinning. The assumption that people having a high prestige job will on average have 
more access to wealth and power is not only very reasonable, but also empirically sup-
ported (e.g. Schooler & Schoenbach, 1994). A more questionable assumption however, is 
that having a social tie with people with high prestige jobs will result in having access to 
their wealth, status and power. After all, having a social relationships is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for having access to social capital (Finsveen & van Oorschot, 2008). 
What is necessary for social capital is not only a social tie to an alter, but also the willing-
ness of the alter to give ego access to his resources. Lin strongly defends that the position 
generator methodology measures the capacity of social capital which he contrasts with a 
measure of mobilization or use. However, he defines capacity as being the same as access 
to social capital, as “the pool of embedded resources available to an actor” (N. Lin & Ao, 
2010). Because there is no measure of the willingness to provide ego access to resources, 
we are convinced that the position generator only measures potential access (Enns, 
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Malinick, & Matthews, 2008). Therefore, one could argue that position generator 
measures, although they are deliberately built to measure access to social resources, are 
actually to be regarded as indicators of network features (regarding the social status com-
position of a network) instead of real indicators of social capital. 
The position generator instrument partly addresses this problem through the indication of 
tie strength that is attached to it. One can assume that with increasing tie strength, the 
probability of getting access to resources increases. However, knowing whether the alter 
under consideration is a family member, a friend or an acquaintance is quite a rude indica-
tor of tie strength. Many people don’t often meet their aunts, uncles, cousins and nieces so 
they don’t know them very well. However, if their profession is listed (and known by ego), 
the relationship between ego and this alter is coded as the strongest possible relationship. 
Therefore, tie strength has not been taken into account while calculating social capital 
measures in chapter 3.2.3B. 
Taking the discussion one step further, we can imagine some theoretical reasons why 
having ties to people with a high occupational prestige might just not increase ego’s social 
capital (remember that the opposite hypothesis is the base for tree of the five measures 
mentioned in chapter 3.2.3B). People with high prestige might be less inclined to exchange 
resources with others because they need less access to those kind of resources them-
selves. Imagine ego with an average social status having a tie with an alter with a high 
social status (and a lot of money). The principle of reciprocity predicts that ego will only be 
able to use the resources of alter when he can return that favor one day. But does ego 
really have something to offer to the alter? Imagine ego is a talented do-it-yourselfer. Will 
alter be inclined to ask ego for some odd jobs around the house, creating a ‘social debt’ 
towards ego, or will he just pay a professional to do it? Would ego not be better off, in 
terms of social capital, to have a tie to a mason instead, that could help him to improve 
his DIY skills? 
This discussion is linked to the discussion about the difference between social resources 
that help people get by in life versus those that help them to get ahead15. With getting by 
                                                    
15 In the writings of Nan Lin and others (e.g. N. Lin, 2001b; Van Der Gaag, 2005), the authors talk 
about resources that are productive in expressive actions versus resources productive in instrumental 
actions. Instrumental actions are actions that are aimed at enlarging the pool of resources one has 
access to (e.g. getting a job that is better paid) while expressive actions are aimed at defending the 
pool of resources one already has access to (e.g. showing interest in your boss’ hobby so you can keep 
your job). Expressive actions are called expressive, because the goal of the action is the expression by 
the alter of a confirmation that ego’s has the right to access certain resources. For Lin, all actions can 
be classified as either expressive or instrumental. Therefore, having a pint with friends is also classified 
as an expressive action, i.e. an action aimed at defending one’s pool of resources. We don’t believe this 
is a very useful classification. First of all, we believe that defending a pool of resources is as instrumen-
tal as trying to enlarge it. Second, describing every human action as instrumental towards the defense 
or enlargement of a pool of resources seems to us to be far too abstract as an idea to be a good repre-
sentation of reality. Therefore, we prefer to use the terms getting ahead versus getting by that are 
often used in the collective school of social capital to describe a similar contradiction between bonding 
and bridging social capital (Putnam, 2004).  
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we mean that people try to make their life comfortable without necessarily wanting to 
improve their socio-economic position. Improving one’s socio-economic position is de-
scribed by getting ahead. Regarding our discussion above, it could be argued that the 
resources that are available through ties with lower status alters mostly serve ego to get 
by (e.g., having a well-painted living room) while his ties with higher status alters could 
serve him to get ahead (e.g. because he can get a good job reference). However, access 
to cheap ways of getting daily jobs done might result in being able to save enough to get 
better education for your children. In other words, these kind of exchanges of resources 
that are more typical for the lower middle and working classes may be of high value (cf. 
Meert, 2000). Not only to get by, but also to get ahead in life. This kind of exchange of 
resources cannot be traced by the position generator methodology. 
Lin has addressed the problem of reciprocity in relationships between wealthy and poor 
alters. “In a persistent relationship where transactions are not symmetric even in the long 
run, the engaging actors are engaging in an ever greater creditor-debtor relationship […] 
While the debtor gains, why would the creditor want to maintain the relationship and thus 
suffer transitionally? […] To be able to maintain the relationship with the creditor, the 
debtor is expected to take certain social actions to reduce the relational cost (or increase 
the utility of exchanges) for the creditor. That is, the debtor should propagate to others 
through his or her social ties his or her indebtedness to the creditor.” (N. Lin, 2001b) Mak-
ing the wider social environment aware of this unbalanced relationship increases the repu-
tation, the social standing of the creditor. In other words, through the maintenance of the 
unbalanced relationship, the creditor is accumulating social recognition. Where the ad-
vantages of lower status alters connecting to higher status alters are captured through the 
measures total accessed prestige, average accessed prestige and upper reachability, the 
advantage of higher status alters of connecting to lower status alters are partly captured in 
the range and variance measures.  
Additionally, van der Gaag (Van Der Gaag, 2005) showed that there is a correlation be-
tween the status of one’s social network and access to social resources as measured by 
the resource generator. High prestige social capital also had a positive influence on per-
sonal income and personal prestige, after control for education and father’s prestige and 
respondent’s prestige. Therefore we must conclude that, although position generator 
measures are far from ideal operationalization of social capital, there are theoretical and 
empirical reasons to assume that they do have something to tell us about possibilities for 
goal achievement through access to social resources, and therefore they are of interest for 
our research purpose. 
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3.3 SUMMARY: THREE STRATEGIES FOR MEASURING 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In this chapter we tried to figure out a way to determine the value of an individual’s stock 
of social capital. Although intuitively the obvious strategy would be to try to assess the 
volume of that stock, we showed that determining the diversity provides us with a strategy 
that is both more practical and more valid. Assessing that diversity involves adding up a 
number of accessed resources. In turn, this means determining the value of those re-
sources through the establishment of a common unit of measurement. 
The problem of the unit of measurement can be solved in three ways: one can restrict 
attention to a specific domain of social resources, one can apply a theory of social meas-
urement on a restricted list of resources presented to a number of respondents (=a re-
source generator), or one can use occupational prestige as the common unit of measure-
ment (=a position generator). 
Each strategy of measurement has its advantages and disadvantages that are discussed in 
the text above. Additionally, there is a trade-off between two elements effecting the con-
tent (or theoretical) validity of the different measurement strategies. That is, measures 
that are more applicable to the general concept of social capital will give the user less 
certainty certainty that higher levels of the measures really indicate that more access to or 
resources is present (cf.Figure 2). The position generator methodology equates access to 
occupational prestige to access to social resources. By measuring the access to a (strati-
fied) random sample of occupations, it comes closest to the idea of measuring access to 
social resources in general. However, because there is no information about the willing-
ness of the alters listed to give ego access to their resources, it is not very certain that 
high levels of the derived measures imply a lot of access to social resources. When meas-
uring social capital is restricted to a specific domain, it is not very obvious that the results 
can be applied to other fields of exchange of social resources. However, because there is 
the possibility to ask about the willingness of alters to give access to social capital, be-
cause it is possible to include all relevant resources in a questionnaire (certainly when the 
domain is very limited) and because it is more obvious to determine a meaningful unit of 
measurement, the researcher can be quite certain that a subject having a higher score on 
the measure of social capital has more access to social resources – at least in this limited 
domain. The resource generator is situated in between on both dimensions. Because there 
is information on the willingness of alters, it is more certain a higher value means more 
social capital as compared to the measures derived from the position generator. However, 
because we can never count all social resources and because the unit of measurement is 
less obvious (rests on a theory of social measurement), one is less sure higher values 
indicate higher levels of social capital as compared to counting in a specific domain. But 
because social resources of several domains are considered, resource generator-measures 
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apply better to general concept of social capital as compared to counting in a specific do-
main. Finally, because there is no fixed list of social resources one can draw a random 
sample from, the measure is less applicable to social capital in general as is the position 
generator. After all, creating a list of resources always implies that a lot of potential useful 
social resources are not included in the list. 
This said, it is clear that an ideal measure of (individual) social capital does not exist. 
However, we are convinced that all measures do tell us something important about indi-
vidual social capital. We are therefore convinced that for our research purpose it would be 
best to study as many different measures of social capital as possible. 
Figure 2: Content validity of social capital measurement instrument 
Position
Generator
Resource 
Generator
Specific 
Domain
Certainty more access to / mobilization of resources is present 
More applicable to the general concept of social capital
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Chapter 4
Social capital in rural and urban space16
Now that we have clarified the concept of social capital by elaborating on its historical and 
scientific development, definition and measurement in the two previous chapters, we can 
come back to the core question of this dissertation: does living in an urban or a rural 
space matter for an individual’s social capital?  
This question has only sporadically been addressed directly in the literature. However, a 
lot of theorizing and empirical work on the broader question of how urbanization influences 
interpersonal relations – the so called community question (Wellman, 1979) – has been 
done, and different answers to that question have been formulated. Some argue that an 
urban environment isolates city dwellers from one another (Wirth, 1938), others say that 
city life creates opportunities for social networking (Fischer, 1975b), while still others be-
lieve that it does not really make much of a difference (Gans, 1962a). 
In this chapter we first elaborate on the different points of view from the literature. We 
discuss theories about the isolating city, the liberating city and theories that deny urban-
rural differences. Subsequently we formulate a number of hypothesis deduced from these 
different theories that express specific expectations about the effect of an urban environ-
ment on individual social capital. Finally, we summarize the findings of empirical work that 
has (partly) tested these hypotheses. 
4.1 THE ISOLATING CITY17
4.1.1 Social differentiation: the structural argument 
Theories of the isolating city explicitly or implicitly make a link between urbanization and 
modernization. The creation of large, dense en heterogeneous permanent settlements 
(Wirth, 1938) is seen as both a consequence of and a stimulation for modernization. But 
even more importantly, city-life is contrasted to rural life in the same way as modern soci-
ety is contrasted to traditional society: “Cities exemplify all that seems modern: industry 
                                                    
16 The principal ideas of this chapter have appeared in (Lannoo, Verhaeghe, Vandeputte, & Devos, 
2012). 
17 The theories predicting negative effects of urbanization for social capital are given various names by 
various authors, such as the community lost argument (Wellman, 1979), the decline of community 
thesis (Fischer, 1977), etc. 
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and commerce, technology and mechanization, complexity and commotion, and especially 
scale – large buildings, large institutions, large numbers of everything” (Fischer, 1982, p. 
1). 
Ferdinand Tönnies ([1887] 1970) linked modernization and urbanization through the con-
cept of the division of labor. In a pre-modern village society the division of labor is not 
very specialized, resulting in very similar roles for most of the villagers. Because of these 
equal social positions, cooperation is based on the belief to share a common fate. In such 
a Gemeinschaft, strong social ties with family, extended kin and neighbors are predomi-
nant. The mirror image of this traditional community is formed by the modern large-scale 
society, the Gesellschaft, in which an advanced division of labor creates very divergent 
social roles. Cooperation in such a society is based on rational, instrumental considerations 
of self-interest instead of being “organic, self-fulfilling or instinctive” (J. Lin & Mele, 2005, 
p. 16). Secondary social relationships based on contracts and the market (e.g. worker-
boss and client-shopkeeper relationships) are now predominant. Whereas the 
Gemeinschaft was based on a moral order, the Gesellschaft is predominantly instrumental. 
(Gold, 2002) 
Tönnies description of the urban and rural extremes has often reappeared in the literature 
as the rural-urban continuum (Bell, 1992; Fischer, 1975a; Lupri, 1967; Pahl, 1966, 1967), 
or under other names such as the folk-urban continuum (Redfield, 1947). The ideal types 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are also very closely related to Emile Durkheim’s 
([1897]1960) description of mechanical and organic solidarity (J. Lin & Mele, 2005). In a 
society held together by mechanical solidarity, people are tied to one another because 
they have the same tasks and responsibilities in the production system. In modern socie-
ties people only perform a limited range of tasks. Therefore, “they need many other peo-
ple to survive. The primitive society headed by father-hunter and mother-food gatherer is 
practically self-sufficient, but the modern family, in order to make it through the week, 
needs the grocer, baker, butcher, auto mechanic, teacher, police officer, and so forth. 
These people, in turn, need the kinds of services that others provide in order to live in the 
modern world.” (Ritzer, 2000, p. 78). Dürkheim doesn’t immediately make the link be-
tween the mechanical-organic and rural-urban dichotomy. However, specialized division of 
labor is seen as the consequence of a sufficient increase in the number of people and the 
interaction between them. This situation, which Durkheim labels dynamic density, results 
in increased competition of scarce resources, which can only be peacefully resolved by an 
increased division of labor. The large urban places in the modern western world are clear 
examples of environments characterized by dynamic density (Ritzer, 2000). 
At first sight, the applicability of the aforementioned theories to contemporary rural-urban 
differences in the industrialized world seems rather limited. In the predominantly rural 
areas of Belgium in 2007 only 5,2% of the workforce was employed in the primary sector. 
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In Spain, this number amounted only to 11,9% (EU, 2010). And even within the agricul-
tural sector, division of labor is very advanced. The self-sufficient mixed family farm has 
cleared the way for ever more specialization (Meert, 2003; Williams, 1964). It is therefore 
difficult to see why the interests of a contracted pig farmer, an industrial mushroom grow-
er, or a small self-employed bio-farmer should necessarily run parallel. As a consequence, 
the gemeinschaft-like society Tönnies described has disappeared from the rural world – if 
it ever has existed. 
However, in relative terms one can still say that there is more social differentiation in a 
large city as compared to a small town or village. In his famous article Urbanism as a way 
of life, Louis Wirth (1938) didn’t only call attention to the division of labor, but also to the 
separation of spheres of life. In large cities people meet their neighbors only as neighbors, 
kin as kin, and colleagues as colleagues. The grocer is only known for the quality of his 
food and a policeman is only a policeman. In a small town or village, the odds are much 
greater that your co-worker lives in the same neighborhood and is a (distant) family 
member. In such a village you will know the local policeman and grocer by name, know his 
wife en where his children go to school. The scale of the city results in a greater separation 
of function and person, and a specialization of social roles. In a small community roles 
overlap and people with an official function are often also personal acquaintances. As a 
consequence, whereas in a small community coincidental encounters are encounters with 
friends and acquaintances, the city dweller constantly interacts with strangers. Therefore, 
Louis Wirth argues, the urbanite adopts impersonal interaction habits which he will also 
apply to his relationships with more familiar people. At the end of the story, the urbanite is 
left with very few sentimental and a lot of superficial and transitory relationships (Curtis 
White & Guest, 2003). 
But there is more. The small town environment in which there is more overlap of social 
rolls (in network analysis terms: more multi stranded relationships resulting in a dense 
network (Beggs, Haines, & Hurlbert, 1996)) creates a situation in which social control is 
more efficient. “The overlapping of numerous economic as well as social relationships 
within a limited geographical area gives to even the most superficial of social contacts 
economic significance. Any displeasure aroused within the sphere of leisure time activities 
might have economic repercussions. The people with whom financial negotiations are 
entertained are the same with whom the villager rubs elbows with in his private life” 
(Riemer, 1951). But not only the overlapping of economic and social relationships does the 
trick, the overlapping of relationships in different social spheres is as important. If a villag-
er has an open dispute with his neighbor, this will also be discussed in the local cycling 
association the villager is a member of. In a city this will probably not be the case because 
the chance that the cycling friends also know the neighbor is very small. The overlapping 
of social spheres in a small community makes gossip and spying upon each other more 
effective. For social capital transactions, this might potentially have serious consequences. 
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In the city, where social control is less effective, social capital investments might yield 
lesser return because exchange partners don’t feel as obliged to reciprocate as they would 
on the countryside. 
4.1.2 Stimulus overload: the psychological argument 
As until now, the expected attenuation of social relationships in urban settings has been 
based on structural arguments. However, Wirth and other Wirthian theorists18 have made 
their point also on psychological grounds (Milgram, 1970). Georg Simmel (Simmel, 2005 
[1903]) was probably the first one to formulate the argument that in dense and large 
settlements people suffer from a kind of stimulus overload. In large cities on every mo-
ment of the day one can hear car horns blare while ambulances race the streets with wail-
ing sirens. Flashy billboards are yelling for attention while underneath them a funeral pro-
cession is passing by. Urbanites get more stimuli than rural dwellers, simply because more 
people are present on a small surface. But even more importantly, they also get very 
contradictory stimuli: in a few seconds, the urbanite receives signals that arouse happi-
ness, sadness, jealousy, sympathy and sexual excitement at the same time. Forced to 
adopt to this situation, city dwellers become indifferent, detached and cool. This urban 
attitude allows for a restoration of the mental equilibrium, but comes with some serious 
side-effects. The psychological changes reinforce the structural ones, turning the urbanite 
into an essentially asocial creature that sacrifices his strong and intimate relationships for 
superficial and transitory ones (Fischer, 1976). 
In the early sixties John Calhoun (1962) published the result of an experiment in which he 
raised a number of rats in very dense situations. The author reported a total breakdown of 
social organization among the rats. A part of them showing extremely violent behavior, 
physically attacking even their own offspring. Others withdrew from all social interaction. 
They ate and slept, but had no contact with the other animals. Looking physically healthy 
and having no scars from fights, Calhoun called these rats the beautiful ones. In the long 
run, the beautiful ones became the majority. However, because these rats were not able 
to mate, the population dropped rapidly. The reduction in density resulting from this evo-
lution did not stimulate social behavior. Unfortunately, the changes brought about seemed 
to be permanent (Ramsden & Adams, 2009). 
Linking the behavior of rats living in overcrowded cages to that of human beings in the 
modern metropolis might seem rather far-fetched for many us. However, it inspired a lot 
of social psychological research which ultimate goal was to test the notion of Wirth that 
living in large and dense settlements fosters asocial behavior. A lot of that research was 
                                                    
18 Wirth’s publication is so important for the community lost-perspective that this line of reasoning has 
been called Wirthian theory by Fischer (1976) among others. 
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performed in very artificial laboratory situations rendering its results practically useless for 
understanding real-life urban situations (Fischer, Baldassare, & Ofshe, 1975). More applied 
research seems to suggest that city life leads to a strategy of specialized withdrawal: “The 
general notion is that, when confronted with high densities, individuals learn to conserve 
energies by attending to more rewarding encounters and avoiding neutral or potentially 
harmful interactions. Those having rational capacities can thus learn over time to avoid the 
experience of cognitive fatigue or social overload.” (Baldassare, 1978, p. 42).  
To summarize, isolation theory (or decline or Wirthian theory) is based on a structural and 
a psychological argument. The structural argument states that in cities there is a more 
advanced division of labor, less overlap of social roles and less multi stranded relation-
ships. This greater social differentiation makes social control less effective. Because social 
control is important for the enforcement of reciprocity, the urban situation makes social 
capital transactions less probable. The psychological argument states that the busy and 
crowded urban environment leads to an overstimulation of the human senses. To restore 
the mental equilibrium, people (partly) redraw from social life. Again, this creates a situa-
tion that is detrimental for the exchange of social resources. 
Figure 3: Graphical display of the model of isolation theory 
4.2 THE LIBERATING CITY 
4.2.1 Challenging decline theory 
In Perspectives on Community and Personal Relations (1977), Claude Fischer tries to show 
that a number of hidden assumptions lies behind the idea that city life creates social isola-
tion. According to the author, theorists of the decline of community–thesis seem to have a 
preference for relationships in primordial corporate groups. A corporate group is defined as 
“a group in which needs and wills of individuals are subordinate to the needs and collective 
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will of the whole” (Fischer, 1977, p. 8). The (extended) family and isolated village commu-
nities can be regarded as the most important examples of primordial corporate groups. 
“By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the […] assumed ‘givens’ of 
social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connections mainly” (Geertz, 1963 cited in: 
Fischer, 1977). Cohesive sects can be regarded as an example of non-primordial corporate 
groups.
The decline theorists assume that only in primordial corporate groups meaningful trust-
worthy relationships (the ones that make social capital transactions more likely), can arise 
and flourish. The reasoning behind this conviction, Fischer continues, is that humans will 
only behave in a non-selfish, cooperative way if they are part of a group they cannot leave 
because all of their needs are met within that group. The serious restrictions of freedom 
that are imposed on the individual by the group make sure that man does not become a 
wolf to his fellow man. 
Both modernization and urbanization create opportunities for individuals to relate to others 
outside of the primordial corporate group. Modernization does that through faster means 
of communication and transportation, making it possible to meet others living far away. 
Urbanization does the same because in large and dense settlements an enormous pool of 
potential social partners are available within walking distance. The idea that restrictions on 
freedom of choice in relation formation positively influence the quality of social relations, 
Fisher concludes his exegesis, is a fundamental hypotheses on which decline theory rests. 
4.2.2 Subcultural and other liberalization theories 
Based on this reading of the classical literature, Fischer (1975b, 1995) builds his own 
theory of urbanism which he baptized subcultural theory. He agrees with the classical 
scholars that cities, because of their seize and because they attract migration from all over 
the world, contain much more socio-cultural diversity as do rural environments. In the 
words of Robert Park, the city is a “mosaic of little worlds” (1915, p. 608). Moreover, seize 
makes it possible for these different socio-cultural categories to become real groups. Fish-
er calls that the principle of the critical mass: when sufficient people with the same charac-
teristic live within a certain proximity they can become a real social group, or even a spe-
cific subculture. In a rural environment one might find, in relative terms, as much gay 
people as in an urban environment. However, the fact that many people with the same 
sexual preference live in close proximity to one another makes it possible for them to 
come together and form a group. Backing one another up, it will be a lot easier for gay 
people to openly express their personality. It is no surprise that the first gay communities 
saw the light of day in large cities. 
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On a more abstract level, Fischer’s theory expects that the increased freedom of cities will 
actually enhance the number of voluntaristic social ties: those with colleagues, classmates, 
but especially ‘just friends’ (Curtis White & Guest, 2003). However, subcultural theory is 
less clear about the consequences for social capital transactions. On the one hand, the 
increased voluntaristic ties might exist at the expense of traditional ties. After all, il faut du 
temps pour s’aimer: people only have a limited amount of time and other resources they 
can invest in their relationships. If they invest more in their ties with friends, they will 
have less resources left to invest in their other ties. When voluntaristic ties can provide as 
much access to social resources as traditional ones, we expect to find no difference be-
tween rural and urban environments. However, voluntaristic ties might provide a social 
capital advantage. After all, we can assume that people will especially invest in those ties 
that provide them with a lot of benefits. In the case family ties are the most profitable, 
they will stick to those. Since Fisher shows in his writings that he is convinced about the 
advantages of freedom, we believe that the latter interpretation is best in line with subcul-
tural thought. 
Next to Fischer, several other scholars have defended the idea that the increased freedom 
for social tie formation, characteristic for modern urban settlement, might be advanta-
geous for providing access to social resources. Barry Wellman states that increased free-
dom in the choice of network partners gives the urbanite the opportunity to create the 
most supportive network possible: “The cost is the loss of a palpably present and visible 
local community to provide a strong identity and belonging. The gain is the increased 
diversity of opportunity, greater scope for individual agency and the freedom from a single 
group’s constrictive control” (Wellman, 2001, p. 237). Turning the argument around, small 
villages contain so few people that it is very difficult for rural dwellers to develop a net-
work that can supply them with the social resources they need (Wilkinson, 1986). Völker 
and Flap (2007) demonstrated that people having less social ties in the neighborhood had 
more ties elsewhere. They suggested that if people have the opportunity, they will substi-
tute the ties from traditional contexts with self-chosen ties that provide them with more or 
better support. Furthermore, possible negative effects of small-scale communities have 
often been overlooked. Public familiarity, the fact that inhabitants of the same neighbor-
hood or village know each other very well, might provoke negative gossip and division 
among people resulting in less social capital (Blokland & Savage, 2008). 
To summarize, liberalization theory argues that an urban environments compared to  more 
rural ones are characterized by more control over the composition of one’s own network. 
Because freely construed networks are better networks, they will lead to more accumula-
tion of social capital. Two processes are responsible for the increased room for individual 
agency in network formation in the city. The first process is actually the mirror image of 
the one identified by the structural argument of the decline theory. It is the idea that 
greater social differentiation in the city is makes social control less restrictive which makes 
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people feel less pressure to include or exclude certain potential network partners. The 
other reason is that the immediate presence of a large amount of different people increas-
es the chance of meeting the exact kind of people one finds the most interesting as net-
work partners. A graphical display of the theoretical model can be found in Figure 3 
Figure 4: Graphic display of the model of the liberalization theory 
4.2.3 Different theories, different perspectives 
To conclude, we must point to the reader that we cannot simply juxtapose the ideas of the 
lost and liberated perspective. Most of the defenders of the decline-theory approach the 
community question from a collective point of view. A fundamental difference between 
authors such as Fisher and Wellman on the one hand and most of the defenders of the 
decline-theory on the other, is that they use a different perspective on the community 
question. Fischer approaches this question from the angle of the individual, he is funda-
mentally interested in the question whether modernization and urbanization have conse-
quences for the value of the social ties of an individual for that individual. In the terminol-
ogy of individual social capital the question becomes: do the relationships of an individual 
living in the city provide as much opportunity for access to social resources as do the so-
cial relationships of someone living on the countryside? 
Most of the defenders of the decline-theory approach the community question from a col-
lective point of view. They want to know whether the relationships between individuals in 
an urban context are as valuable for society as a whole, as are the relationships between 
individuals in a rural context. This is where the divide between the lost-perspective and 
the liberated perspective runs parallel with the divide between the collective and the indi-
vidual school of social capital: we cannot translate this principal question of the decline-
theorists into the terminology of the individual school, but we can translate it into that of 
the collective school. Decline theorists want to know whether “the glue that holds society 
together” (Wood & Giles-Corti, 2008) sticks as well in a urban context as it does in a rural 
one.
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Because Fischer’s formulation of the community question is about the distribution of (so-
cial) resources in society, it is a question about the structural integration of society. Con-
trary to that, the Wirthian formulation touches the normative integration society (Wellman 
& Leighton, 1979). It should be clear to the reader that the principal question of this dis-
sertation is structural. However, one should not conclude that the decline-theories are 
therefore worthless for our sake. These ideas allow us to formulate some interesting hy-
potheses concerning rural-urban differences in access to and mobilization of social capital. 
It is important to mention however, that the test of these hypotheses is not a test of the 
full scope of the decline-theories, it is only a test of whether they can be applied to rural-
urban differences in individual social capital or not. 
4.3 CITY EQUALS COUNTRYSIDE 
4.3.1 The urbanized countryside 
In his latest film La Source des Femmes, Radu Mihaileanu takes us on a journey to a de-
serted mountain village somewhere in the Arab World where time seems to have come to 
a complete stand still. Despite the introduction of mobile phones, the traditional rural way 
of life is maintained, only to be challenged by education and, above all, social struggle. 
Contrary to the image sketched in this film, many social commentators and theorists have 
emphasized the central role of progress in communication and transportation technology 
for the disappearance of rural-urban differences. They criticize both Wirthian and liberali-
zation theory because these ideas are supposed to be built upon the outdated image of the 
autonomous village (Thissen & Droogleever Fortuijn, 1999). This image portrays a coun-
tryside on which rural dwellers get educated, work, marry and die in the same place, in 
isolation from the outside world. However, the innovation in and democratization of com-
munication and transportation technologies are responsible for a decrease of the im-
portance of distances, setting a number of different socio-spatial processes in motion that 
have seriously breached that isolation (Blau, 1977).  
One of these socio-spatial processes is the decentralization of economic production: trans-
portation of raw materials and end products has become cheaper and easier. The car and 
an extended roads system allows workers to commute over long distances. The telephone, 
fax and especially the internet make it as easy to communicate with a production facility at 
the other side of the world as with one situated at the other side of town. One of the con-
sequences of these changes is that cities have started to deindustrialize (Blokland & Rae, 
2008; Tittle & Grasmick, 2001). Although most of the factories were displaced to large 
industrial parks on the urban fringe, some were also dispersed over the countryside (De 
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Decker et al., 2010). The dispersion was further stimulated by the transition from a Fordist 
to a post-Fordist production system in which as much tasks as possible are outsourced to 
different, most often smaller, companies. As a consequence of this decentralization pro-
cess, rural dwellers practice the same professions in the same economic sectors as do 
urban dwellers, whereas they used to be especially working in agriculture (cf. paragraph 
4.1.). 
Another effect of the increased commuting possibilities is that rural dwellers have become 
increasingly more footloose: the fact that they are living on the countryside does not pre-
vent them from having intensive contact with urban areas (Driessen & Völker, 2000; 
Piselli, 2007), for instance because they combine working in the city with living on the 
countryside. These people do not only have jobs that used to be done by urbanites, they 
also have contact with the city on almost a daily bases. On working days they often spent 
more conscious hours in the city as compared to the countryside. These increased trans-
portation possibilities in combination with an overall rise in prosperity of the middle and 
lower classes, have also made it possible for ever more young rural people to go studying 
in the big city. Some of them commute, others reside in city-based student locations. 
Some move to the city forever, but most of them move back – immediately after gradua-
tion or a few years later (De Corte, Raymaekers, Thaens, Vandecerckhove, & François, 
2003). 
Commuting possibilities further allowed former urban dwellers to move out of the city. 
Mostly to the suburban areas, in relatively close distance from a large agglomeration, but 
increasingly also to more remote rural areas (De Corte, et al., 2003). These immigrants do 
not only change rural-urban differences because they have an influence on statistical av-
erages (average income, educational level, or even average network features), their pres-
ence also influences the autochthone rural dwellers. In his famous study of Hertfordshire, 
a county in the London rural-urban fringe, Ray Pahl (Pahl, 1965b, 2008) argued that the 
arrival of urban immigrants introduced previously absent class consciousness and conflict 
in the rural community.  
Finally, the evolution in telecommunication has directly altered local social networks. Ac-
cording to Wellman (Collins & Wellman, 2010; Wellman, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2005) the 
personal networks of people living in small isolated rural settlements could be character-
ized as door-to-door networks. Those providing comfort, information and practical help all 
lived nearby and communication with them was based on belonging to a household. Possi-
bilities for accessing social resources were bounded by the position of the household in the 
local hierarchy. In the course of the twentieth century the development of communication 
and transportation possibilities gradually increased people’s opportunity to reach beyond 
the village and the neighborhood. “Place-to-place community links households that are not 
in the same neighborhood […] Physical closeness does not mean social closeness. Home is 
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now the base for relationships that are more voluntary and selective than the public com-
munities of the past.” (Wellman, 2001, p. 234). The next major step in the communication 
evolution are the mobile phones with personal numbers replacing fixed phones with a 
single number per household and computers with personal e-mail addresses and Face-
book-accounts replacing the single mailing address of the household (Ling & Campbell, 
2009). The new developments now undermines the role of the household in the establish-
ment of networks: “Where high-speed place to place communication supports the dispersal 
and fragmentation of community, high-speed person-to-person communication goes one 
step further and supports the dispersal and role-fragmentation of households” (Wellman, 
2001, p. 235). This evolution is what Wellman calls the rise of personalized networking,
and it is clear that the importance of place, and therefore of urban-rural differences, in 
network formation has steadily decreased.  
To sum up, in the past 150 years rural dwellers have increasingly been working in sectors 
and jobs outside of agriculture. Some of them commute on a daily bases to their urban 
working place. Some have grown up in urban centers, or lived there temporary during 
early adulthood. With the help of modern communication technology rural dwellers - at 
least in the wealthy industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America – can 
built there personal networks with members from all over the world, including from urban 
places. As a consequence even the remote low-density countryside has taken over urban 
culture and habits and has therefore lost its typical rural way of life (Lewis, 1970; Redclift, 
1973). If we take this argument to an extreme, we can say that rural-urban differences 
have ceased to exist or are no longer of any importance (Dewey, 1960; Friedland, 1982).  
Although one can hardly argue that technological and economic evolutions have not had 
an impact on the rural-urban divide, this impact should not be exaggerated (Fischer, 1987, 
1997; Florida, 2003). Thanks to research from Wellman and his associates (Carrasco, 
2008; Carrasco, Hogan, Wellman, & Miller, 2008; Mok, Wellman, & Basu, 2007; Mok, 
Wellman, & Carrasco, 2010) we know that distance still plays an important role for per-
sonal networking: as distance between two network members increases, the frequency of 
contact decreases. Of course, face-to-face contact is the most sensitive form of communi-
cation in this respect, but also phone contact and even e-mail contact seems to decrease 
with distance19. In a recent field experiment in rural India Matous, Tsuchiya and Ozwa 
(2011) concluded that the introduction of mobile phones in an isolated rural community 
did not have an overwhelming effect on the social networks of inhabitants. The phones 
were especially used to intensify contact with people that already belonged to their net-
work, but they did not use them to enlarge their networks or access new kinds of social 
                                                    
19 However, e-mail has a very peculiar relationship with distance between network members: “The 
frequency of e-mail shows a cusp point at 3000 miles: within 3000 miles, distance decreases by 0.2 per 
cent for each 1 per cent increase in distance; beyond 3000 miles, the frequency of contact increases at 
5.8 per cent” (Mok, et al., 2010, p. 2779). The most important consequence of e-mail is that it creates 
opportunities for keeping in touch with network members that live really far away. 
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resources. Intensive research into the influence of the internet on social networking 
(Bateman Driskell & Lyon, 2002; Hampton & Wellman, 2000, 2001, 2003; Mesch & 
Levanon, 2003; Wellman, Quan Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001) is leading to an emerging 
consensus, quite similar to the one of Matous and his colleagues: “Internet use supple-
ments network capital by extending existing levels of face-to-face and telephone contact. 
[…] Heavy Internet users neither use e-mail as a substitute for face-to-face visits and 
telephone calls nor visit and phone more often” (Wellman, et al., 2001, p. 450). Because 
distance seems to remain important for social contact, and because internet and mobile 
phone interaction exits for the most part out of contact with people who were already 
network members before getting connected online, we might expect urban-rural differ-
ences to persist (Stern & Wellman, 2010). Some evolutions in technology may even fur-
ther stimulate those differences. In a recent study Fischer (2002) concluded that because 
of the improvement in transportation possibilities Americans seem to move less than a 
number of decades ago, potentially increasing their attachment to their local community. 
Whether or not all of these changes have made rural-urban differences in access to and 
mobilization of social capital irrelevant is the empirical question this dissertation seeks to 
answer. 
4.3.2 Village in metropolis 
Whereas those emphasizing the role of technology in the disappearance of rural-urban 
differences seem to believe that these difference did exist in the past, others have at-
tacked the very idea that social networking has ever been different in cities as compared 
to the countryside. They believe people are biologically programmed to live in groups: 
they will under all circumstances connect with others (Wellman & Leighton, 1979; Wellman 
& Wortley, 1990). Local communities will therefore be equally present in the city as they 
are in the countryside. Likewise, kinship ties will be of equal importance in rural as in ur-
ban areas. Possible differences between country and city are not a consequence of the 
different social nature of rural and urban areas, but of the different characteristics of the 
people living in those areas (Goudy, 1990; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Stinner, Vanloon, 
Chung, & Byun, 1990). 
An important stimulation for this idea was Herbert Gans’ praised work The Urban Villagers 
(Gans, 1962a) in which he describes the social lives of the inhabitants of the Boston Italian 
immigrant neighborhood The West-End. Gans observed a community in which everyone 
knows everyone, in which there is a lot of gossip and social control, and people dispose of 
solidary ties on which they can draw in an hour of need. The Italian immigrants of the 
West End, almost exclusively originating from the Sicilian countryside, had adapted them-
selves to city-life, reproducing “the distrust of authority and self-protection that are typical 
of many peasant societies by building walls […] around the home and the family” (Zukin, 
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2007, p. 39). For Gans, urban sociologists overemphasize the importance of place and 
space. Every observed difference is attributed to features of space and the theories are to 
mechanical, leaving no space for individual agency. Gans believes that the way space is 
used and the kind of people using it really explain those differences. On the contrary, the 
direct mechanical effects of space on society are, so he claims, very small (Gans, 2002). 
Gans favours what he calls a use-centred view on the sociology of space, or in other words 
“for him, the materialities of both “space” and “nature” are ascribed lesser explanatory 
weight in sociological explanation, which centers instead on what people do to those 
things” (Gieryn, 2002, p. 342). Such a view is also taken by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) 
in their development of a systemic model of community attachment. They believe that 
community attachment is not as much a function of size or density, but especially of the 
amount of time people are living in their local community – with a longer length of resi-
dence resulting in greater community attachment. But also social position and stage in the 
life cycle (age in combination with civil status and whether or not one has children) are 
supposed to be among the causal determinants. Differences between urban and rural 
environments are a consequence of the fact that they attract different kinds of people 
(Milligan, 2003), not because there is an effect of urbanity per se. Statistical control for 
the real causal variables should show that the relationship between community size and 
density on the one hand and community attachment on the other is in fact spurious20. The 
systemic model has gained a lot of empirical support (e.g. Beggs, Hurlbert, & Haines, 
1996; Goudy, 1990; Sampson, 1988; Stinner, et al., 1990). Of course, Kasarda and 
Janowitz did not apply their model to social capital, but to community attachment which 
they define as the extent to which friendships are locally bound and people have affective 
attitudes towards their local community. But the same reasoning can easily be applied to 
our own research question: rural and urban regions attract people with different character-
istics. These characteristics effect social capital, which in turn explains why there are rural-
urban differences in social capital. That is one of the hypothesis that will be tested in the 
empirical part of this dissertation. 
4.4 FORMULATING HYPOTHESES 
As we have mentioned before, the theories outlined above are theories with a broad 
scope. They are applicable to the influence of urbanization on every aspect of human rela-
tions, and therefore also on access to social capital. In this paragraph, we will deduce 
                                                    
20 One could discuss whether a process of self-selection into urban and rural areas means that previ-
ously observed differences were spurious, or that there is an indirect effect of urbanity (e.g. De 
Maesschalck & Luyten, 2006). This is however largely a philosophical debate (what is causality). We will 
not get into it here. 
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explicit expectations from the aforementioned theories and apply them to the different 
indicators of social capital we discussed in Chapter 3. 
Isolation theory states that the city environment leads to a reduction of social control and 
a partial withdrawal from social life. Both elements are expected to have a negative effect 
on the exchange of social resources, especially on exchange of resources with network 
members belonging to the classic institutions of kin and neighborhood. Therefore, isolation 
theory expects that, all other things being equal, people living in urban environments will 
have less access to social capital as compared to those living in more rural environments. 
This will especially be the case for access to social capital from kinship ties. Therefore, 
urban respondents in surveys are, on average, expected to report less access to social 
resources and to make less use of specific social resources. 
But what about the social status composition of one’s network? As we pointed out in Chap-
ter 3, position generator measures refer to network status composition to estimate indi-
vidual’s access to social capital. In general, isolation theory portrays villages as communi-
ties in which occupational status plays a lesser role in social life (Berreman et al., 1978; 
Hamnet, 2001; Pahl, 1965a, 1965b, 2005, 2008; Wade, 1975; Warshay & Warshay, 
2002). At least in the sense that people from different status groups will know each other 
better, and therefore enter more often into exchange relationships. Therefore, isolation 
theory expects to find more socio-economic diversity in rural networks as compared to 
urban networks. There is no expectation that the average social status of the network will 
differ between rural and urban places. 
Isolation theory predicts a negative effect of an urban environment for social capital accu-
mulation for the entire population, but especially for the less privileged. A context which 
attenuates the protective classic institutions and puts the responsibility for the mainte-
nance of one’s support network more the hands of the individual will probably create more 
problems for the less privileged (Cantillon, Elchardus, & Pestieau, 2003; Engel & Strasser, 
1998; Pahl, 1988). Put differently, support networks based less on social control and more 
on free will, will increase the necessity to invest resources in those networks, creating 
more difficulties for those possessing less resources. Based on this theory we can expect 
that in urban environments the socio-economic inequalities in social capital will be rein-
forced. In other words, the effect of the socio-economic background of individuals on their 
access to social capital will be larger in urban areas as compared to rural areas. 
Liberalization theory tells a different story. The increase in availability of potential network 
partners and socializing possibilities and the decrease in social control gives individuals 
more control over the formation of their personal network. An urban network, built on free 
choice, will be better in terms of access to social resources in comparison to a network 
build on the constraints of the rural environment. As a consequence, urban dwellers are 
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expected to report more access to and mobilization of social resources. They are especially 
expected to exchange more with colleagues and just friends. Because people invest in the 
social relationships from which they expect the greatest return, and therefore have a pref-
erence for network partners with a slightly higher occupational status (cf. 2.2.2A), the 
liberalization theory expects that the average network status will be higher in cities as 
compared to the countryside. 
Table 1: Hypotheses deduced from the three main bodies of literature 
Iso lation Theory
 - Urban environments will generate less access to  social capital
 - Urban environments will generate less status diversity in personal networks
 - The (positive) effect of the socio-economic background on access to  social capital will be larger in the city
Liberalization Theory
 - Urban environments will generate more access to  social capital
 - Urban networks will have a higher average prestige level
City equals Countryside
 - No differences in social capital between rural and urban environments will be found
 - Differences will dissapear after contro l for individual level characteristics
Finally, the last school of theories we mentioned expects that no differences will be found. 
Either because people are gregarious animals and therefore biologically programed to form 
relationships or because in contemporary society every difference between country and 
city that might have ones existed has been wiped because of ever better and cheaper 
communication and transportation technologies. If differences can be found they can be 
explained by the compositional effect: because urban and rural places attract different 
people, and because differences in term of status, income, education, age, marital status, 
etc. explain differences in access to social capital, statistically controlling for these varia-
bles should explain all urban-rural differences away. 
4.5 STATE OF THE RESEARCH 
In the first three parts of this chapter we discussed the three main theoretical ideas about 
the influence of urbanization on social relationships in general. In the fourth part, we de-
duced from these theories some clear and testable expectations concerning urban-rural 
differences in social capital. In this part we make a round-up of the empirical research that 
has (partly) tested those hypotheses. In this part, we concentrate on research that has 
specifically tested access to and mobilization of individual social capital as we have defined 
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it in Chapter 2. We try to draw some conclusions from this empirical work and show why 
our research will take scientific knowledge on the subject one step further.  
Most empirical work on differences in social capital transaction between urban and rural 
regions has either concentrated on the exchange of one specific social resource and/or  on 
exchanges in a specific social group. For instance, some research has been done on urban-
rural differences on how underprivileged groups use their social network in order to sur-
vive. Henk Meert (2000) compared the survival strategies of a group of rural poor native 
Belgians with urban poor native Belgians and urban poor Turkish immigrants in Belgium. 
He found that in relevant terms the rural group developed strategies that were more 
aimed at non-market reciprocal exchanges, while urban native Belgians relied more on 
welfare state arrangements and Turkish immigrants on the market strategies (second 
hand shops, small Turkish entrepreneurs selling food at relatively low prices, …). The same 
conclusion was drawn from a comparable research project in the United States (Morton, 
Bitto, Oakland, & Sand, 2008). In another study with underprivileged in the United States 
conclusions were more complex. No rural-urban differences in childcare help and money 
help were found, but rural residents did seem to get more informal transportation assis-
tance (although the latter could simply imply a greater need for such assistance in rural 
areas). Additionally, urban residents got less help from relatives as compared to rural 
residents (Neustrom, Deseran, & Don, 2001). 
Another group that has been given some attention are the elderly. Dinkel (1944) com-
pared the attitudes towards supporting aged parents between urban and rural regions 
during the second world war in the United States. He found that urbanites were less sup-
portive towards their parents in comparison to their rural counterparts. However, when 
Wake en Sporakowski (1972) did the same a few decades later, they couldn’t observe any 
statistically significant difference. When Lee, Coward and Netzer (1994) compared the 
expectations of older persons towards receiving aid from their children, they observed that 
those born in the rural regions of Florida expected more help than those born in the urban 
regions. An investigation into older people’s neighborhood networks in the Netherlands did 
not show any urban-rural difference in exchanging help with neighbors (Thomése, 1998). 
Finally, A Chinese study (Zeng, 2004) showed more perceived access to social capital for 
rural older people, but more actual mobilization of social capital for those living in the city. 
Patients with a permanent need of assistance have also been the subject of this kind of 
research. In Spain, Alamo Martell and his colleagues (1999) found that rural patients had 
more difficulty communicating problems and asking for help. However, in an American 
study rural patients that had suffered traumatic brain injury were more open to seeking 
social support (Farmer, Clark, & Sherman, 2003), whereas in an Indian study households 
with a family member suffering from chronic schizophrenia expressed equal social support 
in rural as in urban regions (Mubarak Ali & Bhatti, 1988). We also discovered a study of 
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speech-language pathologists reporting less perceived access to social resources in urban 
environments (Blood, Thomas, Ridenour, Qualls, & Hammer, 2002). 
Some research attention has been devoted to rural-urban difference in the extent to which 
people make more use of their social networks in order to find a job. Both in Canadian 
(Matthews, Pendakur, & Young, 2009) as in British Research (Lindsay, Greig, & McQuaid, 
2005) job seekers in rural areas relied more on their social network as did job seekers in 
urban areas. In a Danish study, young entrepreneurs in rural areas received more help 
from their social network for establishing their business (Freire-Gibb & Nielsen, 2011). 
Finally, Hofferth and Iceland (1998) investigated patterns of money flows between fami-
lies. They concluded that rural families were more likely than urban ones to exchange only 
with kin. In general, rural families received more money aid than urban families did, and 
those that grew up in rural regions gave more financial support than those who grew up in 
the city. 
Other research didn’t look at the exchange of resources, but at the number of person with 
whom resources are exchanged. Mollenhorst, Bekkers and Völker (2005) found that Dutch 
urban dwellers had more informal helpers as compared to rural dwellers. A comparable 
founding was reported by Fischer (1982) in his study of northern California. However, 
Fischer didn’t simply count the number of helpers in the network, but looked at how many 
people were in danger of not having enough help because they reported only a small num-
ber of possible helpers. On the other hand, an study in the US, examining exclusively older 
people, showed that urban dwellers had less helpers as compared to rural dwellers (Lee & 
Whitbeck, 1987). 
Still other studies examined the diversity of social networks. Beggs, Haines and Hurlbert 
(1996) investigated diversity in educational attainment of the network partners in Louisi-
ana and found more diversity in the city. In Canada Bonnie Erickson (2004) investigated 
rural-urban differences in status diversity of networks (using the position generator), re-
porting more diversity on the countryside. In Belgium, Vanhoutte en Hooghe (2009) ex-
amined network diversity in terms of religious and sexual orientation, etnic background, 
political ideas and age. They found that in more urban municipalities people one average 
had more diverse networks. 
An American study of middle school students reported higher perceived access to social 
resources in rural areas as compared to suburban and urban areas (Wenz-Gross & Parker, 
1999). We know of only two studies that compared urban and rural areas on a relatively 
large number of social resources for the general population. In their study of the Nether-
lands, Vermeij and Mollenhorst (2008) looked at receiving help for shopping, getting 
somewhere, bringing the children somewhere and health care. Significant differences could 
only be found for getting help doing shopping from friends and acquaintances and being 
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brought somewhere by friends and acquaintances, with urban dwellers reporting more 
mobilized help. However, when asked about giving health care to others, rural dwellers 
reported more supply of help. Another study compared a rural and suburban community in 
Kansas on perceived access to social resources with the general population. Although they 
found that in the rural community inhabitants had more frequent contact with their sup-
port network, there was no difference in the available aid through that network (Lemke, 
Lichtenberg, & Arachtingi, 1992). We should however note that the sample sizes used 
were very small (40 urban and 40 rural respondents). 
To sum up, underprivileged groups seem to make more use of their social network on the 
countryside. For the elderly most research didn’t find any difference. And when they did, 
rural areas had an advantage. For people with a protracted illness, findings were contra-
dictory. Job seekers and young entrepreneurs seemed to rely more on their network in 
rural areas as compared to urban areas. As far as the number of informal helpers is con-
cerned, urban areas seemed to be advantageous. But this was not the case when only 
older people were studied. For network diversity we found two studies reporting an urban 
advantage and another one reporting a rural advantage. The few studies examining differ-
ences in a relatively large number of resources lead once again to contradictory conclu-
sions. American rural middle school students reported more access to social resources as 
compared to their urban counterparts. In the Dutch general population, differences were 
only to be found concerning help from friends, and giving an advantage to urban places. 
Finally, in a Kansas case study no difference in available aid could be found. 
In other words, findings in the literature are not at all consistent. This is no surprise, since 
there are huge differences in research populations and social resources under investiga-
tion. Our own empirical research will look both at the socio-economic composition of the 
network as at the exchange of a large number of social resources. A part of it is done on a 
large sample of the general Belgian population. The other part is done on data from a so 
far unexamined student population (At least as far as rural-urban differences in social 
support are concerned). Moreover, for the first time hypotheses will be tested on compa-
rable data gathered in different countries (Belgium and Spain, cf. infra). Therefore, this 
research will constitute an important contribution to the literature. 
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Chapter 5
The rural-urban contrast: some theoretical 
and practical issues 
In the previous chapters we have been talking about rural-urban differences, city versus 
countryside, urbanization and so forth. We all have an intuitive idea about the meaning of 
these concepts, but for reasons of comparability and growth of knowledge scientific re-
search needs clear definitions and operationalization. Therefore, in this chapter we elabo-
rate on the theoretical and operational choices we made in this respect. 
5.1 DEFINING URBAN AND RURAL 
Rural and urban are adjectives that are applicable to geographical locations where people 
live. In other words, the adjectives serve to distinguish between different kinds of human 
settlements. According to Frey and Zimmer the urban concept “is an abstraction that in-
volves a series of interrelated factors” (2001, p. 25). Some of these factors are ecological. 
They are about the size and density of the settlement. Others are economic. In contrast to 
a rural economy, in an urban economy the share of agriculture in employment and GDP is 
relatively small, while the share of the political and administrative service sector is rela-
tively large. Finally, some social factors determine an urban place. We are talking about 
“the way urban people live, their behavioral characteristics, their values, the way they 
perceive the world, and the way they interrelate” (Frey & Zimmer, 2001, p. 26).  
Incorporating all these factors into the definition of an urban place can, however, be very 
problematic. First of all, as we have shown in section 4.1.1, if we were to define rural 
regions as those regions in which the economy is predominantly agricultural, not much 
rural areas would still be present in Europe. But even more problematic would be the inte-
gration of social factors into the definition. After all, such a “sociological definition of the 
city” (Gans, 1962b, p. 643) incorporates some of the very effects of city life we want to 
investigate. In order to be able to make testable statements about the influence of living 
in an urban place, the definition of urban should be ecological rather than social. In that 
way the definition of what is a city is prior to the creation of theory on the possible effects 
of city life and circular reasoning can be avoided (Fischer, 1976). Whether or not such 
effects exist can then be determined by empirical testing. Therefore, we choose to define 
an urban place as “a relatively large and permanent concentration of people in a bounded 
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area” (Zenner, 1996, p. 203). Conversely, a rural place is an area is which the concentra-
tion of people is relatively small. 
5.2 DEMARCATING URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 
5.2.1 Difficulties applying the size-variable 
Now we have decided that a settlement can be regarded as more urban when there are 
more people living in it21, we need to decide how to demarcate the settlement on which to 
apply the definition. 
One option would be to apply it to a residential nucleus, i.e. a continuous build-up area. 
For case-studies it might be possible to delimit such zones manually. For studies like ours, 
who make use of a very large number of observations, such an endeavor would be very 
costly in both time and money. An alternative is to make use of existing geographical 
circumscriptions. In most countries, the smallest of such circumscriptions are the statisti-
cal neighborhoods demarcated by the national census bureaus, called statistische sectoren
in Belgium and secciones censales in Spain, comparable with the census tracks in the US. 
The correspondence between actual residential nucleus and census tracks is not perfect, 
but, at least in Belgium, it comes pretty close. For larger nucleus, different tracks have to 
be combined.  
However, for a lot of research no information of the exact location of the respondents is 
available. The only geographical information available in most databases, is the municipali-
ty respondents reside in. One could then, in order to determine how urban a certain mu-
nicipality is, simply count the number of people living in it (e.g. Lämmle, Worth, & Bös, 
2012). Yet such a procedure would pose a number of serious problems. For instance, if we 
were to order the Belgian municipalities Assenede and Sint-Martens-Latem according to 
number of inhabitants and regard that variable as our operationalization of urbanization, 
we would decide that Assenede (14 000 inhabitants) is more urban than Sint-Martens-
Latem (8300 inhabitants). However, the latter municipality is part of the agglomeration of 
the city of Ghent, whereas the first is a set of small villages. Of course, an important rea-
son for this mess-up is that Assenede (87 km2) is much bigger in surface than Sint-
Martens-Latem (14 km2). We could therefore choose to use population density as an indi-
cator. Although this choice would put Sint-Martens-Latem (581 inhabitants per km2) be-
fore Assenede (158 inhabitants per km2), it would also lead to deciding that Mesen (265 
                                                    
21 With living in a city we do not only refer to residing in a city, but also to shopping, working and rec-
reating there. After all, a settlement concentrating a large number of functions that attract a great 
number of people concentrates more people, and is therefore more urban, as compared to a settlement 
with the same amount of inhabitants but withouth those functions. 
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inhabitants per km2, but a small village of 1000 inhabitants relatively far from any large 
urban center) is more urban than Aalter (238 inhabitants per km2, but with a center of 
about 10 000 inhabitants and relatively close to the city of Ghent). In other words, using a 
municipality’s population size or population density as an indicator of its urban character 
seems to lead to an invalid ordering of these municipalities. 
Moreover, there is even a more fundamental problem with using size and density of mu-
nicipalities or census tracks as an operationalization of urbanization. Such 
operationalizations seem to depart from the idea that the influence of a big settlement 
stops at its morphological or political boundaries. In the light of the development of cheap 
and effective transportation technologies this is a superseded view. Someone who resides 
in a small village on a ten minute drive from a large urban area is exposed to a greater 
concentration of people as compared to someone living in an equally small village but on a 
two hour drive from the first large urban area (Curtis White & Guest, 2003). This is anoth-
er reason why a straightforward application of the size variable would lead to invalid deci-
sions. 
5.2.2 The idea of a functional urban area 
Let’s summarize our point so far. Size and density are the predominant variables that 
differentiate between rural and urban settings. Yet, mechanically applying these variables 
to existing geographical circumscriptions seems to lead to an invalid ordering and doesn’t 
take into account that larger settlements have an influence on people living beyond their 
morphological and political boundaries. We therefore need a different point of departure. 
In order to find this point of departure, we must take a closer look at the history of mod-
ern urbanization in the industrialized world. 
The story starts with the industrial revolution that made big production facilities become 
much more competitive than the small scale traditional production that had been dominant 
before the nineteenth century. Some of these facilities were set up in urban places were 
many working men were already available. The factories attracted numerous new formerly 
rural laborers that settled in their immediate surroundings creating zones of new dense 
urban development directly attached to the existing urban structure. An example is the 
Belgian city of Ghent where the areas that were built at that time are called the 19th centu-
ry belt, and still constitute the city’s most densely populated neighborhoods. In other cas-
es, the production facilities were established were a lot of natural resources (especially 
coal) were available. The factories also attracted workers that settled in the immediate 
vicinity. In this way new large urban centers developed at an extremely rapid pace. A 
Belgian example of such a city is Charleroi, that grew from a small village of a few 1000 
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inhabitants in the beginning of the 19th century to an agglomeration of over 300 000 by 
1910.  
In consequence of the rapid urban growth, competition for scare urban space intensified 
sharply and pushed up land prices in city centers. Houses for the working class were often 
extremely small, of low quality and of relatively high cost. Poor sanitary conditions and all 
kinds of pollution from the factories created unhealthy living conditions. Low wages, bad 
working conditions, the absence of welfare arrangements and recurrent periods of high 
unemployment stimulated alcoholism, crime and violence. As a result, many members of 
the higher classes started to display an aversion from city life and settled outside the city 
centers. Of course, living conditions for the rural poor were at that time also quite deplor-
able. Access to a small piece of land creating the opportunity to grow vegetables and 
breed small livestock might have made the situation somewhat better, but what was more 
important for the high-class immigrants was that social control in the villages was stronger 
and prevented criminal and violent acts towards them, just as it prevented the lower clas-
ses from getting involved in the organized labor movement (Reynebeau, 2003). Because 
the wealthy could afford to keep a carriage or a motor car, commuting to the center for 
work and leisure was possible for them. For the lower and middle classes, commuting only 
became an option after the transformation to the Fordist welfare state22. Mass production 
and democratization lead to a substantive rise in purchasing power for the lower middle 
and working classes. The possession of a car made it possible to move from low-quality 
houses in the old neighborhoods of the 19th century belt and go living in detached and 
semi-detached houses in newly developed neighborhoods (Kopecky & Suen, 2010; Wang, 
2010). Sometimes these neighborhoods were attached to the existing urban agglomera-
tion, but often they were situated in formerly rural quite a distance away from the ag-
glomeration (Gold, 2002).  
The result of this process was the development of a wide perimeter around the city that is 
characterized by intensive material and immaterial links to the urban center. With immate-
rial links we refer to the fact that many inhabitants of the villages and small towns in that 
perimeter used to live in the center and that they commute on a daily basis to the center 
for work, schooling, shopping and entertainment. With the immaterial links we refer to the 
existence of an integrated labor and real estate market on which people form the city 
center compete with others from the suburban fringe (Gaussier, Lacour, & Puissant, 2003; 
Navarro, 2011). The combination of this perimeter and the urban agglomeration is often 
referred to as a Functional Urban Region (FUR). In the fringe areas of such a region we 
can find all kinds of landscapes and land uses. Some of them have a completely urban 
character, some are mixed and others are even completely rural (Antrop, 2000, 2004). 
                                                    
22 Before the democratization of the automobile, the train sometimes offered an affordable commuting 
possibility. This was for instance the case in Belgium were the government strongly encouraged it. We 
come back to this in the next chapter. 
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However, the idea behind the functional urban areas is that areas that morphologically 
might appear rural can still be highly influenced by urbanization. We can say that people 
residing in those areas are living in an urban environment of high population concentration 
because they come into contact with the urban center on a day-to-day basis (Frey & Zim-
mer, 2001).  
The way we described the FUR in the previous is to some extent an oversimplification. In 
the process of sub- and counterurbanization, not only people, but also functions moved 
away from the city center. Most of the industry is now located on industrial parks outside 
the central agglomerations. Large shopping malls and recreation facilities are often found 
alongside the access routes of urban centers. The structure of FUR’s evolves more and 
more from monocentricity to polycentricity with each part having a specific function (van 
der Laan, 1998). Some authors go as far as to claim that no hierarchy among those cen-
ters can be determined anymore (Dear, 2002). Although we acknowledge the polycentric 
structure of FUR’s, we are convinced that large agglomerations still have an important 
center function for their hinterland since it are especially the settlements close to the larg-
er cities that count many outgoing commuters, whereas those larger cities are the ones 
counting a lot of incoming commuters (Vanderbiessen & Jacobs, 2012). Also, inter-
municipality shopping trips are predominantly directed towards the larger urban centers 
(Desmyttere, Termote, & Nieuwborg, 2007). It is therefore still valid to say that large 
agglomerations constitute the greatest concentration of people and are therefore the most 
urban places. People living in the suburban belt are also living in an environment of high 
concentration, partly because of the proximity and intensive contact with these large ag-
glomerations and partly because the suburban zone itself concentrates many people and 
functions. 
This concept of the functional urban region will be our new point of departure for the de-
limitation of rural and urban areas because it “recognizes that urbanization has overflowed 
traditional city boundaries leaving neighboring communities tied together in large metro-
politan agglomerations that supersede the boundaries of individual places” (Curtis White & 
Guest, 2003, p. 245). But this starting point does not solve all of our problems yet. One 
important problem is that not all social groups in a certain area interact just as much with 
the nearby city. Theoretically, an exact boundary of were the FUR begins and were it stops 
can therefore never be determined (Davoudi, 2007; Gans, 2009). But for most empirical 
research endeavors (such as ours), drawing some kind of boundary is a necessity. There-
fore, in order to create delineations that are as valid as possible, these boundaries should 
be determined on empirical grounds and be dependent of functional interaction between 
city and surrounding areas. In our own empirical research we will use such an empirically 
determined delimitation (cf. Chapter 6). 
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5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARABILITY 
5.3.1 The specificity of Belgian urbanization 
Some elements of Belgium’s recent history have had a profound impact on the it’s urban 
development, explaining why it is so different from most countries in Europe. First of all, 
Belgium was the second country in the world (after the United Kingdom) to become indus-
trialized. Consequently, the growth of urban centers also happened very early (Hohenberg, 
2003). It confronted the conservative and catholic elite of that time with a very difficult 
dilemma. On the one hand they needed the labors to come working in the urban centers 
where the factories that made them wealthy and powerful were situated. On the other 
hand they wanted to avoid a concentration of the impoverished working class in the cities. 
Workers were better to stay in their villages were the social control of the clergyman pre-
vented them from becoming more politically aware and involved. A solution for this di-
lemma was found in the development and subsidization of the railway system. The first 
train on the continent rode between Brussels and Mechelen in 1835, and by 1860 all in-
dustrial and urban centers in Belgium were connected through the railway system. But 
even more important for our story is the development of a light railway system that con-
nected the villages on the countryside with the main network. In no other country in the 
world the railway system was that closely knit as it was in Belgium. And in no other coun-
try workers commuting tickets were maid that cheap trough subsidization (De Block & 
Polasky, 2011). In Belgium, “urbanism has developed not only through the drift of people 
into the towns but also, more than in any other country in the world, through the devel-
opment of the daily journey from home to workplace” (Dickinson, 1957). 
But not only policies aimed at stimulating commuting, also housing and planning policies 
were responsible for the creation an extraordinary amount of urban sprawl. As soon as 
1889 legislation was passed to promote individual homeownership for the masses, but 
these policies were especially successful when wages seriously increased after the second 
world war. They led to a huge boom in housing development and were one of the reasons 
that Belgium was the first country in the world were suburban growth was more important 
than urban growth (Champion, 2001). Policies of private ownership were of major im-
portance in stimulating urban sprawl because they were combined with a lack of urban 
planning. Whereas industrialization and politics stimulating commuting and private owner-
ship began much earlier than in the surrounding countries, urban planning only came 
much later. The boom in housing construction after the second world war, stimulated by 
homeownership policies, happened virtually without any spatial planning. Houses were 
therefore constructed were land was the least expensive: on the countryside (De Decker, 
2011). 
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The policies described above restricted the growth of Belgium’s urban centers. As a conse-
quence, the Belgian urban structure is characterized by the presence of relatively small 
cities on a very limited distance from one another. Additionally, these cities and their sub-
urban rings are in international perspective rather sparsely populated. So although the 
magnitude of Belgium’s city regions is rather modest when we look at the number of in-
habitant, they are very large when we look at the surface they employ (Kesteloot, 2002). 
And because these city regions are located on a small distance from one another, very few 
rural areas are left out of their sphere of influence. Moreover, those areas that can be 
considered rural, are in international perspective densely populated, characterized by a lot 
of sprawl and ribbon development (De Decker, 2011; De Decker, Kesteloot, De 
Maesschalck, & Vranken, 2005; Lenders, Lauwers, Vervloet, & Kerselaers, 2005). In sum-
mary, Belgium is characterized by sparsely populated and relatively small cities and a 
countryside that for the most part is relatively densely populated. In an international per-
spective, the spatial differences23 between rural and urban environments in Belgium are 
very limited.  
This is especially the case in Flanders. First because in the coal belt of Wallonia industriali-
zation and urbanization happened earlier and faster, so that the policies discussed above 
had less of an influence. As a consequence the urban centers of Wallonia are somewhat 
more densely populated than the ones in Flanders (Kesteloot, 2002). Second, in the south 
of Wallonia (the Ardennes region) the land is more hilly and less fertile and has therefore 
always been more sparsely populated. Consequently, both the only real rural region and 
the more densely populated cities of Belgium can be found in Wallonia. 
Of course this unique situation might have serious consequences for the interpretation of 
our results and the international value of our conclusions. Imagine we do not find any or 
only very little difference in social capital between rural and urban regions in Belgium. This 
finding could point to the irrelevance of urban-rural differences, but could equally be ex-
plained by the exceptionally small spatial differences between rural and urban environ-
ments in Belgium. A replication of our research design in a country were spatial rural-
urban differences are much larger would therefore be an important test for the robustness 
of our findings. 
5.3.2 Looking for a contrasting case 
Because we are looking for a mirror image of the Belgian settlement structure, we are 
looking for a country that is typified by large and dense cities, relatively small suburban 
rings and a very sparsely populated countryside. Moreover, we would like that country to 
                                                    
23 We explicitly refer to the spatial differences. With that we means the density of construction and 
habitation. Whether or not this implies that there will be less social differences we will have to find out 
through our empirical analysis. 
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differ a little as possible on all other variables, so if we find a different effect of urbaniza-
tion in that country as compared to Belgium, we can attribute it with more certainty to the 
difference in the spatial urban structure. 
Figure 5: Residential Density in 15 European Cities (Kasanko et al., 2006) 
It is a well-known fact in the literature that the cities in the countries surrounding the 
Mediterranean show a specific pattern of urbanization (Hall, 1980; Kasanko, et al., 2006). 
Whereas cities in central and northern Europe are in general more dispersed, southern 
European cities are in general relatively compact (cf. Figure 5): they have smaller subur-
ban rings and a densely populated core (Munoz, 2003). The difference between southern 
and northern European cities is usually explained by the fact that in southern Europe ur-
banization started much later. As a consequence, the development of the suburban rings 
also started later. Therefore, they are not yet as large as northern European ones and not 
yet as much metropolitan dwellers live in the suburban rings. This is especially the case for 
Spain where only from the late 1970’s - early 1980’s the suburbanization process has been 
set into motion (García-Coll, 2011; Lanaspa, Pueyo, & Sanz, 2002; Le Gallo & Chasco, 
2008; Morillo Rodríguez & Susino Arbucias, 2010). Moreover, this difference will not nec-
essarily disappear in the future. Some authors point to the fact that suburbanization pro-
cesses in different regions do not run perfectly parallel (Dura-Guimera, 2003). In Spain, 
there is traditionally a preference for high density urban development and a negative atti-
tude towards suburbanization, suggesting that urban sprawl will never be as intense as it 
is now in for instance Belgium  (Módenes & López-Colás, 2007). Also, development in the 
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suburban core of Spanish metropoles is also characterized by higher densities as compared 
to northern cities (Catalán, Saurí, & Serra, 2008).  
The Spanish settlement pattern is not only typified by the high density of its cities. The 
country also contains, together with the Nordic countries and Ireland, the most sparsely 
populated rural areas of the European Union (cf. Reginster & Rounsevell, 2006 and Figure 
5). Because of these and some practical considerations on which we will elaborate in Chap-
ter 6, Spain was considered an ideal contrasting case. 
Figure 6: Average population density in predominantly rural regions (source: Eurostat)  
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PART 2 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
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Chapter 6
 Introduction to the empirical part 
In this first part of our dissertation we explained that the main goal of this dissertation is 
to find out if and how living in an urban or rural environment effects access to and mobili-
zation of social capital. In the literature, different answers to this question have been for-
mulated. Some authors claim that a rural environment is more favorable, while others are 
convinced that an urban environment is better. Still other authors discard the idea that the 
urbanization of the environment matters at all. We explained that for us social capital is an 
attribute of an individual that indicates to what extend he (she) can make use of resources 
possessed by the alters in his (her) personal network for his (her) own goal attainment. 
This conceptualization of social capital is in line with the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and Nan 
Lin, but rejects those of Robert Putnam and other members of the so called ‘collective 
school of social capital’.  
Subsequently, we dealt with the measurement of social capital. We pointed out that an 
individual’s social capital can be measured by assessing his (her) access to occupational 
prestige, his (her) perceived access to a number of social resources or his (her) actual use 
of a number of social resources. We discussed some theoretical issues regarding the defi-
nition and delimitation of urban and rural space.  
Finally, we defended the position that for our purpose an urban place should be defined as 
a large concentration of people. The concept of a functional urban region helps us to apply 
this definition to existing geographical delimitations. We remarked that Belgium, and espe-
cially Flanders, is typified by small and sparsely populated cities and a densely populated 
countryside. As a consequence, urban-rural differences are quite small. The urban struc-
ture of Spain is in almost every respect the mirror image of that of Belgium (Flanders). 
Therefore, the country is typified by large urban-rural differences and constitutes an ideal 
contrasting case. 
In the second, empirical, part of this dissertation, we will test a number of hypothesis 
deduced from the literature. Before we get started with the analysis, we give an overview 
about the data sources, measures and statistical models that will be used. This overview is 
limited and serves to give the reader a better idea about what is to follow. In the subse-
quent  two chapters we report on the analysis of our data. 
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6.1 DATA SOURCES 
6.1.1 Data on people 
Data on access to and mobilization of social capital is not abundantly available. Fortunate-
ly, between 2004 and 2007, the Belgian statistical authorities included a small questions 
battery on perceived access to social resources to the questionnaire of the EU-SILC (Euro-
pean Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). The EU-SILC also includes a ques-
tion on free child care by family, friends and neighbors and on exchange of financial aid 
between families.  
Although the SILC contains a lot of very useful data, it doesn’t contain any information on 
access to occupational prestige and neither does any other large and representative da-
taset. However, a questionnaire distributed among the Ghent University students (the 
Studentens Barometer) did include a position generator. It also included a resource gener-
ator. Because we are mainly interested in effects for the general population, student data 
are suboptimal, but because of the uniqueness of the data we chose to use them anyway. 
As we have mentioned in Chapter 5, Belgium has a very peculiar urban structure. Because 
the small rural-urban differences resulting from that peculiar structure, testing our hy-
pothesis exclusively on Belgian data might lead to a serious underestimation of the effects 
of living in an urban versus a rural area. Therefore, we would have liked to test our hy-
potheses on the SILC-data from other participating countries. Unfortunately, the questions 
on individual social capital were only included in the Belgian questionnaire. Replicating the 
questionnaire ourselves was impossible given the enormous costs of the data collection 
(he SILC-data are, at least in Belgium, based on face-to-face interviews with a representa-
tive sample of the complete Belgian population). On the contrary, the Students Barometer 
is an online questionnaire that is distributed through the institutional e-mail addresses of 
students. Because this procedure is much cheaper and demand to much working hours, its 
replication in another country was considered feasible. 
We choose to replicate our questionnaire at the University of Granada (UGR) in Spain. This 
choice was based on both substantial and practical reasons. Substantially, Spain is a good 
contrasting case for Belgium because of the high density of its cities of the low density of 
its countryside. Practically, a number of considerations were important. First of all, Spain 
counts a large number of urban centers. Because this increases the number highly level 
observations coded very urban, this poses a statistical advantage over countries (such as 
Ireland and the Nordic countries) that only count one or a few large urban centers (alt-
hough UGR students originate predominantly form Andalusia, an important part of them 
also come from the other regions of Spain). Second, and most importantly, replicating 
such a survey means that one has to find a ghost institution that is enthusiastic about 
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receiving a guest researcher for a while and that preferably has some substantial 
knowledge on the topic. Because of its long standing specialization in rural and urban 
social theory, the sociology department of the UGR was considered as a good possibility. 
Moreover, our contact at the UGR immediately showed a lot of interest for the project, 
which was not the case for some other research institutions that were contacted. 
6.1.2 And data on places 
Our main purpose here is to test whether there is a link between a characteristic of an 
individual (social capital) and a characteristic of a place (urban-rural). This means that we 
do not only have to gather data on people and on the places where those people live, we 
also have to be able to link those two together. 
The SILC dataset contains detailed information on the residential location of the respond-
ent. Normally, the dataset only includes the municipality of residence and when the munic-
ipality is a merger of formerly independent municipalities also on that formerly independ-
ent municipality where the respondent lives. When ordering the data from the national 
statistics office, we requested to include information on the statistical sector of the re-
spondent. The statistical authorities complied with that request. In the Student Barometer, 
both in the original Belgian questionnaire as in the replication in Spain, there was a ques-
tion included on the postal code of the place where the student originates from. This postal 
code could in both countries be linked to a municipality. 
As compared to data on people, data on places are much more easily available. Both the 
Belgian (ADSEI) and the Spanish national statistics institute (INE) provide municipality-
level data that is partly, but not exclusively, based on census data. These data were down-
loaded from their respective websites. 
6.2 MEASURES 
6.2.1 Social capital measures 
As we have discussed at length in Chapter 3, there are many ways to measure social capi-
tal. The choice of the measures used is in the first place determined by the data that were 
available to us (cf. supra). In the SILC-dataset two measures of social capital transactions 
restricted to a specific domain are available. The first measure is about free childcare from 
family, friends and neighbors. The second one is about financial aid. Both measures will be 
used. Such measures are not present in the Students Barometer data. 
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In the SILC as well as in the Students Barometers a resource generator is available. Using 
Rash moddeling (cf. heading 6.3.1), the raw scores will be translated to a metric measure. 
Finally, in the Students Barometers also a position generator is present. A number of dif-
ferent measures can be derived from the position generator. We will use the measures 
Average Accessed Prestige and Standard Deviation of Accessed Prestige. We will not use 
the Total Accessed Prestige measure because this measure is a function of three different 
personal network features: size, occupational diversity and average status. We believe 
that urbanization might have a different effect on these three different features. Conse-
quently, using a measure that is a combination of these different features can only lead to 
confusion. A better strategy is to look at those network features separately. We do not 
look at network size separately because the position generator does not lead to valid data 
on network size24.
6.2.2 Demarcation of rural and urban areas 
The demarcation of rural and urban areas that we will use is based on the idea of function-
al urban areas as we have outlined in Chapter 5. In Belgium, already by the end of the 
seventies social geographers have mapped these areas (Van der Haegen & Pattyn, 1979). 
The exercise was based on the data of the census of 1971 and has been updated twice 
since. First, using the census data of 1991 (Van der Haegen, Van Hecke, & Juchtmans, 
1998) and a decade later using those of 2001 (Luyten & Van Hecke, 2007). We will of 
course be using the latest updated version. Although it is the most recent, the data it is 
based on are already more than a decade old. Fortunately, we know from comparing the 
previous updates that the delimitation is quite stable over time, so we can be relatively 
sure that since 2001 no tremendous changes will have taken place. 
Luyten and Van Hecke identify 18 functional urban areas in Belgium. Two criteria have to 
be met for a city to be considered a FUA. First of all, the agglomeration has to contain at 
least 75 000 inhabitants. But more importantly, the city has to create a dynamic leading to 
the development of a suburban area. That is the reason that Aalst, Roeselare, Arlon and La 
Louvière are not included in the list while Turnhout is. Within the group of 18 FUA’s the 
authors distinguish between three groups. The first group only includes Brussels because it 
is the only real international metropolis of Belgium. The second group contains the big 
cities of the country, i.e. Antwerp, Ghent, Liège and Charleroi. The third group are the 
regional cities Ostend, Brugges, Kortrijk, Sint-Niklaas, Turnhout, Mechelen, Hasselt, Genk, 
Leuven, Mons, Verviers, Tournai and Namur. 
                                                    
24 Cf. heading 3.2.3B for more detailed information on the calculation of these measures and their 
respective advantages and disadvantages. 
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Table 2: Criteria for classification of Belgian municipalities 
Central agglomeration At least 20% of the population lives in the morphological agglomeration 
Suburb - Population growth between 1981 and 2003 >= 15%
- Median income in the municipality >= median income in the entire Larger 
Urban Area 
- At least 40% of immigration in the municipality between 1992 and 2001 origi-
nates from the central agglomeration or At least 25% of the out-migration from 
the municipality between 1992 and 2001 directed towards the central agglom-
eration
- At least 25% of the working population commutes daily to the central agglom-
eration
- At least 50% of all commuters in the municipality commutes to the central 
agglomeration 
- At least 35% of the students of the municipality commute to the central ag-
glomeration 
- The proportion of build-over surface in the municipality is at least 20% or the 
amount of build-over surface has risen with 30% since 1991 
Commuters' Zone At least 15% of the working population commutes daily to the central            
agglomeration 
Outer Zone All other municipalities
On the level of municipalities a distinction is made between municipalities belonging to the 
central agglomeration of a FUA, municipalities belonging to the suburban area and munici-
palities belonging to the commuters’ zone. Municipalities belonging to neither one of these 
categories are considered to be rural. There is a difference between the morphological 
agglomeration and the operational agglomeration. Morphologically, the agglomeration is 
the entire area of continuous build-over surface. The frontiers of such an agglomeration do 
not coincide perfectly with the political/administrative frontiers of municipalities. Therefore, 
for a municipality in order to be classified as belonging to a central agglomeration, at least 
50% of its inhabitants have to be living in the morphological agglomeration. In order to 
assign municipalities to the suburban zone, a number of criteria are listed (cf. Table 2). 
Municipalities are considered as a part of the commuters’ zone when at least 15% of the 
working population commutes on a daily basis to the central agglomeration. The other 
municipalities are put in the category of the outer zone. The result of this delimitation is 
presented in Figure 7. 
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For Spain, a delineation based on the idea of functional urban areas has been developed 
by José Feria (Feria Toribio, 2008, 2010). He considered municipalities counting more than 
100 000 inhabitants as being cabaceras metropolitanas or metropolitan cores. Some pro-
vincial capitals that have a little less than 100 000 inhabitants are also considered as met-
ropolitan cores. Municipalities having a strong relationship with the core in terms of com-
muting for work are classified as the rest of the metropolitan area (for details cf. Table 2). 
In total 46 metropolitan areas could be distinguished, containing 52 metropolitan cores. 
There are more cores than areas because some large metropols such as Madrid and Barce-
lona contain multiple cores. The largest of these areas is Madrid counting over 5 600 000 
inhabitants. The smallest is Benidorm with 104 884 inhabitants. 
Table 3: Criteria for the classification of Spanish municipalities 
Metropolitan center At least 100 000 inhabitants, or a little less but serving as a provincial capital 
Rest of the metropolitan 
area 
- If at least 1000 workers commute to or from the municipality: 15% of working 
population commutes to the center or at least 15% of the jobs in the municipal-
ity are taken by people from the center  
- If less than 1000 but more than 100 workers commute to or from the munici-
pality: at least 20% of the working population commutes to the center or at 
least 20% of the jobs are taken by people from the center. 
Non-metropolitan cities - The municipality does not belong to a metropolitan area
- The largest residential nucleus of the municipality counts at least 10 000 inhab-
itants 
- The municipality meets at least three criteria of urban autonomy 
Rural Centers with urban 
functions
- The municipality does not belong to a metropolitan area and does not meet 
three criteria of urban autonomy 
- The largest residential nucleus of the municipality counts at least 10 000 inhab-
itants OR the municipality meets at least 3 criteria of urban centrality 
Rural Zone All other municipalities
Even more so as in Belgium25, the remaining category of municipalities not belonging to a 
metropolitan core is very diverse. Some municipalities are situated in very remote desolat-
ed rural areas while others are middle size towns who sometimes have a strong tourist 
function (such as for instance Ronda in Andalucía). Therefore, Joaquín Susino (2011) fur-
ther refined the classification by making a distinction between non-metropolitan cities, 
rural centers with urban functions and really rural municipalities. For making this distinc-
tion, Susino developed 4 criteria of urban autonomy and 4 criteria of urban centrality. The 
autonomy criteria are (1) containing a center of secondary education, (2) containing a 
health care center, (3) containing at least four bank offices. and (4) containing at least 
                                                    
25 In Belgium very remote urban areas do not exist. Moreover, some of the smallest FUR’s in Belgium 
would not be included in the Spanish classification. 
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1400 m2 of mixed shopping surface. The centrality criteria are (1) having more incoming 
commuting workers as outgoing commuting workers, (2) having more incoming commut-
ing students as outgoing commuting students, (3) having more than the national average 
of hospital beds per capita and (4) being indicated as a commercial center in the Annual 
economic outlook of the Caixa bank26. A municipality is classified as a non-metropolitan 
city when it does not belong to a metropolitan area, when the largest residential nucleus 
counts at least 10 000 inhabitants, and when it meets at least three out of four autonomy 
criteria. Municipalities not belonging to a metropolitan area and not being classified as a 
non-metropolitan city but of whom the largest residential nucleus counts at least 10 000 
inhabitants or of whom at least three out of four centrality criteria are met are classified as 
rural centers with urban functions. The remaining municipalities are classified as the rural 
municipalities. The result of the classification is presented in Figure 8. 
There are of course a number of important differences between the classification applied in 
Belgium and the one applied in Spain. First of all, while the most urban category in the 
Belgian classification contains the entire agglomeration of a city, in the Spanish one it does 
only contain the metropolitan core. Second, the criterion for inclusion in a functional urban 
area is more strict in Spain as compared to Belgium. Therefore, the Spanish FUR’s can in a 
just and fair manner be called metropolitan areas while the Belgian ones are called urban
areas. Third, there is no distinction between suburban areas and commuters’ areas. Both 
areas are integrated in the same category, together with the outskirts of the central ag-
glomeration. Finally, the remaining category is subdivided into three parts. The first one 
contains cities that in the Belgian delimitation would be classified as the agglomeration of 
a FUR or as the outer category. 
Both classifications are valid and adopted to the specific situation of their country. Both 
also have their weaknesses. However, since it would not have been feasible to improve the 
existing classifications ourselves, we must make shift with what we have. Because the 
reiteration our research project in Spain has as its goal to test the robustness of the find-
ings in Belgium, the differences in delimitation should not be considered a major problem. 
                                                    
26 Every year the Barcelona-based bank la Caixa publishes its Annuario Economico containing a large 
number of data on all Spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants. 
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6.3 STATISTICS 
6.3.1 Scaling 
A. The basic ideas of Item Response Theory (IRT) 
Social Capital indicators derived from the Position Generator and the measures of financial 
support and free household care are more or less direct observations of a certain trait. 
They measure access to euro’s, to time or to occupational prestige. This is not the case for 
the measures derived from the Resource Generator. These are not expressed in euro’s, 
time or prestige, but should be indicators of social capital as such. Such measures are 
always based on a number of assumptions, i.e. on a theoretical measurement model. We 
will base the construction of our Resource Generator measure on the Rash model for di-
chotomous responses, which is a member of the family of parametric item response theory
models (IRT).
Figure 10: Continuum of difficulty and ability for political science 
In order to explain the basic ideas of IRT, we will use the example of an exam for an intro-
ductory course in political sciences (cf. Figure 10). For simplicity’s sake, we assume that 
the answer to the questions in the exam can only be right or wrong, i.e. that the questions 
or items are dichotomous27. IRT assumes that there exists such a thing as a continuum of 
political science ability. This continuum is however latent, it cannot be directly observed 
but should be assessed using several exam questions. On the continuum we can order the 
questions from very easy to very difficult. On that same continuum we can also order 
students from very able to not able at all. A student will give a correct answer to a ques-
tion when he is more able than the item is difficult. On the other hand, when the item is 
more difficult than the student is able, he will give a wrong answer to the question. If we 
know the ability of a student and the difficulty of an item, we can predict what items the 
student will answer correct and what items he will answer wrong. In the example of Figure 
10 this means that Adrian will know who the minister of the interior is and will be able to 
define democracy, but not to apply the cross-cutting cleavages theory to Belgium. 
                                                    
27 IRT models for polytomous items also exist, but because our items are dichotomous we do not go 
into that here. 
Minister of the interior? Democracy is? Apply cross-cutting cleavages to Belgium
Ellen Adrian Namadie
Low 
Ability
High
Ability
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The same reasoning can be made regarding a questionnaire with items aimed at measur-
ing access to social capital (cf. Figure 11). Some resources are very easy to access, while 
others are more difficult. Respondents with a lot of access to social capital will be able to 
access the easily available items as well as the more rare ones. Based on their answers to 
our questionnaire items, we will be able to order them on the continuum of access to social 
capital. 
Figure 11: Continuum of difficulty and ability for Social Capital 
Of course, it would be rather difficult to make an exam to which this rule always applies (a 
response pattern that completely complies with this rule is called a Guttman response 
pattern). It might for instance be possible that Ellen has the question about the cross-
cutting cleavages correct because by accident the topic has been treated in the only class 
she attended. On the other hand, Adrian might have the question on the minister of the 
interior wrong because when answering it he was inattentive for a moment. In the same 
way, Jan might be able to access a van because his only friend happens to have one, alt-
hough he cannot access any other comparable social resource because he only has one 
friend. IRT-models, such as the Rash model, can deal with these coincidental (i.e. random) 
deviations from the general rule. In other words, modern IRT-models are not determinis-
tic, but probabilistic. They make the less stringent claim that if Jan is more able than the 
cleavages-question is difficult, than the probability that he will answer the question correct 
is larger than the probability that he will answer it wrong. In the same way it claims that 
Lisa has more access to social capital as compared to Claire because the probability that 
she will get legal advice is higher than the probability that Claire will get legal advice. That 
probability can be described by a function that is called the Item Characteristic Curve 
(ICC) or Item Response Function (IRF). In Figure 12 an example of such an ICC is provid-
ed. 
Within the family of IRT models, there are parametric models and non-parametric models. 
Parametric models impose heavy restrictions on the ICC. For instance the Rash model 
assumes that the ICC’s can be described by a logistic function of which only one parame-
ter, i.e. the item difficulty, is to be determined freely. The disadvantage of imposing strin-
gent restrictions on the ICC’s of the scale items is that it will lead to the deletions of more 
items, some of which can be very interesting from a theoretical point of view. The ad-
vantage of imposing heavy restrictions is that the resulting scale is of better quality. One 
of the most interesting features of Rash modeling for instance, is that the logistic pro-
Do shopping when ill Borrow a van Get legal advice
Jan Claire Lisa
No
access to
social capital
A lot of
access to
social capital
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cessing of the items results in truly metric scales, while non-parametric IRT results in 
ordinal scales.  
Figure 12: Example of an Item Characteristic Curve
Most publications on Resource Generators make use of Mokken Scaling (a non-parametric 
IRT-model), but disregard the fact that their resulting measurement instrument is only of 
ordinal level. We believe that this is a serious shortcoming of previous research and that it 
is better to strive for measures that satisfy the stringent quality demands of parametric 
IRT as much as possible. Therefore, we will apply the (dichotomous) Rash Model to our 
Resource Generator items. 
B. The dichotomous rash model 
The measurement model we will use is based on three assumptions of which the first is 
unidimensionality. This means that the items measure only one latent trait. In other 
words, all of the variance in the items can only be explained by one latent trait and a ran-
dom error component. Second, the monotone homogeneity model assumes local stochas-
tic independence, meaning that the respondents’ score on an item is not influenced by his 
score on the other items. Local independence implies that the error components of the 
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 different items are uncorrelated. A violation of the assumption might for instance occur 
when a respondent initially is confused about the questions in the questionnaire but gets 
the hang of them after filling out a few questions. In a social capital questionnaire social 
desirability might lead to such a violation. For instance when a respondent has given a 
negative answer on a few questions measuring his access to a certain social resource, he 
might feel very inclined to answer positive on the following questions in order not to pre-
sent himself as socially isolated. Third, our model assumes that the Item Response Func-
tion (the function describing the probability of a positive response to an item give a certain 
level of the latent variable) is monotonically increasing. This means that if Lisa has more 
access to social capital as compared to Claire, the probability that she will answer an item 
correctly will always be greater than or equal to that of Claire. Finally, Rash assumes suffi-
ciency of the sum score. With this assumption we mean that the ‘ability’ of a person (his 
score on the latent variable) can be calculated from the number of positively answered 
items without any information on the items. This is another way of saying that a respond-
ent will only answer positively on an item when his ‘ability’ is higher than the item ‘difficul-
ty’ (Storms, 2010). 
C. Rash analysis 
As we mentioned before, the Rash model is probabilistic, not deterministic and therefore 
allows for misfit, as long as the misfit stays within the margins of random error. When 
performing a Rash analysis we can test whether the observed answers to the items corre-
spond to the answers that were expected from the model. For every item-person pair we 
can calculate the response residual (ݕ௡௜) by subtracting the response expected by the 
model (ܧ௡௜) from the actual response (ݔ௡௜): 
ݕ௡௜ ൌ ݔ௡௜ െ ܧ௡௜ 6.3.1-1 
The total residual score can be squared and then aggregated for every item (and for every 
person). A simple aggregation results in the Outfit Mean Square. The residual scores can 
also been weighted by the model variance of the observation. The variance will be lower 
for extreme observations and higher for well-targeted observations. The sum of this 
weighted score is called the Infit Mean Square. The infit-measure is most often regarded 
as the most important one. Infit and Outfit are divided by their degrees of freedom, so 
they have an expected value of 1, and a range from 0 to positive infinity. Infit and Outfit 
statistics also have standardized forms. Most often they are reported as t-statistics.  
Important for the interpretation of the fit indices is that a value smaller than 1 for the 
mean square measures or a negative t-value indicates that the response-pattern looks 
more than the ‘ideal’ Goodman-pattern than the Rash-model expects. We call this overfit.
Positive t-values (mean square larger than 1) means more haphazard answers than ex-
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 pected. We call that underfit. The implications of both are of course different. Overfit 
mostly has no practical implications in the human sciences (although a lot of overfit can 
indicate correlated error). 
In order to judge whether the data can be regarded as in line with the model28, we need 
some rules of thumb. Because the standardized values are t-statistics, we will want them 
to lie between +2 and -2. The mean square values should lie between 0.75 and 1.3. How-
ever, it is known that mean square values tend to get closer to 1 as sample size increases. 
And of course, in a small sample size t-values will never be larger than 2. Therefore, we 
should always interpret these fit measures together with sample size. (Bond & Fox, 2007) 
6.3.2 Multilevel analysis 
Rash analysis is a preparatory technique that will be used before we start testing our hy-
potheses with the Resource Generator measures. We will now briefly address our choice 
for an adequate statistical model for executing the actual tests of our hypotheses. 
The main focus of this dissertation is to test whether living in a rural or urban environment 
effects individual’s access to social capital. Under heading 6.2.2 we explained that because 
of the operationalization we use, urban and rural are features of a municipality. Social 
capital however, is a feature of an individual. In other words, our data have a hierarchical 
structure: individuals nested in municipalities. If we would apply standard analysis tech-
niques such as OLS-regression or Analysis of Variance, we would have to disaggregate the 
information about the municipalities or aggregate the information about social capital. I.e., 
we would create a variable at the individual level that tells us how urban the municipality 
in which the individual lives is (disaggregation) or we would create a variable at the level 
of the municipality that tells us what the average level of social capital of its inhabitants is 
(aggregation).  
Such a strategy would lead to several problems. First of all, there are conceptual prob-
lems. If the analysis are not interpreted with care one could make a fallacy of the wrong 
level, such as the ecological fallacy, the atomistic fallacy or the Simpson’s paradox. Se-
cond, there are statistical problems. Aggregating data leads to a loss of information and 
therefore of statistical power. Disaggregating data leads to an overestimation of the num-
ber of independent observations with more type I-errors as a result. Imagine for instance 
that we dispose of a sample of fifteen persons from the city of Ghent and ten persons from 
the village of Mater. Aggregating the data would reduce the sample to only two observa-
tion and no chance of finding significant results. Disaggregating the data means pretend-
                                                    
28 In Rash analysis we want the data to fit the model, not the model to fit the data because we want to 
test if the quality of our data (=observed data) are as good as we want them to be (=model). 
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 ing to dispose of fifteen independent observations of urban places and ten independent 
observations of rural places, whereas in reality only two places were observed. 
A better way of dealing with hierarchical data is to apply a multilevel statistical model. 
Such models assume there is a dataset with variables at multiple levels, and with the 
outcome variable situated at the lowest level. Multilevel models can best be understood as 
“a hierarchical system of regression equations” (J. J. Hox, 2002, p. 11). Whereas a stand-
ard regression equation with one explanatory variable is written as follows: 
ܻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ ൅ ݁ 6.3.2-1 
A multilevel regression equation with one explanatory variable at the lowest level and an 
intercept and slope that is random at the second level would be written as: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ ଵܺ௜௝ ൅ ݁௜௝ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݑଵ௝ 6.3.2-2 
The subscripts indicate that the outcome variable ܻ, the first level explanatory variable ܺͳ
and the individual error term ݁௜௝ take on different values for all individuals ݅ nested in all 
municipalities ݆. The intercept ߚ଴௝ and the slope ߚଵ௝ take on different values in every munic-
ipality ݆, as does error term ݑ଴௝ that is associated with the random intercept and the error 
term the ݑଵ௝ that is associated with the random slope. Variables at the second level are 
used to explain variance in the intercept and/or in the slope(s). Therefore to equation 
6.3.2-2 we must add the following equations: 
ߚ଴௝ ൌ ߛ଴଴൅ߛ଴ଵܼଵ௝ሺ൅ݑ଴௝ሻ 6.3.2-3 
ߚଵ௝ ൌ ߛଵ଴൅ߛଵଵܼଵ௝ሺ൅ݑଵ௝ሻ 6.3.2-4
The Greek letter ߛ is used for the regression coefficients at the second level. Equation 
6.3.2-3 predicts the average level of the outcome variable ܻ in a municipality based on the 
explanatory variable ܼ. In our own case, this equation predicts the average level of access 
to social capital in a municipality using its rural or urban character as a predicting variable. 
If ܼଵ௝ is larger in urban areas, a positive value indicates a positive effect of living in an 
urban area on access to social capital. This equation will therefore be the primary focus of 
our investigation. Equation 6.3.2-4 predicts the level of the slope for first level explanatory 
variable ଵܺ based on explanatory variable ܼ. Imagine that in our case variable ଵܺ is the 
income of the respondent. Equation 6.3.2-4 then predicts the magnitude of the effect of 
income on social capital, dependent on the urban or rural character of the municipality of 
the respondent. If ߛଵଵis positive and the value of ܼ is larger in urban areas, this means that 
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 the effect of income on social capital is larger in urban areas. In other words, equation 
6.3.2-4 predicts an interaction effect of a first and second level variable. 
Substituting equations 6.3.2-3 and 6.3.2-4 into equation 6.3.2-2 gives the following re-
sult: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ߛ଴଴൅ߛଵ଴ ଵܺ௜௝ ൅ ߛ଴ଵܼଵ௝ ൅ ߛଵଵܼଵ௝ ଵܺ௜௝ ൅ ݑଵ௝ ଵܺ௜௝ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݁௜௝ 6.3.2-5 
In a more general way and assuming we have ܲ first level explanatory variables ܺ, and ܳ
explanatory variables ܼ, we can write equation 6.3.2-5 as follows: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ߛ଴଴൅ߛ௣଴ܺ௣௜௝ ൅ ߛ଴௤ܼଵ௝ ൅ ߛ௣௤ܼ௤௝ܺ௣௜௝ ൅ ݑ௣௝ܺ௣௜௝ ൅ ݑ଴௝ ൅ ݁௜௝ 6.3.2-6
In the student barometer data we will have only two models and only information on two 
different levels. Therefore the model of equation 6.3.2-6 will be used for testing our hy-
potheses. For the SILC-data matters are a bit more complicated. In most cases we have 
information on three levels: individuals, families (e.g. income) and municipalities. There-
fore, a three level model will be used. The principals of such a model are analogous to the 
ones outlined above. We also have a dichotomous outcome variable. For these data a 
multilevel generalized linear model is used. Also for this model the principal ideas that are 
important for our sake are analogous to the ones outlined above. (Joop J. Hox, 2010) 
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 Chapter 7
 Analysis of the students barometers data 
7.1 THE DATA 
7.1.1 Collection procedures 
Between November 25, 2009 and January 3, 2010 the students of the Ghent University 
were invited to participate in a survey organized by the Department of Sociology. Although 
one of the aims of the inquiry was providing valuable policy information for the university 
and the city of Ghent, it was primarily designed to collect data for scientific research. For 
that purpose, four thematic modules were integrated in the questionnaire, two of which 
included questions on social capital. 
All students enrolled at Ghent University for the academic year 2009-2010 were included 
in the research population, except for incoming guest students and Ph.D.-students. The 
first ones were excluded because the questionnaire was in Dutch, a language that most of 
the guest students don’t master. The second ones were excluded because in the Belgian 
system of higher education they are in first instance considered academic staff and not 
students. All students were invited to participate, no sample was drawn. The invitation was 
put on the students personalized electronic learning environment. Additionally, two intro-
ductory e-mails were sent to the institutional e-mail accounts. Students were encouraged 
to fill out a form by putting up several money prices for ravel. In total 7190 students filled 
out usable response forms, which means that a response rate of 24.13% was achieved. 
This sample was representative for the total student population as far as the number of 
students with a special status29 was concerned. However, there was an overrepresentation 
of women and of the faculties Political and Social Sciences, Arts and Philosophy, and Psy-
chology and Educational Sciences, and an underrepresentation of first master students. 
Results of the representativity analysis can be found in Table 4 (Source: Vercruyssen & 
Verhaeghe, 2010). Post stratification will not be applied. We are not able to test whether 
we are in a situation of Missing Ad Random, moreover it is more likely that we are in a 
                                                    
29 A number of students at Ghent University have a special status giving them peculiar rights, for in-
stance to take exams on another day than regular students. Students can have a special status for 
several reasons, for instance because they are professional sportsman or because they have a disabil-
ity. 
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 situation of Missing Not Ad Random. In such a situation reweighing could lead to an in-
crease in mean square error.  
Table 4: Representativity Analysis UGent-sample 
Population StuBar UGR Diff.
N % N % %-points 
Sex Men 12617 42% 2741 38% -4 
Women 17174 58% 4449 62% 4
X
2
=52,98     df=1     p < 0,000 
Status Normal 1180 4% 263 4% 0
Special 28611 96% 6927 96% 0
X
2
=1,7361     df=1     p = 0,998 
Faculties Arts & Filosophy 4021 13% 1092 15% 2
Law 3674 12% 771 11% -2 
Sciences 2073 7% 558 8% 1
Medicine and Health 4814 16% 1015 14% -2 
Engineering 2309 8% 642 9% 1
Economics 2414 8% 465 6% -2 
Veterinary Medecine 1395 5% 272 4% -1 
Psychology and Eductional 4299 14% 1141 16% 1
Bioscience Ingeering 1289 4% 260 4% -1 
Pharmaceutical Sciences 844 3% 192 3% 0
Political and Social Sciences 2658 9% 782 11% 2
X
2
=154,73     df=10     p < 0,000 
The questionnaire was made up out of two parts. In the first part a number of core ques-
tions (such as demographic variables) were presented to all participants. In the second 
part the respondents had to answer questions from one out of a total of four thematic 
modules. This procedure was chosen to avoid confronting participants with too long ques-
tionnaires. Allocation to a specific module was based on month of birth. Participants born 
in January, March, May, July, September and November were attributed to one of the 
modules containing the social capital questions. 3440 students born in these months filled 
out useful forms (P.-P. Verhaeghe, Van Houtte, Van De Putte, & Vermeersch, 2010). 
As we mentioned before, we replicated this survey at the University of Granada in Spain. 
We did not present the entire questionnaire, but only the questions that were of interest 
for our study of social capital. We tried to make the data collection procedure as similar as 
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 possible to the one used in Ghent. At the UGent, the most important (electronic) means of 
communication between student and university were used to invite students for participa-
tion. Of course, every university has its own system of communication, which made it 
impossible to follow exactly the same procedure at the UGR.  
Table 5: Representativity analysis UGR-sample 
For starters, it was not possible to make announcements that would appear in the stu-
dents’ personalized learning environment. We therefore had to ask professors to make an 
announcement on the pages of their respective courses. We e-mailed every professor of 
the UGR with that request, but off course not everyone complied with it (in the first place 
because not every professor uses the electronic learning environment). Therefore, our 
most important contact mechanism with the students was sending invitation e-mails to 
their institutional e-mail addresses. Unfortunately, not a lot of students actually make us 
of the e-mail address. Moreover, the university administration, research groups, profes-
sors, etcetera do use the addresses intensely to spread information on conferences, guest 
speakers, practical matters etcetera. Because there is such a vast amount of information 
being sent to the addresses, a lot of users simply delete information from the university 
without reading it. Although we sent four remembrance e-mails, we were only able to get 
responses from 1867 students, or a mere 3,3% of the total student population. This low 
number is first of all explained by the fact that we could not reach all students. Second, 
the study was announced as a scientific research project that was performed in collabora-
tion between UGR and UGent, whereas for the survey in Ghent was also announced as a 
     Population StuBar UGR Diff.
N % N % %-points 
Sex Men 25810 45% 690 37% -8777
Women 31315 55% 1177 63% 8777
X
2
=50,98     df=1     p < 0,000           
Faculties Arts, Literature & Philosophy 8162 14% 283 16% 2000
Medicine & Health 10043 18% 181 10% -7000
Doble Titulación 1314 2% 9 1% -2000
Exact Sciences 13562 24% 409 24% 0777
Economics 6775 12% 209 12% 0777
Social Sciences 11848 21% 460 27% 6777
Law 3304 6% 86 5% -1777
Psychology 2117 4% 97 6% 2777
X
2
=126,04     df=7     p < 0,000               
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 way to improve city and university policy. Probably the latter argument convinces more 
people to collaborate in the survey. As could be expected, our representativeness analysis 
showed statistically significant deviations from the population. The relative frequency of 
men in our sample is 8 percentage points lower as compared to the population. In the 
UGent sample that difference was 4 percentage points. For the faculties30, there is a large 
overrepresentation of the departments of the social sciences, and a large underrepresenta-
tion of medicine. The relative frequency of the other faculties in our sample does not differ 
all that much from the one in the population. We must conclude however that both the 
UGent and the UGR-sample are not representative for the student population. Of course, 
no survey ever is really representative. But with these low response rates we must even 
be more careful. 
As the reader will have noticed, the datasets we will use in this part have some serious 
limitations. Data are only available for students, a small part of the general population we 
are interested in. Moreover, they are not representative of the population of students in 
general. However, the datasets also have some very attractive features. First of all, they 
contain detailed measures of individual social capital that are not available in other da-
tasets. Moreover, the datasets contain information on the place where the respondents 
originate from and allow us to compare results from two countries that have a completely 
different urban structure. These datasets are in that regard really unique and therefore 
worth to study. It would of course be ideal if we would have gathered data from a large 
sample of the entire population collected through highly controlled face-to-face interviews. 
However, we lack the time and financial resources to do that, so we must work with the 
means available. Second, we will not base the substantial conclusions of our research only 
on these datasets. In the next chapter we will analyze data from a large set gathered 
through highly controlled face-to-face interviews (but with measures of lower quality). And 
finally, because we are doing hypotheses testing research, the non representativity of the 
sample is somewhat less of a problem as it would be if we would want to make point esti-
mates for the population. After all, if our hypothesis holds in general, it should also hold 
for this particular group. Because we could expect that in our group of students the effects 
of coming from an urban or rural environment will be smaller than in the population in 
general (for instance because all students are to some degree exposed to the city), we are 
in fact performing a very conservative test of our hypotheses. 
                                                    
30 The University of Granada has a very large number of different schools and faculties (for instance 
because the departments outside of the city of Granada are all autonomous departments). We therefore 
choose to regroup the faculties in substantially interesting clusters. 
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 7.1.2 Measures 
A. Rural and urban areas 
The theoretical and technical details concerning our delineation of urban and rural areas 
have been discussed before. Here we will only discuss the distribution of the observations 
of urban and rural areas. In Table 6 and Table 7 we show how much municipalities and 
how much respondents have been observed in every category of our rural-urban delinea-
tion. Both for the Belgian and the Spanish sample we notice that there are less students 
attributed to a rural and urban region as there were students who filled out questionnaire 
forms. For the Belgian sample, 60 students could not be assigned to a specific municipality 
because they did not fill out a valuable postcode. That brings the total number of respond-
ents down from 3440 to 3380. For the Spanish sample 106 students were deleted because 
they filled out an invalid postal code (mostly because they were foreign students who 
indicated that the place where they live with their parents was situated outside of Spain). 
This brought the Spanish sample down from N=1867 to N=1761. 
Table 6: Distribution of Urban and Rural Areas in Belgium 
Municipalities Respondents 
F % F % 
Agglomeration 52 18,1% 1098 32,5% 
Suburban Area 53 18,5% 410 12,1% 
Comuters' Area 79 27,5% 923 27,3% 
Rural Area 103 35,9% 949 28,1% 
Total 287 3380 
In Belgium we observed 287 municipalities in total. As Figure 13 illustrates, these munici-
palities were almost exclusively situated in Flemish region, especially in the provinces of 
East and West Flanders. In Spain we observed a total of 358 municipalities, most of which 
came from Andalusia, especially from the provinces of Granada, Jaen, Málaga and Córdoba 
(cf. Figure 14 and Figure 15). The observations are unequally distributed over the munici-
palities. In both countries the municipalities with the most observations are situated close 
to the university. However, we must keep in mind that the geographical extension of the 
observations is much larger in Spain, since the province of Granada alone is about the 
same size as the Flemish region. 
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 Table 7: Distribution of Urban and Rural Areas in Spain 
Municipalities Respondents 
F % F % 
Metropolitan Core 27 7,5% 235 13,3% 
Rest Metopolitan Area 89 24,9% 166 9,4% 
Non-metro City 59 16,5% 337 19,1% 
Rural Center 58 16,2% 420 23,9% 
Rural 125 34,9% 603 34,2% 
Total 358 1761 
B. Municipality-level control variables. 
At the level of the municipalities we dispose of a number of control variables. For the Bel-
gian municipalities we dispose of an indicator of the average income. To be more precise, 
the indicator measures the average income after taxation per inhabitant in the municipali-
ty. Data are provided through the national statistics office (ADSEI), and are based on the 
official tax declarations of the Belgians. We also dispose of an inequality-measure which is 
based on the interquartile coefficient of tax declarations. As can be noticed in Table 8 and 
Figure 16, the income variable is fairly normally distributed (this is not unexpected be-
cause the variable is the average income in a municipality, not a raw income variable per 
person or household). The inequality-variable however was severely skewed, with a long 
tail to the left. 
For the Spanish municipalities data of average income are not available. However, the 
national statistics office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística - INE) publishes another very 
interesting indicator, that is the average socio-economic status in the municipality. Data 
are based on the census of 2001. The indicator is fairly normally distributed. 
Our second control variable at municipality level is the unemployment rate. For Belgium, 
our indicator is the average unemployment rate for 2007. The unemployed are those reg-
istered as non-working job seekers by the National Service for Unemployment (RVA). Data 
were accessed via the Vlaamse Arbeidsrekening (Flemish Labour Account). For Spain, the 
indicator is the percentage of unemployment of people between 20 and 60 years of age. 
The definition of the unemployed is similar to the one in Belgium (no work, looking for a 
job and available for the job market). The data are however gathered trough the census of 
2001 rather than through registration by the unemployment office. For Belgium, there is a 
strong negative correlation between average unemployment rate and average income and 
inequality. Both the Spanish and the Belgian indicators were severely skewed.  
113
 Subsequently, we dispose of information about the proportion of foreigners in the munici-
palities. For Belgium, the data originate from the national register 2006 and have been 
obtained through the national institution for statistics. For Spain, the data come from the 
census of 2001 and were also obtained through the country’s national institute for statis-
tics. Although the data are a few years old, we still feel comfortable using them for a num-
ber of reasons. First of all, it is not the absolute numbers, but the relative differences 
between municipalities that are of interest to us, and normally that changes relatively slow 
over time. Second, the possible effect of the presence of foreigners is assumed to work in 
the long run, so a recent high relative increase in immigration in a certain municipality 
takes a while to exert its full effect. 
The proportion of foreigners is calculated the same way in Spain as in Belgium: it is the 
number of people having another nationality than the Spanish respectively the Belgian, 
divided by the total population in a municipality. However, both measures represent very 
different social phenomena in both countries. That is illustrated by the correlational struc-
ture visible in Table 9 and Table 10. For Belgium, we notice that the presence of foreigners 
correlates positively with unemployment rate and negatively with average income. Inhab-
itants with a foreign nationality are for the most part economic or political refugees31 who 
settled in the old industrial centers and the inner cities were income is lower and unem-
ployment higher. In Spain, on the contrary, the presence of foreigners correlates negative-
ly with unemployment rate and positively with average socio-economic status. In Spain, 
migration can largely be split in two groups. There are, as in Belgium, an important num-
ber of economic and political refugees, but there is also an important group of relatively 
wealthy, often retired, Western Europeans that are in first place attracted by the climate. 
To gain some more insight in the phenomenon we split the information about the presence 
of foreign population out for those two groups. In the dataset of INE there is information 
on the country of origin of the foreigners. Therefore, we decided to make a difference 
between immigrants from western-European countries and from other countries. To be 
more specific, immigrants from Germany, Italy, France and the UK are put in the category 
immigrants from western countries. Immigrants from Bulgaria, Rumania, Morocco, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are put in the 
group of immigrants from non-western countries. Immigrants from other countries are in 
the data file from INE attributed to a rest category. As a consequence, this last category 
contains people from both western and non-western countries and therefore is left out of 
the analysis. If we look at the correlational structure in Table 9, we see that the correla-
tions remain the same, but become less strong for western immigrants than for non-
western immigrants. As we mentioned before, the influx of non-western immigrants in 
                                                    
31 However, in some municipalities close to the Dutch border there is an important influx of Dutch for 
fiscal reasons. And in the Brussels region there are a lot of international workers, mainly attracted by 
the institutions of the European Union. These phenomena are however of minor importance compared 
to the influx of wealthy (retired) Europeans in Spain. 
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 Spain is very recent; it dates back mostly to the period of economic boom preceding the 
current recession. Those immigrants have settled mainly in places where there is a lot of 
work. Most Western immigrants have also settle in the more prosperous urban and coastal 
areas, but an important number of them have also settled in places with beautiful rural 
landscapes were unemployment is much higher (Recaño & Domingo, 2006). It is probably 
the latter kind of immigrants that brings the negative correlation with unemployment 
down.
Table 8: Discriptive statistics for  the second level control variables 
Mean Min Max SD Skew SE (skew)
Ugent-sample
Average Income (€1000) 15.61 8.10 22.27 1.90 -0.03 0.14
Inequality 106.79 83.44 148.89 10.99 0.88 0.14
Unemployment Rate 6.50 2.70 31.90 4.50 3.01 0.14
Proportion of Foreigners 0.05 0.01 0.45 0.06 2.83 0.14
Grey Pressure 0.18 0.08 0.28 0.02 0.86 0.14
Green Pressure 0.23 0.16 0.30 0.02 -0.22 0.14
Proportion of Owner-Occupiers 0.76 0.33 0.93 0.09 -1.92 0.14
UGR-sample
Average Socio-economic status 0.84 0.54 1.27 0.12 0.53 0.13
Unemployment Rate 21.31 0.00 69.39 13.04 1.33 0.13
Proportion of Foreigners 0.03 0.00 0.49 0.05 4.40 0.13
Proportion of Western Foreigners 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.03 5.82 0.13
Proportion of non-Western Foreign 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.02 3.37 0.13
Grey Pressure 0.42 0.11 3.19 0.21 6.50 0.13
Green Pressure 0.43 0.06 0.58 0.06 -1.16 0.13
Proportion of Owner-Occupiers 0.88 0.60 0.99 0.06 -1.23 0.13
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 C. Individual level control variables 
On the level of the individuals we dispose of several control variables. First of all, we have 
information on the sex of the responding students. The dispersion of sex in both our sam-
ples is very similar. As we can read in Table 11 both in the UGent sample as in the sample 
from the UGR, a little less than 40% of the respondents are men and a little more than 
60% are women. 
Table 11: Distribution of non-metric first level control variables 
UGent UGR 
N % N % 
Sex Man (0) 1285 38,0% 655 37,2% 
Woman (1) 2095 62,0% 1106 62,8% 
Ethnic Origin Native (0) 2870 84,9% 1566 88,9% 
Immigrant (1) 497 14,7% 180 10,2% 
Residence With Parents (0) 1269 37,5% 546 33,0% 
Student Accommodation (1) 2111 62,5% 1107 67,0% 
Education of 
the mother 
Low (0) 212 6,3% 553 31,4% 
Medium (1) 992 29,3% 647 36,7% 
High (2) 2146 63,5% 482 27,4% 
We also dispose of some information on the ethnic origin of the students. We asked the 
students in what country they were born themselves and where their parents and grand-
mothers were born. If they answered that one of these persons was born outside of Bel-
gium respectively Spain, the students were categorized as non-natives. In the UGent sam-
ple 14,7% of respondents were categorized as immigrants, in the Granada sample that 
was only 10%. 
In the questionnaires we asked where the students live during school weeks. For the 
Spanish questionnaire, students could indicate whether they lived with their parents or 
not, for the Belgian questionnaire there were more categories, but we also transformed 
the variable into a binary one. In the Ghent sample over 62.5% indicated that they lived in 
some kind of student accommodation. In the Granada sample that number amounted to 
only 67%. 
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 Table 12: Descriptive statistics for metric first level control variables 
Mean Min Max SD Skew
SE 
(Skew)
Age 23.98 18.00 38.00 3.94 1.13 0.06
Highest SES 48.55 17.00 82.00 18.60 0.11 0.06
Age 22.53 18.00 31.00 2.18 0.85 0.04
Highest SES 61.29 16.00 90.00 14.66 -0.40 0.05
U
G
R
U
G
e
n
t
Subsequently we have measured the educational level of the mother of our students. This 
variable will be used as an indicator of the human capital of the students since research 
has demonstrated that human capital is especially transmitted through the mother (e.g. 
Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2003; Leibowitz, 1974; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1994). Meas-
urement of the education variable was based on the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED-97). For the Spanish questionnaire we used the same question that 
were used in the European Social Survey of 2008 and used the ESS-strategy to code those 
questions into the 5 ISCED categories32. For the Belgian questionnaire matters were 
somewhat more complicated. The question of the Belgian student barometer was not de-
signed to be easily translated to ISCED-categories. To make a translation possible we had 
to merge categories I and II and categories III and IV. Category V remained independent. 
As a result, we were only able to make a distinction between students with mothers having 
enjoyed primary education, secondary education or higher education as their highest edu-
cational level. In Table 11 a big difference in the distribution between Belgium and Spain 
becomes clear. Spanish mothers are in our sample more or less evenly spread over the 
different categories, while in the Belgian sample they have mainly enjoyed higher educa-
tion. The later economic development and subsequent democratization of education in 
Spain, is probably the main explanation for that observed difference. 
We also dispose of two metric predictor variables, i.e. the students’ age and the socio-
economic status of the parents. The average age is a little higher in the Spanish sample as 
compared to the Belgian one. The minimum age is the same (18), but the maximum age is 
much higher. As a consequence, skewness in in the Spanish distribution is a little higher as 
compared to the Belgian sample. Since Spanish students on average study longer than 
Belgian students this could be expected. 
                                                    
32 For the exact wordings of the questions: see Appendix. For more detailed information on the coding 
see ESS (2008). 
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 In Spain, there is a significant bivariate association between age on the one hand and sex, 
origin, residence and education of the mother on the other. Male students are on average 
half a year older than female students, immigrant students almost 1.5 years older as com-
pared to Spanish students, and students living with their parents on average half a year 
younger than the other students. The average age of children from higher educated par-
ents is higher than those from less educated parents. Further, there is a significant bivari-
ate association between highest SES and origin, residence and education of the mother. 
The parents of immigrant students on average have higher statuses as compared to par-
ents of autochthone students. Students from less educated mothers on average have 
lower educational statuses. There also is a significant association between the sex of the 
student and the highest educational level of the students’ mother: the odds of being a man 
are higher in the lower education categories. In other words, the education of the mother 
is on average lower of men students as compared to female students. There also is a sig-
nificant association between origin and education of the mother: the odds of being an 
immigrant are higher in the higher educational categories as compared to the lower educa-
tional categories (mothers of immigrant students are on average higher educated). Finally, 
there is a significant association between residence and education of the mother: the odds 
of living with the parents is higher for students with higher educated mothers. 
These bivariate associations of course do not tell us much substantially. What they do tell 
us is that there are no associations that are so high that they will probably lead to 
multicollinearity problems. Also, the different associations in Belgium and Spain between 
the origin variable and the status and education variables illustrate further how different 
the immigration phenomenon is in both countries. 
D. Dependent variables 
D.1 Scaling the Resource Generator items 
The list of resource generator items we will use in our analysis is based on the one of Mar-
tin van der Gaag (2005)33. The original list of van der Gaag contained 33 items. However, 
the items were designed for working people, so they had to be adopted to the living envi-
ronment of students. For instance, items that referred to advice about problems at work 
were replaced with an item referring to problems at the university. Other items were de-
leted, such as an item about knowing someone that speaks a foreign language (since Bel-
gian university students are expected to speak at least two themselves). A list of 25 items 
remained. The list can be found in the questionnaire in Appendix. 
                                                    
33 In chapter 3.2.2 more detailed information on the construction of van der Gaag’s list is available. 
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 Table 15: Resource Generator Items with item popularities (Ugent) 
Question Name P(X=1) 
Peronal Support 
Someone from whom you could borrow a small amount of money Borrow money .97 
Someone who can give sound advice about problems at school Advice school .72 
Someone who can give sound advice about my educational career Advice career .68 
Someone who can do shopping when I'm Ill Shopping .95 
Political and Financial Capital 
Someone who knows a lot about government regulations Government regulations .60 
Someone who could give you sound advice about financial problems Financial advise .73 
Someone who regularly can employ people Employ .37 
Someone who is a member of the city council City council .45 
Personal Skills 
Someone who knows a lot about DIY DIY .97 
Someone who can repare a broken down car Car .64 
Someone who is  a reliable merchant Merchant .61 
Someone who can help me with odd jobs around the house Odd jobs .97 
Prestige and Education related 
Someone who works for the local goverment Local government .46 
Someone who can give sound legal advice Legal advice .60 
Someone who has good contacts with the media Media .36 
In order to make filling out the questionnaire less demanding, we choose to present only a 
limited list of 15 items to the students in Granada (the same limited list will be used in the 
analysis of the Belgian data). Because we wanted that all of the dimensions identified by 
van der Gaag34 were present in the set, and because we wanted to include items with a 
different range of popularity35, we selected the items presented in Table 15. In the table 
we have listed the questions translated to English and the names of the items we will use 
in the consequent analysis. In the last column the item popularities for the Belgian sample 
are listed. The original wording of the questions in Dutch and Spanish can be found in 
Appendix. 
As we mentioned in chapter 6.3.1, we want to create a metric measure from our item list 
and check whether that measure satisfies the stringent requirements of the Rash model. 
One of these requirements is unidimensionality. A one-dimensional solution is preferable 
because it is more parsimonious, but contradicts the finding of van der Gaag who reports 
                                                    
34 Cf also chapter 3.2.2 
35 The popularity of an item is the percentage of respondents that indicated to be able to access the 
social resource the item refers to. 
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 that several empirical dimensions are present in his list. However, because the dimension 
he identified were interrelated and because he used more items on a different populations, 
it is not unthinkable that our list of items is one-dimensional. Therefore we will start our 
Rash analysis with an attempt to create one unidimensional metric measure from our set 
of 15 Resource Generator items. If the attempt would fail we can try to find out if a solu-
tion with multiple dimensions works better. 
Table 16: Fit-statistics of Resource Generator Items in the Belgian Sample 
      Outfit Infit 
Item P(X=1) Difficulty MnSq t MnSq t 
DIY 0.96 -2.51 0.79 -9.30 1.07 1.10 
Odd Jobs 0.97 -2.72 0.71 -13.10 0.94 -0.90 
Gov. Regulations 0.58 0.81 0.88 -5.10 0.93 -3.70 
Media 0.35 1.95 1.00 0.10 1.00 -0.20 
Financial Advise 0.74 0.00 0.83 -7.10 0.93 -2.70 
Advise School 0.72 0.09 0.80 -8.70 0.89 -4.30 
Advise Career 0.68 0.33 0.86 -5.80 0.94 -2.70 
Legal Advise 0.60 0.74 0.88 -5.20 0.93 -3.50 
Car 0.62 0.62 1.01 0.50 1.05 2.40 
Merchant 0.61 0.70 0.94 -2.40 0.98 -1.00 
Local Gov. 0.46 1.41 0.93 -2.80 0.95 -2.70 
Employ 0.38 1.78 0.90 -4.10 0.91 -4.70 
City Council 0.41 1.64 0.94 -2.30 0.95 -2.50 
Shopping 0.96 -2.24 1.15 0.17 1.06 0.49 
Borrow Money 0.97 -2.61 0.66 -15.80 0.80 -3.40 
Average 0.67 0.15 0.87 -5.80 0.95 -2.00 
In order to perform our analysis we used the freeware program ConstructMap that was 
developed by the BEAR center of the University of Berkeley and can be downloaded from 
their website. The results of the analysis for the Belgian data can be found in Table 16. For 
the Spanish data the results are listed in For the Belgian data no infit nor outfit mean 
square values larger than 1.33 were found. Also no items had an outfit t-value larger than 
2, and only the item Car had an infit t-value larger than 2. The value of 2 could lead us to 
think that the item doesn’t fit the model very well. However, we have a very large dataset 
here (N=3221) and therefore will get relatively large t-values. The infit mean square value 
of 1.05 tells us that we find only 5% more variance than expected, which is very reasona-
ble. Therefore, we decide to keep the item in anyway. 
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 Table 17. For readers that are not familiar with this kind of output we refer back to the 
explanation in chapter 6.3.1. 
For the Belgian data no infit nor outfit mean square values larger than 1.33 were found. 
Also no items had an outfit t-value larger than 2, and only the item Car had an infit t-value 
larger than 2. The value of 2 could lead us to think that the item doesn’t fit the model very 
well. However, we have a very large dataset here (N=3221) and therefore will get rela-
tively large t-values. The infit mean square value of 1.05 tells us that we find only 5% 
more variance than expected, which is very reasonable. Therefore, we decide to keep the 
item in anyway. 
Table 17: Fit-statistics of Resource Generator Items in the Spanish sample 
      Outfit Infit 
Item P(X=1) Difficulty MnSq t MnSq t 
DIY 0.74 -0.30 0.91 -2.70 0.99 -0.40 
Odd Jobs 0.81 -0.78 0.87 -3.70 0.94 -1.50 
Gov. Regulations 0.61 0.42 0.83 -5.10 0.89 -3.50 
Media 0.34 1.75 1.04 1.20 1.05 1.50 
Financial Advise 0.72 -0.21 0.79 -6.50 0.88 -3.20 
Advise School 0.82 -0.88 0.84 -4.70 0.97 -0.70 
Advise Career 0.81 -0.78 0.85 -4.50 0.98 -0.40 
Legal Advise 0.65 0.18 0.88 -3.50 0.96 -1.10 
Car 0.67 0.07 0.98 -0.60 1.06 1.50 
Merchant 0.59 0.52 0.88 -3.70 0.92 -2.40 
Local Gov. 0.46 1.16 0.95 -1.30 0.98 -0.60 
Employ 0.44 1.27 0.93 -2.00 0.95 -1.80 
City Council 0.41 1.42 0.98 -0.70 0.99 -0.20 
Shopping 0.94 -2.22 0.78 -6.70 0.91 -1.60 
Borrow Money 0.90 -1.62 1.12 -0.31 1.04 -0.99 
Average 0.66 0.11 0.89 -3.20 0.96 -1.00 
Although we did not encounter any t and mean square values that were too large, we did 
find a lot that were too small. However, to small values indicate more ideal measurement 
than the Rash model expected, that is a scale that is more like a Goodman scale than we 
would expect from the Rash model. Such a situation of overfitting indicates that a very 
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 HA3: The positive effect of highest status of the parents and educa-
tional level of the mother will be stronger in the city 
HA4: The individual level control variables will explain all differences 
between rural and urban areas away 
As the reader probably remembers from Chapter 4, hypotheses A1 and A3 are deduced 
from isolation theory and A2 from liberalization theory. Hypothesis A4 is deduced from 
theories that expect no rural-urban differences in contemporary society. 
As far as the position generator measures are concerned we deduced the following hy-
potheses: 
HB1: In more urban areas standard deviation of accessed prestige will 
be lower 
HB2: In more urban areas average accessed prestige will be higher 
HB3: The positive effect of highest status of the parents and educa-
tional level of the mother on average accessed prestige of the 
student will be stronger in the city 
HB4: The individual level control variables will explain all differences 
between rural and urban areas away 
Hypotheses B1 and B3 are deduced from isolation theory. Hypothesis B2 is deduced from 
liberalization theory. Hypothesis B4 is deduced from theories that expect no rural-urban 
differences. 
Finally, since rural-urban differences are much stronger in Spain as they are in Belgium we 
can propose the following hypothesis: 
HC: Differences between urban and rural areas will be larger in Spain 
as they are in Belgium 
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 7.3 RESULTS 
7.3.1 Analysis of the Resource Generator measure 
A. Results from the Belgian sample 
Due to item non-response 647 cases could not be used in the analysis of the Resource 
Generator measures. This leaves us with a total number of 2733 respondents from 279 
municipalities that were used in the initial analysis. 
In Table 20 the results of the analysis can be found. The first part of the table contains the 
results of a model for which only a random intercept has been specified. In the second 
part of the table we introduce the municipality-level predictors. The third part contains the 
results of the final model in which both the first level and the second level predictors are 
specified36. All standard errors reported are the robust standard errors. 
We included three control variables at the second level, that is young age dependency, 
unemployment rate and proportion of owners. The young age dependency-variable was 
assumed to have a positive effect on access to social resources for students, because it is 
an indicator of the presence of potentially useful network partners. After all, people mostly 
make friends with other people of their age, so the students’ network should benefit from 
being formed in an environment in which many young people are present. Unemployment 
is assumed to be an indicator of general disadvantage, which in earlier studies has been 
documented to have a negative effect on access to social resources (see for instance: 
Haines, Beggs, & Hurlbert, 2011; Turney & Harknett, 2010). Finally, the percentage of 
owners in the municipality is regarded as an indicator of residential stability, which might 
also positively influence residents’ access to social capital resources (e.g. Schieman, 
2005). In order to test the robustness of our results we checked whether the introduction 
of other second level control variables than the ones used in the final model changed our 
conclusions about rural-urban differences in social capital. That wasn’t the case, so we 
decided to only keep these three control variables mentioned above in our final model. 
In order to assess the appropriateness of our model we performed some model diagnos-
tics. First of all, we checked whether the level-1 error variance was equal across the level-
2 units (homoscedasticity of level-1 variance). The test resulted in a very insignificant chi-
square value of 125.14 with 220 degrees of freedom, so there was no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
                                                    
36 Traditionally, multilevel model are build up differently: individual level predictors are brought into the 
model before the second level predictors. However, we have good reasons to proceed the way we do. 
One of our hypothesis (HA4 and HB4) is that urban-rural differences can be explained away by individual 
level characteristics. To test this hypothesis, we must first check whether we can find rural-urban dif-
ferences without taking individual characteristics into account. Afterwards, we must check whether 
these differences disappear when we control for the individual characteristics. 
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 Figure 25: Geographical location of Moeskroen
p-value of 0.011. In other words, there is convincing evidence for an effect of the rural-
urban typology on reported access to social capital. In order to appreciate the size of the 
 effect we calculate two measures. First, we calculate Cohen’s d which expresses the effect 
in terms of standard deviations. Second, to make the effect size more tangible for readers 
less familiar with statistics, we will also translate the largest observed difference between 
the rural-urban category into a percentage of the effective scale range. The largest ob-
served difference is the one between the municipalities of the suburb and those of the 
outer areas and amounted to 0.1443. Cohen’s d was equal to 0.2, which in Cohen’s  terms 
should be interpreted as a small effect (Cohen, 1988). The effective range in observed RG-
scores (after list wise deletion of item non-response and deletion of the outliers) went from 
-1.4 to 2.8. The difference of 0.1443 therefore represents a difference of 3.4% of the 
response scale. Finally, comparing the effect of the rural-urban typology to the effect of 
the other variables in the model also helps appreciating the size of the effect. Based on the 
standardized parameters we can say that the difference between the municipalities of the 
suburban zone and those of the outer zone represents the second strongest effect in the 
model (the strongest being age). 
While there still is no proof for an effect of the municipality level control variables, the 
individual level control variables do seem important for explaining access to social capital. 
Female students report less access to social capital as do males students. Age has a signif-
icant positive effect on reporting social capital. There is no significant difference between 
allochthonous and autochthonous students, neither are there differences between students 
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 residing in a student accommodation and those residing with their parents. The highest 
social status of the parents of the responding students does have a significant positive 
effect. Finally, students with higher educated mothers report significantly more access to 
social capital as compared to students with mothers that did not enjoy secondary educa-
tion. There is no significant difference, however, between students with higher educated 
and students with secondary educated mothers. 
At first sight, there seems to be a paradox present in the results: they suggest that there 
is no variation in the average prestige level of people’s acquaintances network at the mu-
nicipality level, while at the same time the rural-urban categories that represent a feature 
of those municipalities explain a part of that variation. This implies that we are either mak-
ing a Type II error when deciding that there is no significant second level variance or a 
Type I error when deciding that urbanization has no effects. Because the first scenario is 
much more probable than the second, we agree with Snijders and Bosker (1999) that in 
such circumstances the most important thing is the significant result of the effect. We can 
therefore say that these results support hypothesis HA1 and contradict hypothesis HA2.
Hypothesis HA4 is refuted because the introduction of the second level control variables led 
to an increase in the difference between more urban and more rural municipalities, and 
not to a decrease in that difference. 
Hypothesis HA3 stated that the effect of the status of the parents and educational level of 
the mother would be stronger in urban settings. In other words, this hypothesis expected 
a significant (cross-level) interaction effect of highest ISEI of the parents and the rural-
urban typology and of education of the mother and the rural-urban typology. These cross-
level interactions were introduced in the model, but showed to be insignificant. Because 
cross-level interactions make a model much more complex these interaction terms were 
not included in our final model. We can however decide that hypothesis HA3 has been re-
futed. 
B. Results from the Spanish sample 
Due to item non-response 282 students could not be used for the analysis of the resource 
generator data. This brought the effective sample down from 1761 students to 1479 stu-
dents. The number of observed municipalities was brought down from 358 to 334.  
Table 21 is build up the same way as was Table 20. The first model is an intercept-only 
model. In model 1, the second level explanatory variables are added, while in table 2 the 
first level explanatory variables are added. We picked the same control variables at the 
second level. As was the case in the Belgian sample, introducing other control variables at 
the municipality level did not change our conclusions about the effect of the rural-urban 
typology.
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 Granada report lower access to social capital. However, unlike in the Belgian case, this 
difference was not significant. Age did have a very significant and large positive effect (the 
highest standardized parameter of all the variables in the model). Allochthonous students 
on average report significantly less access to social capital as compared to autochthonous 
students. The highest socio-economic status of the parents of the student has a significant 
and positive effect on reported access to social resources and so does the educational level 
of the mother. As far as the last variable is concerned, only students whose mothers did 
not enjoy secondary education differ significantly from those whose mothers enjoyed high-
er education. 
Figure 28: Geographical location of El Carpio
As was the case in the Belgian sample, the introduction of the control variables leads to an 
increase in the difference in reported access to social capital between the categories of the 
rural-urban typology. However, it still are only the metropolitan core municipalities that 
show a significant difference with the rural municipalities. It is important to notice, howev-
er, that when we change the reference category to the metropolitan core, all the other 
dummies (except non-metro city) show a significant effect. Also, performing a chi-square 
difference test between the final model and a model with all the control variables but with-
out the dummies for the urban-rural typology resulted in a ܺଶ-value of 10.82 with 4 de-
grees of freedom and a p-value of 0.028. We can therefore decide that the rural-urban 
typology does have a significant influence on the access to social resources reported by 
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 the students and that it is especially the difference between the metropolitan core munici-
palities and the other municipalities that seems to matter.  
The largest observed difference between the rural-urban categories was between the met-
ropolitan core and the rural municipalities. Cohen’s d was equal to 0.4, which should be 
interpreted as a small to medium effect. The difference amounted to 0.3350 on an effec-
tive scale ranging between -1.75 and 2.65 (after listwise deletion of missing values and 
deletion of the outliers). The difference between urban core municipalities and rural munic-
ipalities therefore represents 7.6% of the scale. Or in other words, students from metro-
politan core municipalities report 7.6 percentage points less access to social capital as do 
students from metropolitan core municipalities. 
Turning to our hypotheses no, we can conclude that hypotheses HA1 is supported by the 
data, while hypotheses HA2 is refuted. Since again we found that introducing first level 
control variables was responsible for an increase in the difference between rural and urban 
categories also hypotheses HA4 must also be refuted. Because no interaction effect with 
status of the parents and educational level of the mother could be found (that’s why they 
were not included in the final model), also hypothesis HA3 should be refuted. Finally, since 
the difference between metropolitan core and rural municipalities in Spain is more or less 
twice as large as compared to the difference between suburban and outer zone-
municipalities in Belgium, we can conclude that we have also found some evidence for 
hypothesis C. 
7.3.2 Analysis of the Average Accessed Prestige-measure 
A. Results from the Belgian sample 
866 individual cases were lost due to item non-response. This left us with a sample of 
2514 students coming from 273 different municipalities. 
In Table 22 and Table 23 the results of the analysis are listed. The tables look somewhat 
different from the ones we saw above. First of all, we have changed the reference category 
of the rural-urban typology to the most urban category instead of the most rural category. 
Why we did this will be explained below. The most important change however has every-
thing to do with the fact that our model diagnostics demonstrated that the homoscedas-
ticity assumption had been violated (ܺଶ ൌ ͶʹͲ, ݂݀ ൌ ʹͳͺ and ݌ ൏ ǤͲͲͲ). Fortunately, multi-
level models are able to deal with heteroscedasticity by modeling the residual variance at 
the individual level. This means that the individual level residual variance is allowed to 
depend on one or more individual level variables (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). In order to 
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 of accessed professions and age. In model 1 we added the second level explanatory varia-
bles and in model 2 the first level explanatory variables. Model 2 is presented two times, 
i.e. the first column contains the results of a model in which the variance is assumed to be 
homogeneous, while in the second column the results of a model with heterogeneous 
level-1 error is presented. We included the first column in Table 23 to show the effects on 
the final model of allowing heterogeneous level 1 variance. The model comparison test in 
the model fit part for model 1 compares model 1 with the 0-model. The model comparison 
test for the final model compares the model with heterogeneous level-1 variance with the 
model with homogeneous level-1 variance. Because the model without homogeneous lev-
el-1 variance is not nested in another model, no model comparison test for that model is 
performed. 
The result of modeling the error variance is given in the random part of the table. The 
fixed part of the table is analogous to the previous tables. As second level control variables 
we added average fiscal income, unemployment rate and the percentage of owners-
occupiers. Fiscal income was expected to have a positive impact on average accessed 
prestige because it is regarded as an indicator of the average prestige level of the people 
living in the municipality. Unemployment was expected to have a negative impact because 
the presence of a lot of unemployed people means that less local network partners with a 
high prestige will be present. We also checked whether adding other second-level explana-
tory variables to the model had no influence on the conclusions about the results. This was 
the case for one variable, i.e. the percentage of owner-occupiers in the municipality (more 
details later). Therefore, that variable was also included in the model. Because none of the 
interaction effects that were modeled were significant, they were also left out of the final 
model. 
The Q-Q-plot for the first-level residuals (cf. Figure 29) shows that there is no severe de-
viation from normality. However, there were some heavy outliers, both at the left and the 
right tale of the distribution. Closer inspectation of these cases did not reveal any specific 
ideas about why they were outliers. Plotting the Mahalanobis distances (cf. Figure 30) 
showed severe deviation from multivariate normality. It also pointed us to three heavy 
outlier which appeared to be De Haan (6 observations), Schilde (9 observations) and 
Heuvelland (8 observations). Again, no evident reasons why these municipalities were 
outlying cases could be found. Deleting the outliers increased the observed differences 
between the more rural and more urban municipalities. However, because we could not 
find any specific reason why these individuals and municipalities were outliers, we decided 
it would be safer not to delete them from our dataset. As a consequence, the analysis of 
which the results are presented in Table 22 and Table 23 are based on all of the data, 
including the outlying cases. 
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 Table 22: Multilevel analysis results for AAP (Ugent - part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 49.055 .0732 .000 49.034 .0649 .000
Sex
Allochthonous 
Student Accomodation
Highest ISEI Parents
Education Mother
No secundary
Only secundary
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Agl.=ref
Suburban -.3562 -.0344 .2162 .100
Commuters' Zone -.6113 -.0700 .2259 .008
Outer Zone -.4935 -.0603 .2006 .015
Average Income (€1000) .1550 .0737 .0424 .001
Unemployment .0111 .0012 .0405 .785
Owner -2.1095 -.0698 1.126 .062
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .1985 .4456 0.002 .0115 .107 .272
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 3.9187 .2997 0.000 3.8947 3.895 .000
ʌ / Age .0218 .0134 .104 .0212 .021 .109
N° acc. prof. -.1717 .0068 .000 -.1686 -.169 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 13988 5.00 13263 11.00
ȴ Est. parameters 6
X
2 725 0.000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
0-model Model 1
Random Intercept and heterogeneous 
level-1 variance
2nd level effects and heterogeneous 
level-1 variance
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 Table 23: Multilevel analysis results for AAP (Ugent - part 2) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 49.478 .0986 .000 52.316 .4019 .000
Sex .2694 .0329 .1517 .075 .3875 .0473 .1257 .003
Allochthonous .0525 .0045 .2290 .819 .0579 .0050 .2161 .789
Student Accomodation .4633 .0566 .1539 .003 .3027 .0370 .1408 .031
Highest ISEI Parents .0476 .1782 .0058 .000 .0432 .1617 .0051 .000
Education Mother
No secundary -1.6106 -.0861 .3190 .000 -1.3995 -.0748 .2894 .000
Only secundary -.7896 -.0904 .2090 .000 -.6510 -.0745 .1743 .000
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Agl.=ref.
Suburban -.4636 -.0448 .2899 .111 -.3860 -.0373 .2384 .106
Commuters' Zone -.4457 -.0510 .2748 .106 -.4394 -.0503 .2220 .048
Outer Zone -.6151 -.0751 .2782 .028 -.5877 -.0718 .2212 .009
Average Income (€1000) .1479 .0704 .0584 .012 .1321 .0629 .0505 .010
Unemployment .0049 .0005 .0543 .928 .0086 .0009 .0445 .847
Owner -3.0860 -.1021 1.497 .040 -2.8258 -.0935 1.252 .025
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0180 0.13 0.048 .0028 .0530 >.500
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 13.957 3.736 5.5231 .2955 .000
ʌ / Age 0.1% -.0856 .0132 .000
N° accessed professions -.0490 .0066 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 13763 15.00 13738 17.00
ȴ Est. parameters 6
X
2 26 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
Final Model
Final Model without heterogeneous 
level 1-variance
Model 2
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 owners had a significantly negative effect. Although we did not anticipate this effect (cf. 
supra), we can look for an explanation. We know that the percentage of owner (i.e. owner-
occupier) is an indicator of residential stability. We assume that municipalities with high 
residential stability are municipalities in which there is more social control and in which 
relationship patterns are more conservative. This allows for less network freedom as com-
pared to municipalities with more residential change. In other words, we believe that the 
effect of this variable is in line with the theory of the liberating city we discussed in chapter 
4.2. This explanation makes a lot of sense since we know that in the central cities there 
are less owners-occupiers and we noticed that bringing the owner-variable into the model 
lead to a decrease in the difference between the municipalities of the central agglomera-
tion and the municipalities of the outer zone, so a part of the difference between urban 
and rural municipalities can be explained by the fact that there are more owners-occupiers 
in the central agglomerations. We will get back to this when we present a more general 
interpretation of our findings. 
In the final model we introduced the individual level explanatory variables. The average 
prestige level of the network of female students is somewhat higher than that of male 
students. The variable with the largest effect is, logically, the highest status level of the 
parents of the student. Also the education of the mother has a significant positive effect: 
the networks of students whose mother did not enjoy secondary education are 1.4 points 
lower than those who finished higher education. The average prestige level of students 
whose mothers’ highest educational achievement is secondary education is on average 0.6 
points lower as compared to the networks of students whose mothers enjoyed higher 
education. No difference could be found between students with an allochthonous back-
ground and students with an autochthonous background. Finally, the average status of the 
network of students residing in a student accommodation was 0.3 points higher as com-
pared to those residing with their parents. Since students who live in a student accommo-
dation are more exposed to city life as compared to those residing at home, we could see 
this as additional evidence for the positive effect of city life on the average status of a 
students’ network. 
After the introduction of the individual level control variables the estimated differences 
between the municipalities of the outer zone and those of the central agglomeration in-
creased a little. The difference between the commuters’ zone and the central agglomera-
tion decreased as bit, while the differences between the central agglomeration and the 
outer zone increased. As a consequence, the effect looks more linear now and the biggest 
difference is the one between the outer zone and the agglomeration. That difference 
amounted to 0.5877 or 1.4% of the scale. Cohens’ d was equal to 0.15, indicating a small 
effect. When we look at the standardized parameters, we see that the rural-urban catego-
ry only exerts the fourth largest effect, after the status and educational background of the 
parents and the proportion of owner-occupiers in the municipality. We performed a chi-
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 squared difference test to check whether adding the rural-urban typology variable leads to 
a significant increase in model fit. The result of this test was that the introduction of the 
complete rural-urban typology was insignificant (ܺଶ ൌ ͵Ǥͻ with ݂݀ ൌ ͵ and ݌ ൌ Ǥʹ͹ͳ). Howev-
er, when we introduced only the urban agglomeration dummy, this led to a significant 
decrease in deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ͹ǤͲ with ݂݀ ൌ ͳ and ݌ ൌ ǤͲͲͺ). As we mentioned before, the re-
sults show that is especially the urban agglomeration that sets itself apart from the other 
areas. The effect is however rather small. However, this is not unexpected. First of all, the 
hypothesis states that the difference will be small since people aim at connecting to others 
that have that are a little higher, not a lot higher (cf. supra). Second, a part of the differ-
ence between the urban agglomeration and the outer zone seems to be explained by resi-
dential stability which makes the remaining effect smaller. 
If we look at the results of model 2, we see that modeling the heterogeneous level-1 vari-
ance had a rather limited effect on the results. The dummy for the commuters’ zone went 
from non-significant to significant after modeling the error variance, and the sex-variable 
became significant. However, the main conclusions to be drawn remain the same, which 
shows that the robust standard errors are doing their job pretty well. Nonetheless, be-
cause the model showed a better fit (ܺʹ ൌ ʹ͸ with ݂݀ ൌ ʹ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͲ), it is the preferable 
model. 
Turning to our hypotheses now, we can say that we have found support for hypotheses B2 
that predicted a higher average accessed prestige level in urban areas. On the contrary, 
no support has been found for hypothesis B3 (predicting an interaction effect of the rural-
urban typology and the education and status variables on average accessed prestige). Also 
hypothesis B4 (predicting the disappearance of rural-urban differences after the introduc-
tion of first level control variables) is not supported by our data. 
B. Results from the Spanish sample 
In the sample of UGR-students 258 individual cases were lost because of item non-
response, bringing the sample down from 1761 to 1503 students and from 358 to 337 
municipalities. 
Table 24 and Table 25 contain the main results of the analysis. The tables look the same 
as the one for the Belgian sample. That is of course because also in Spain evidence for 
heteroscedasticity was revealed (the test resulted in a ܺʹ ൌ ʹ͸ͷǤ͹ with ݂݀ ൌ ͳ͸ͷ and 
݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ) and the first level random variance was consequently modeled by age and the 
number of accessed professions. As second level control variables we wanted to use the 
same variables we used in the final model in the Belgian sample (average income, unem-
ployment rate and percentage of owners-occupiers). However, we weren’t able to access 
information about the average fiscal income in the municipalities of Spain. Fortunately, the 
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 Table 24: Multilevel analysis results for AAP (UGR - part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 49.055 .0732 .000 48.140 .0673 .000
Sex
Age
Allochthonous 
Student Accomodation
Highest ISEI Parents
Education Mother
No secundary
Only secundary
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Metro Core=ref.
Rest metro area -.6997 -.0833 .1887 .000
Non-metro city -.6421 -.0906 .1402 .000
Rural center -.8010 -.0929 .1995 .000
Rural -.7908 -.1165 .2162 .001
Average status -1.0006 -.0376 .6929 .150
Old age dependency -1.7775 -.0892 .6935 .011
Owner -.8863 -.0361 1.070 .408
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .1476 .3842 .008 .0026 .051 .391
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 3.8826 .7641 .000 4.4641 .240 .000
ʌ / Age .2671 .2460 .278 .0108 .010 .267
N° acc. prof. -.2071 .0085 .000 -.2067 .008 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 7143 5.00 7099 12.00
ȴ Est. parameters 7
X
2 44 0.000
0-model Model 1
Random Intercept and heterogeneous 
level-1 variance
2nd level effects and heterogeneous 
level-1 variance
155
 Table 25: Multilevel analysis results for AAP (UGR - part 2) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 48.525 .0895 .000 50.570 .5055 .000
Sex -.0593 -.0714 .1990 .765 .0509 .0613 .1364 .709
Age .0703 .0064 .0256 .006 .0581 .0053 .0215 .007
Allochthonous .2121 .0319 .2266 .350 .0266 .0040 .1848 .886
Student Accomodation -.1108 -.6449 .1752 .527 -.1393 -.8108 .1225 .256
Highest ISEI Parents .0351 .0051 .0053 .000 .0282 .0041 .0042 .000
Education Mother
No secundary -1.1000 -.1690 .2055 .000 -.5968 -.0917 .1801 .000
Only secundary -.9097 .0000 .1764 .000 -.6493 .0000 .1521 .000
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Metro Core=ref.
Rest metro area -.4712 -.0561 .2555 .066 -.5576 -.0664 .1986 .006
Non-metro city -.3558 -.0502 .2271 .118 -.3684 -.0520 .1457 .012
Rural center -.3887 -.0451 .2963 .191 -.4103 -.0476 .2385 .086
Rural -.1874 -.0276 .2970 .528 -.3079 -.0454 .2213 .165
Average status -1.1646 -.0438 .8877 .191 -1.2865 .0000 .7194 .074
Old age dependency -1.4781 -.0741 .8118 .069 -1.4905 .0000 .6944 .032
Owner .1153 .0022 1.301 .930 -.5769 .0000 1.078 .593
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0931 0.31 >.500 .0018 .0426 >.500
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 8.869 2.978 3.6619 .1210 .000
ʌ / Age 1.0% .0050 .0097 .610
N° accessed professions -.0869 .0084 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 7541 16.00 7347 18.00
ȴ Est. parameters 2
X
2 194 .000
Final Model
Final Model without heterogeneous 
level 1-variance
Model 2
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 In the second model we added the individual level control variable. The differences be-
tween the urban-rural categories decreased considerably. Remarkably, the difference with 
the metropolitan core was the smallest for the most rural category. However, the differ-
ences between the different types of municipalities not belonging to the metropolitan core 
was in general rather limited. As was the case in the Belgian sample, we can conclude that 
it is especially the metropolitan core that sets itself apart from the other municipalities. 
The largest difference was noted between the metropolitan core and the rest of the metro-
politan area and amounted to 0.5576 or 1.8% of the effective scale. Cohens’ d was equal 
to 0.14. Introducing the rural-urban typology was responsible for a significant drop in 
deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ͳʹǤͲʹ with ݂݀ ൌ Ͷ and ݌ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ͹). In other words, the observed effect is real, 
but rather limited in size, as was the case for the Belgian sample. Moreover, the size of the 
effect is almost equally large in Belgian as in Spain. 
Conclusions about the second level control variables remained the same: only old age 
dependency showed a significant effect. The owner-occupiers-variable did not show a 
significant effect, contrary to what we saw in the Belgian sample. This is interesting, since 
we argued in the previous section that the observed effect could be seen as additional 
evidence for the community liberated-perspective. However, we must keep in mind that 
behind the same numbers lies a different socio-economic reality. We will get back to that 
in the conclusion. 
Of the first level control variables, only highest status of the parents and education of the 
mother had a significant and positive effect. As was the case in the Ugent sample, the 
strongest effect was, logically, the one of the status of the parents.  
The differences between the model with heterogeneity and the model with homogeneity 
are more pronounced in the Spanish case as compared to the Belgian case. For starters, 
this is expressed in the greater difference in model fit (ܺଶ ൌ ͳͻͶ with ݂݀ ൌ ʹ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ).
But more importantly, the conclusions about the effect of the rural-urban category 
changed. Although the estimated differences are more or less the same, they are estimat-
ed with greater precision (smaller standard errors), resulting in higher significance levels. 
Apparently, the robust standard errors performed worse in the Spanish case as compared 
to the Belgian case. This could already be noticed in the model without heterogeneity since 
the difference between the robust and non-robust standard errors were a lot bigger there 
as compared to the Belgian case. 
As far as our hypotheses are concerned, we can draw some conclusions. First of all, there 
is evidence for hypotheses B3: the average accessed prestige of students from more urban 
municipalities were higher as compared to those from rural municipalities. For the first 
time, there is also some support for hypothesis B5. When we bring in the first level ex-
planatory variables in model 2, the differences between the rural municipalities and the 
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 other municipalities from other rural-urban typologies considerably decrease. Finally, as 
far as average accessed prestige is concerned hypotheses C had to be rejected: expressed 
in percentage of the effective scale as well as in standard errors, the differences were 
about equally large in both countries. 
7.3.3 Analysis of the SDAP-measures 
A. Results from the Belgian sample 
Due to item non-response 873 items were lost, leaving us with an effective sample of 
2507 students from 273 different municipalities. 
Table 26 and Table 27 are build up like the ones in the previous chapter. The 
heteroscedasticity test for model 2 (with homoscedasticity assumed) resulted in a very 
significant chi-square statistic (ܺʹ ൌ ͵ͷʹ with ݂݀ ൌ ͳͷ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ) of 351.88 with 15 
degrees of freedom and a resulting p-value smaller than 0.001. In other words, there was 
evidence for heteroscedasticity in our model. As was is the case for a mean, the estimation 
of a standard deviation tends to be more precise when it is based on more observations. 
And because we assume that the networks of older students will be determined more by 
structural factors and less by coincidence as compared to younger students, both the 
number of accessed professions and the age of the respondent were supposed to have a 
negative effect on the level-1 error variance.  
As second level control variable we choose to include the variables average income in the 
municipality and percentage of owners-occupiers. Because average income is an indicator 
of the availability of potential high status network partners, we believed it might have an 
influence on the status diversity in the students’ networks (as it did in the previous analy-
sis). Being an indicator of residential stability, the percentage of owner-occupiers might 
also have an effect since such stable environments might stimulate people to network 
more in their inner circle (leading to less status diversity in the network). As always, we 
controlled whether including one of the other variables we have at our disposal had an 
effect on our conclusions, which it didn’t. None of the presumed interaction effects were 
significant, so none were included in the model. 
Finally, we checked the residuals at our two levels of analysis. The distribution of the first 
level residuals seemed to approach the normal distribution reasonably well. At the second 
level however, we noticed that the Mahalanobis distance measures were a little beneath 
their expected value. 
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 Table 26: Results of the multilevel analysis of SDAP (Ugent - part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 12.511 .0283 .000 12.535 .0314 .000
Sex
Age
Allochthonous 
Student Accomodation
Highest ISEI Parents
Education Mother
No secundary
Only secundary
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeration -.0936 -.0169 .1048 .373
Suburban -.1038 -.0183 .1050 .324
Commuters' Zone -.0621 -.0129 .0771 .421
Outer Zone = reference
Average Income (€1000) -.0117 -.0102 .0223 .599
Owner .1195 .0072 .4702 .800
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0011 .0338 >.500 .0023 .0478 >.500
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 3.1005 .2959 .000 3.0933 .2961 .000
ʌ / Age .0163 .0132 .219 .0163 .0132 .218
N° acc. prof. -.1994 .0067 .000 -.1990 .0067 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 10053 5.00 10050 10.00
ȴ Est. parameters 5
X
2 3 0.696
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
0-model Model 1
Random Intercept Model without 1e level effects
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 Table 27: Results of the multilevel analysis of SDAP (Ugent - part 2) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 11.997 .0457 .000 12.381 .3122 .000
Sex -.1674 -.0372 .0859 .051 -.3183 -.0707 .0542 .000
Age .0219 .0009 .0180 .225 .0102 .0004 .0127 .422
Allochthonous -.0235 -.0037 .1367 .864 -.0478 -.0075 .0890 .591
Student Accomodatio -.3297 -.0733 .0832 .000 -.2047 -.0455 .0665 .003
Highest ISEI Parents .0062 .0421 .0039 .109 -.0006 -.0043 .0026 .807
Education Mother
No secundary .4210 .0409 .2397 .079 .2859 .0278 .1401 .041
Only secundary .2019 .0421 .1026 .049 .0617 .0128 .0727 .397
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeratio -.2693 -.0486 .1762 .127 -.0862 -.0156 .1151 .455
Suburban -.1374 -.0242 .1376 .319 -.1072 -.0189 .1051 .309
Commuters' Zone -.2089 -.0435 .1180 .077 -.0906 -.0189 .0807 .263
Outer Zone = reference
Average Income (€100 -.0622 -.0539 .0365 .089 -.0216 -.0187 .0223 .334
Owner .1622 .0098 .6907 .815 .4078 .0245 .4613 .378
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0020 .0446 0.156 .0067 .0819 .467
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 4.589 2.142 3.6955 .0829 .000
ʌ / Age 0.0% .6941 .3077 .024
N° accessed professions -.2182 .0068 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 10934 15.00 10009 17.00
ȴ Est. parameters 7
X
2 924 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
Model 3
Final ModelModel with 1e and 2nd level effects
Model 2
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The homogeneity test once again proved to be highly significant (ܺଶ ൌ ͳͳͷǤͺ͹, ݂݀ ൌ ͳ͸ͷ and 
݌ ൏ ͲǤͻͻͻ), which led us to model the level-1 error variance with the variables age and the 
number of accessed professions. As second level control variables we choose for the aver-
age prestige level since the availability of high-status network partners was supposed to 
influence the status variability of the network. As in the Belgian case, we also opted for the 
percentage of owner-occupiers as an indication of residential stability. 
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As one can see in model 3, modeling the first level variance resulted in a very significant 
decrease in deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ʹͳǤͺ, ݂݀ ൌ ʹ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ). This was due to the introduction of 
the number of accessed professions, while the age-variable didn’t explain a significant part 
of the heterogeneity.  
       Figure 36: Q-Q-plot for mahalanobis distance measures 
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 Table 28: Multilevel analysis results for SDAP  in Spain (UGR - part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 13.281 .0284 .000 13.274 .0301 .000
Sex
Age
Allochthonous 
Student Accomodation
Highest ISEI Parents
Education Mother
No secundary
Only secundary
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Metropolitan Core .0412 .0063 .1011 .684
Rest metro area .1482 .0362 .0825 .073
Non-metro city -.0569 -.0123 .0989 .565
Rural center -.0345 -.0073 .1061 .745
Rural=refererence
Average social status .1364 .0093 .3151 .665
Owner -.5686 -.0420 .4647 .222
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0045 .0671 .384 .0006 .0252 .405
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 3.6670 .2411 .000 3.6424 .2401 .000
ʌ / Age .0088 .0098 .368 .0097 .0097 .320
N° acc. prof. -.2420 .0086 .000 -.2419 .0085 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 5114 5.00 5107 11.00
ȴ Est. parameters 6
X
2 8 0.267
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
0-model Model 1
Random Intercept Model without 1e level effects
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 Table 29: Multilevel analysis results for SDAP  in Spain (UGR - part 2) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 12.849 .0491 .000 13.572 .1505 .000
Sex .0914 .0249 .0903 .312 -.1244 -.0339 .0427 .004
Age .0272 .0336 .0089 .003 .0137 .0169 .0055 .012
Allochthonous -.1096 -.0212 .1768 .535 .0455 .0088 .0747 .543
Student Accomodatio -.1070 -.0292 .1040 .304 .0150 .0041 .0491 .760
Highest ISEI Parents -.0012 -.0132 .0031 .686 -.0011 -.0120 .0015 .453
Education Mother
No secundary .1240 .0324 .0986 .209 .1563 .0409 .0761 .123
Only secundary .2318 .0645 .1022 .023 .2000 .0557 .0653 .017
Higher = reference
Rural-Urban typology
Metropolitan Core -.0060 -.0009 .1562 .970 .0650 .0100 .1031 .528
Rest metro area .0402 .0098 .1519 .791 .1464 .0358 .0853 .087
Non-metro city -.0654 -.0137 .1774 .713 -.0521 -.0110 .0995 .600
Rural center -.1884 -.0128 .1918 .327 -.0156 -.0011 .1057 .883
Rural=refererence
Average social status .5546 .0378 .5667 .329 .1231 .0084 .3166 .697
Owner -1.3934 -.1029 .7845 .076 -.4818 -.0356 .4472 .283
RANDOM
a
Level-two random part
ʍ 2 u0 .0050 .0705 >.500 .0005 .0230 >.500
(Model for) the level-one variance
ʍ2e / intercept 3.035 1.742 4.1499 .1212 .000
ʌ / Age 0.2% .0137 .0097 .158
N° accessed professions -.2562 .0085 .000
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 5934 5095 18.00
ȴ Est. parameters 2
X
2 839 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
Model 3
Final ModelModel with 1e and 2nd level effects
Model 2
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 Chapter 8
Analysis of the EU-SILC-data 
8.1 THE DATA 
8.1.1 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
Data collection for the EU-SILC originated from the Lisbon strategy adopted by the mem-
ber states of the European Union in March 2000. Although the bulk of the plan had to do 
with improving the economy’s competitiveness, the member states also declared to want 
to increase social inclusion. Because the goals of the strategy had to be adopted through 
the method of open coordination (i.e. a process of learning from best practices in other 
member states), comparable data on the member states’ performance were indispensable. 
From 1994 onwards data on social inclusion had been delivered through the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). But because the quality of the data were wildly ques-
tioned, a new instrument was created that was called the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). (Eurostat, 2006) 
The EU-SILC includes data on all the member states of the European Union plus Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland, Croatia, and Turkey. Although the reason behind the creation of the 
database was to generate comparable data, collection procedures are not completely 
standardized. “EU-SILC is based on the idea of a common ‘framework’ and no longer a 
common ‘survey’ as was the case for the ECHP. The common framework is defined by 
harmonised lists of target primary (annual) and secondary (every four years or less fre-
quently) variables, by a recommended design for implementing EU-SILC, by common 
requirements (for imputation, weighting, sampling errors calculation), common concepts 
(household and income) and classifications (ISCO, NACE, ISCED) aiming at maximising 
comparability of the information produced” (Eurostat, 2006, p. 17). Participating countries 
have the obligation to supply Eurostat with 200 specific variables in a certain unit of 
measurement. However, they are free to determine the way they collect the necessary 
information. Data can come from existing national sources (existing surveys and or admin-
istrative inquiries), from a new specifically developed survey or from a combination of 
both. Belgium gathers the information through an integrated face-to-face survey. Moreo-
ver, some questions that are not required by Eurostat are added to the questionnaire, 
such as a battery of questions on the availability of social resources. It are exactly these 
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 questions that will be the main focus of our analysis. Because they are only available in 
the Belgian part of the EU-SILC our analysis will, unfortunately, have to be limited to Bel-
gium. 
The SILC is build up as a rotating panel. This means that the sample used in the first year 
of the survey is partitioned into four equal random subsamples. The first subsample is 
asked to only participate once in the survey. The others are aksed to participate two, three 
or four years respectively. The social capital questions were included in the questionnaire 
from 2004 until 2007. However, between the rounds of 2005 and 2006 the wordings of the 
questions changed dramatically. Therefore, longitudinal data on social capital are limited to 
a time span of only two years. Because the influence of living in a rural or urban environ-
ment is expected to work in the long run, the added value of using a longitudinal dataset 
of two years is rather limited. Therefore, we will only make use of the cross-sectional da-
taset of the most recent year, i.e. 2007. 
The sampling design for the survey is rather complicated. First of all, there was a stratifi-
cation with the Belgian provinces and Brussels serving as the 11 strata. Second, the sam-
pling procedure was multi-staged. Municipalities (or parts of municipalities for the larger 
ones) served as the primary sampling units, drawn with selection probability proportional 
to size. 275 draws were made, but because repetition is allowed and because some large 
municipalities were split up in smaller parts, only 231 unique municipalities are represent-
ed in the sample. Households served as the secondary sampling units. In every municipali-
ty about 40 households were selected through systematic sampling, with the households 
ordered to the age of the reference person. In total, data were collected from 6348 house-
holds. The response rate of the households was 64.1%. Within the households, all mem-
bers aged 16 or older were asked to complete an interview. In total 12319 individuals 
completed an interview. The individual response rate was 63.64%. The geographical dis-
tribution of the responding households and individuals is displayed on the maps in Figure 
37 and 
Figure 38.
In the dataset there are weights available for the individuals and the households. The 
weights correct for design effects, initial non-response and attrition. No weights are avail-
able that correct only for the design effects. The weights will be used because correction 
for the design-effects is considered necessary. 
For more detailed information about the dataset we refer to ADSEI (2007). 
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 8.1.2 Measures used 
A. Rural and urban areas 
For the theoretical and technical details about the delineation of rural and urban areas we 
refer to the sections 5.1, 5.2 and 6.2.2. Here we only discuss the distribution of the obser-
vations over the rural and urban areas. As we can see in Table 30, most of the municipali-
ties observed belong to the outer zone, whereas the suburban municipalities constitute the 
smallest group. This picture is very different from the one of the students barometer as we 
displayed in Table 6. Of course, this has everything to do with the very different selection 
procedures. While in the case of the students barometer we had observed a respondent in 
almost all Flemish municipalities and almost no respondent in the Walloon municipalities, 
here the observations are more equally distributed over the country. Moreover, because 
the selection probability of municipalities in the sample was equal to (population-) size, 
every important urban center has been observed. 
Table 30: Distribution of observations over the rural-urban typology 
F % F % F %
Agglomeration 68 29.4% 2781 43.8% 5083 41.3%
Suburban Area 36 15.6% 771 12.1% 1550 12.6%
Comuters' Area 52 22.5% 1108 17.5% 2229 18.1%
Outer Zone 75 32.5% 1688 26.6% 3457 28.1%
Total 231 6348 12319
Municipalities Households Individuals
When we classify the rural-urban typologies according to number of households observed, 
we get the same rank order. However, the relative frequency distribution is more extreme. 
That is of course also a consequence of the fact that the sample of municipalities has been 
drawn with repetition and probability equal to size – leading to the fact that the larger 
urban centers are often included more than once in the dataset. Finally, the distribution of 
individuals shows again a similar image, but we notice that the relative frequency of ag-
glomeration is a little lower for the individuals as it was for the households. The relative 
frequencies of suburban area, comuters’ area and outer zone are a bit higher. This can be 
explained by the fact that urban households on average are smaller than rural households 
(remember that all household members aged 16 and over have been interviewed, not a 
fixed number of household memers per household). 
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 B. Municipality-level control variables 
At the level of the municipalities we dispose of the same control variables as we had for 
the analysis of the Belgian UGent-barometer. The distribution of these variables in the 
SILC-sample is of course somewhat different from the distribution in the student barome-
ter sample since another sample of municipalities have been observed (the distributional 
statistics presented here and presented under heading 7.1.2B are calculated on the sam-
ple of municipalities observed and not on the total population of Belgian/Spanish munici-
palities).  
Table 31: Descriptive statistics for the second level control variables 
Mean Min Max SD Skew SE (Skew)
Average Income (€1000) 14.912 8.100 22.269 1.973 0.247 0.101
Inequality 106.906 82.950 155.000 11.737 0.872 0.101
Unemployment Rate 9.339 2.651 31.882 5.784 1.286 0.101
Proportion of Foreigners 0.060 0.000 0.504 0.069 2.746 0.101
Old age dependency ratio 0.168 0.081 0.277 0.024 0.443 0.101
Young age dependency ratio 0.236 0.143 0.317 0.023 -0.049 0.101
Proportion of Owner-Occupiers 0.757 0.271 0.929 0.095 -1.710 0.101
C. Household level control variables 
Contrary to the Student Barometer dataset, in this dataset we dispose of a lot of infor-
mation about the income-level of our respondents. There is an abundance of information 
available in the dataset, so we had to make some decisions about how to introduce it into 
our statistical models. Frist of all, we decided to bring in this information at the level of the 
household, since the household is the central locus were decisions concerning spending, 
investment and participation on the labor market are made. The SILC-questionnaire col-
lects information about wages, returns on investments, government benefits, and so forth. 
From all that information an indicator of total disposable household income is computed. 
The indicator is further adjusted for within-unit non-response (i.e. household members 
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 Another household level control variable we have at our disposal is the highest socio-
economic status in the family. Just as for our analysis of the Student Barometer data, the 
socio-economic status is measured on the ISEI-scale. 
Table 33: Descriptive statistics for metric household level control variables 
Mean Min Max SD Skew
SE 
(Skew)
Equivalent Household Income 21038 -18012 245163 11396 4.27 0.03
Highest socio-economic status in the family 48.95 16.00 80.00 16.19 0.15 0.03
The composition of the household is the third variable at this level. Different classifications 
could be thought of. Because we believe that for the items of the resource generator in-
cluded in this dataset (cf. infra) the difference between a single person household and a 
multiple person household is the most important, we will include this dummy in our model. 
Because other delineations are not substantially interesting for our sake, we believe they 
would only complicate our model, so they will not be considered.  
Table 34: Descriptive statistics for non-metric household level control variables 
N %
Composition of the household
One person 1770 27.9%
Multiple persons 4578 72.1%
Etnic Origin of the household
All born in Belgium 5096 80.3%
At least one member born in EU, none outside EU 571 9.0%
At least one member born outside of EU 482 7.6%
Subsequently, we dispose of an indicator of the ethnic origin of the household. We distin-
guish between households whose members are all autochthonous, households who at least 
have one member born outside of Belgium but inside the European Union and no house-
hold member born outside of the European Union, and households who have at least one 
member born outside of the European Union. Because we prefer to use an indicator of 
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 Because the classes pre-primary education and post-secondary non-tertiary education are 
rather rare in Belgium, we merged them with another class. Pre-primary was merged with 
the no-education group and post-secondary with the upper-secondary group. As such, the 
educational level-variable now has 5 categories. 
Table 36: Descriptive statistics for Age 
Mean Min Max SD Skew SE (Skew)
Age 47.28 17.00 83.00 17.86 0.15 0.02
In Table 38 we can see that educational attainment is significantly associated with all other 
variables. All associations are moderately strong. Ethnic origin is significantly associated 
with age (those born outside of EU-countries are on average younger). 
Table 37: Distribution of the non-metric individual level control variables 
N %
Sex
Male 5828 48.38%
Female 6219 51.62%
Ethnic Origin
Belgian 10471 86.92%
Eu 765 6.35%
Non-EU 721 5.98%
Education Attainment
No education 899.00 7.66%
Primary 1462 12.45%
Lower secondary 1753 14.93%
Upper/Post secondary 4070 34.66%
Tertiary 3557 30.3%
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 Table 38: Bivariate Associations between Individual level control variables 
Age Sex Ethnic Origin
Eta
2 0.000
p-value 0.118
Eta
2
/Cramers' V 0.009 0.020
p-value 0.000 0.098
Eta
2
/Cramers' V 0.080 0.050 0.138
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sex
Ethnic Origin
Educational 
Attainment
E. Dependent variables 
E.1 The SILC-resource generator 
In the SILC-questionnaire two batteries of five question items measuring access to social 
resources were presented to the respondents. In the first battery respondents had to indi-
cate whether they could count on someone of their relatives for help in five possible situa-
tions. The first situation was that they had to be brought somewhere (e.g. to a doctor or a 
hospital). The second one that they wanted to talk to someone about their personal prob-
lems. The third that they wanted help to fill out administrative forms. The fourth that they 
had to find a place to sleep in case of an emergency. And the final situation was that they 
needed help to take care of a dependent family member. In the second battery, the same 
circumstances were presented, but respondents had to indicate whether they knew some-
one apart from their relatives who would be able to help them. The exact wording of the 
questions (in Dutch) can be consulted in Appendix 3. 
Next to a positive or negative answer, the respondents could also indicate that the ques-
tion was not applicable to them. The latter answer was considered a missing value. Unfor-
tunately, over forty percent of respondents indicated that the situation in which they 
needed help for a dependent family member was not applicable to them (meaning that 
they had no dependent family member). Of course, the idea of a resource generator is to 
ask questions about potential situations, not about actual situations. The addition of such 
an ‘not applicable’ answer category must therefore, at least from our point of view, be 
considered a design failure: it offers an too easy escape route for respondents that, at the 
end of a long interview, want to avoid the cognitive effort to think about such a potential 
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 situation. Instead, it would have been better to offer respondents extra information about 
the potential situation (for instance the interviewer could have suggested a situation in 
which a husband, wife, child, etc. breaks a leg and there if immobile for a limited period of 
time). Eventually, the result of adding the not applicable category was that the care-item 
became useless for our purpose, and we were left with only four items to construct our 
social capital scale. Unfortunately, the escape route was also used for the other items, 
although to a lesser extent. In total, 8.3% of the respondents had a missing value for at 
least one of the ‘relatives’-items and 9.2% for the ‘others’-items. 
Table 39: Resource Generator Items with popularities in the SILC-questionnaire 
Question Name Relatives Others
Someone who can bring yous somewhere Transport .92 .92
Someone to talk to about personal problems Personal Problems .91 .84
Someone who can help fill in administrative forms Administrative forms .89 .83
Someone to stay with in a case of need Stay .88 .80
P(X=1)
Just as was the case for the student barometer data, we want to create a metric measure 
for access to social capital from faily and from others. Therefore we will once again make 
use of IRT-analysis using the program ConstructMap (cf. supra).  
Table 40: Fit statistics of the relatives-items 
Item P(X=1) Difficulty MnSq t MnSq t
Transport .92 -.30 .28 -77.60 .72 -11.80
Personal Problems .84 -.09 .30 -73.10 .81 -7.60
Administrative forms .83 .17 .32 -70.00 .85 -6.20
Stay .80 .22 3.32 .00 1.26 -.10
Average .85 .00 1.06 -55.20 .91 -6.40
Outfit Infit
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 In Table 40 the fit statistics for the items concerning help from relatives are listed. First of 
all, we notice that that the t-values are very large. This is not surprising since also our 
sample size is very large (over 10 000 units). We will therefore have to rely mainly on the 
mean square values. In the tabe we see that no infit meansquare values larger than 1.33 
can be found. Only the transport item has a mean square value lower than .75 (indicating 
overfit). The outfit-values for the first three items indicate overfit, while the last item indi-
cates underfit. and Table 41. We remember the reader that the infit-values are the most 
important for evaluating the quality of the measurement model. Outfit-values are more 
sensitive to outliers (e.g. people answering yess to the ‘most dificult’ stay-indicator, but no 
to another to the transport-indicator). If we would have a lot of items at our disposition we 
might want to consider removing this item. However, because we only have a very limited 
amount of items at our disposition and because the infit-value of the item is satisfying we 
decide to keep the item in anyway. The same conclusions are applicable to the others-
items. The fit-statistics for these items can be found in Table 41 which shows a very simi-
lar image to the one sketched above. In general, we can conclude that the data fit the 
model sufficiently well so we can be confident in using the derived scale in our subsequent 
analyses.
Table 41: Fit statistics of the others-items 
Item P(X=1) Difficulty MnSq t MnSq t
Transport .92 -.96 .31 -71.00 .70 -15.60
Personal Problems .91 .12 .32 -70.00 .76 -12.10
Administrative forms .89 .22 .33 -68.40 .79 -10.70
Stay .88 .62 3.11 -.01 1.34 .00
Average .90 -.15 .32 -69.80 .75 -12.80
Outfit Infit
If we look at the descriptive statistics and the distributional graph below we see that the 
scales we have derived through our Rash-analysis are far from having a normal distribu-
tion. This should not surprise us since we only had a very small number of items, and all 
the items had a very high popularity. The quality of the measurement instrument is obvi-
ously far beneath that of our instrument in the Students Barometer. However, it is the 
best instrument available in a large dataset. So we will have to work with it. 
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 and not very suitable for analysis. Therefore we decided to construct a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 in case at least some time is mobilized and the value of 0 if no 
time at all is mobilized. The distribution of that variable is displayed in Figure 43. The data 
will of course be analyzed by means of multilevel logistic regression. Since 376 out of 1431 
household replied they mobilized social capital for childcare, the odds to mobilize childcare 
are 0.34. 
Figure 43: distribution of mobilized childcare 
8.2 HYPOTHESES 
Just as we did in the previous chapter, we will give a list of specific hypotheses we will test 
with the SILC data and give them a number.  
As far as our resource generator scales of social capital are concerned, we deduced the 
following hypotheses: 
HA1: In more urban areas students will report less access to social 
capital 
HA2: In more urban areas students will report more access to social 
capital 
No
75%
Yes
25%
Does household mobilize social 
capital for childcare?
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 HA3: The positive effects of social status, educational level and dispos-
able household income will be stronger in the city as compared to 
the countryside 
HA4: In more urban areas students will report less access to social 
capital from relatives, but more from others 
HA5: The individual and household level control variables will explain 
all differences between rural and urban areas away 
For the mobilized childcare variable, the following hypotheses are deduced: 
HB1: In more urban areas the odds that social capital is mobilized for 
childcare will be smaller as compared to more rural areas 
HB2: In more urban areas the odds that social capital is mobilized for 
childcare will be greater than in more rural areas 
HB3: The positive effects of social status and disposable household in-
come on the odds of mobilizing social capital for childcare will be 
stronger in the city as compared to the countryside 
HB4: The household level control variables will explain all differences 
between rural and urban areas away 
As the reader probably remembers from Chapter 4, hypotheses A1 and B1 are deduced 
from isolation theory and A2 and B2 from liberalization theory. Hypotheses A3 and B3 are 
deduced from both liberalization and isolation theory. Hypothesis A4 is deduced from 
weaker forms of liberalization and isolation theory. Finally, Hypotheses A5 and B4 are 
deduced from theorists that expect no rural-urban differences in contemporary society. 
8.3 RESULTS 
8.3.1 Access to social capital through relatives 
Due to item non-response 1 926 cases were lost at the individual level, 865 at the house-
hold level and 25 at the municipality level. This left us with a total number of 10 393 indi-
vidual observations coming from 5 483 households and 206 municipalities. 
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In Table 43 and Table 44 the results of the multilevel analysis are listed. The tables are 
somewhat different now, since there are three levels instead of two as was the case in the 
previous models. The variables sex (women coded 1, men coded 0), age, origin and edu-
cational attainment are control variables at the individual level. Disposable income, house-
hold status and single person household (coded 1 if the household is a single person 
household and 0 if it is not) are control variables at the household level. The other varia-
bles are situated at the municipality level. In the random part of the table ߪ௘ଶ denotes the 
variance at the individual level, ߪ௨଴ଶ  the variance at the household level and ߪ௨଴଴ଶ  the vari-
ance at the municipality level. ߩுு denotes the percentage of the total variance at the 
household level, while  ߩெ௎ேூ denotes the percentage of the total variance situated at the 
municipality level. The results of the 0-model show that most of the variance in reported 
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 Table 43: Multilevel analysis results for social capital from relatives (part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 3.1109 .0310 .000 3.1123 .0290 .000
Age
Sex
Origin
Belgian=reference
E.U.
Non-E.U.
Educational Attainment
No education
Primary
Lower sec.
Upper sec.
Tertiary = ref.
Household Income (€10 000)
Highest ISEI in HH
Single Person Household
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeration -.1251 -.0454 .0889 .161
Suburban -.1225 -.0375 .0912 .181
Commuters' Zone -.1261 -.0417 .0772 .103
Outer Zone = reference
Unemployment -.0115 -.0633 .0057 .045
Owner .7045 .0682 .3754 .062
RANDOM
a
ʍ 2 e 0.4417 0.6646 .3934 .6272
ʍ2u0 1.0874 1.0428 .000 1.2707 1.1273 .000
ʍ2u00 0.1216 0.3487 .000 .0941 .3068 .000
ʌHH 65.9% 72.3%
ʌMUNI 7.4% 5.4%
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 30044 29891
ȴ Est. parameters 5
X
2
152.78 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
0-model Model1
Random Intercept Model without 1e and 2nd level effects
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 Table 44: Multilevel analysis results for social capital from relatives (part 2) 
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 3.1301 .000
Age -.0051 -.0721 .0011 .000
Sex .0712 .0287 .0161 .000
Origin
Belgian=reference
E.U. -.0386 -.0075 .0579 .504
Non-E.U. -.2108 -.0408 .0772 .007
Educational Attainment
No education .0865 .0174 .0860 .315
Primary .0415 .0110 .0586 .479
Lower sec. .0316 .0092 .0405 .435
Upper sec. -.0157 -.0061 .0353 .656
Tertiary = ref.
Household Income (€10 000) .0602 .0544 .0240 .012
Highest ISEI in HH .0060 .0783 .0013 .000
Single Person Household -.3669 -.1272 .0643 .000
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeration -.1508 -.0547 .0866 .083
Suburban -.1389 -.0426 .0881 .116
Commuters' Zone -.1305 -.0431 .0786 .098
Outer Zone = reference
Unemployment -.0102 -.0561 .0057 .077
Owner .4046 .0392 .3840 .294
RANDOM
a
ʍ 2 e .3864 .6216
ʍ2u0 1.2049 1.0977 .000
ʍ2u00 .0951 .3084 .000
ʌHH 71.4%
ʌMUNI 5.6%
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 29552.45
ȴ Est. parameters 11
X
2
338.78 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
Model2
Model without 1e level effects
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 the scale, but the sample at the individual level is of course very large). There was no 
significant difference between native Belgians and migrants coming from one of the E.U. 
member states. However, migrants coming from non-E.U. countries scored significantly 
less on the social capital scale. The educational variable showed no effect. 
At the household level the disposable household income did have a significant effect, but 
the highest socio-economic status in the family had a stronger effect. As expected, both 
variables lead to an increase in access to social capital. Composition of the household had 
the strongest effect of all the variables in the model. Single person households report less 
access to social capital from relatives (an average difference of .37 or 7% of the scale). 
After the introduction of the individual and household level controls, the conclusion about 
the rural-urban typology remains the same: the difference between more urban and more 
rural municipalities is not significant. Also when the rural-urban typology is left out of the 
final model, there is no significant increase in deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ͷ with ܦ݂ ൌ ͵ and ݌ ൌ Ǥͳ͹ʹ). 
Coming back to our hypotheses now, we can conclude that, at least for social capital from 
relatives, all our hypotheses must be refuted. Neither hypothesis A1 nor hypothesis A2 is 
supported by the data. Although on average, the more rural municipalities reported higher 
access to social capital as compared to the more urban municipalities, these differences 
are rather small (3.2% of the scale and Cohens’ d = 0.12) and they were not statistically 
significant. Also hypotheses A3 is not supported because no significant interaction effects 
could be found. Finally, since there were no differences between urban and rural areas 
before the introduction of individual and household level control variables, also hypotheses 
A5 must be refuted. 
8.3.2 Access to social capital through others 
Due to item non-response 2168 individual cases, 982 households and 29 municipalities 
could no longer be used in the analysis. This left us with a total number of 10 151 individ-
uals observed in 5 366 households and 202 municipalities. 
Checking the distribution of the residuals revealed a very similar pattern as in the model 
for social capital from relatives. At the individual level, we notice the same deviation from 
normality, but no strong outliers. At the household level, the distribution of residuals is 
more narrow than expected by the normality model, but again no strong outliers can be 
observed. Finally, at the municipality level residuals are more normally distributed, but 
there are a number of municipalities with high negative outliers. However, since the values 
are once again not that extreme, and since the observations represent a lot of individual 
observations, these municipalities will not be deleted from the model. 
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 will come back to this in the conclusion. Looking at the results of model 2 in Table 46, we 
see that the introduction of the individual and household level variables led to a highly 
significant decrease in deviance of 697.87 (with 11 extra estimated parameters). We also 
notice a decrease of the variance at the household and individual level and a small in-
crease at the municipality level. 
Just like in the previous model, age is the variable that exerts the greatest influence on 
social capital. There is also a significant difference between men and women. On our scale 
ranging from -1.47 to 3.66 the score of women is 0.0561 higher as the score of men, 
which corresponds to 1.1% of the scale. No significant differences between natives and 
migrants and between educational groups could be found (it is however interesting to 
notice that the difference between respondents born in Belgium and respondents born 
outside of a EU-country is quite large but borderline insignificant). Disposable household 
income has a significant effect (the second largest after age) and so does the highest ISEI 
in the household. Respondents from single person households reported less access to 
social capital from ‘other network members’, just as they reported less access to social 
capital from relatives. This time however, the difference is not significant. As far as the 
rural-urban category is concerned, the conclusions do not change fundamentally. The 
differences between the categories increased marginally after the introduction of the first 
level variables and the significance level of urban agglomeration now approaches the 0.05-
tresshold a bit closer. The largest difference could be found between the municipalities of 
the outer zone and the municipalities of the suburban region. The difference of 0.4976 
represents 9.7% of the scale. Cohens’ d was equal to 0.31 which in Cohen’s terms indi-
cates a small effect. As always, we performed a chi-square difference test between the 
final model and a model in which only the rural-urban typology was removed. Omitting the 
variable let to a significant decrease in deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ͳ͵Ǥͷ with ܦ݂ ൌ ͵ and ݌ ൌ ͲǤͲͲͶ), indi-
cating a significant effect of the rural-urban typology on access to social capital. 
Our results rejected hypothesis A2 and partly support hypothesis A1. In line with the hy-
pothesis, respondents in the most rural categories reported less access to social capital as 
did those in the more urban categories. However, the largest difference between the outer 
zone and the suburban zone, which is not completely in line with expectations. An inter-
pretation of this finding will be presented in the conclusion. Also hypotheses A3, A4 and A5 
are not supported by the data. 
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 Table 45: Multilevel analysis results for social capital from others (part 1) 
Unstd. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 2.7364 .0481 .000 2.7331 .0472 .000
Age
Sex
Origin
Belgian=reference
E.U.
Non-E.U.
Educational Attainment
No education
Primary
Lower sec.
Upper sec.
Tertiary = ref.
Household Income
Highest ISEI in HH
Single Person Household
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeration -.2006 -.0571 .1380 .148
Suburban -.4644 -.1117 .1740 .009
Commuters' Zone -.2759 -.0716 .1199 .022
Outer Zone = reference
Unemployment -.0164 -.0709 .0080 .043
Owner .3459 .0263 .6052 .568
RANDOM
a
ʍ 2 e 0.6069 0.7790 .6065 .7788
ʍ2u0 1.7459 1.3213 .000 1.7469 1.3217 .000
ʍ2u00 0.3556 0.5963 .000 .3162 .5623 .000
ʌHH 64.5% 65.4%
ʌMUNI 13.1% 11.8%
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 33659 33639
ȴ Est. parameters 5
X
2
19.71 .001
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
0-model Model1
Random Intercept Model without 1e and 2nd level effects
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 Table 46: Multilevel analysis results for social capital from others (part 2) 
Unst. 
Param.
Stand. 
Param. SE/SD p
FIXED
a
Intercept 2.7648 .0473 .000
Age -.0138 -.1527 .0016 .000
Sex .0561 .0177 .0195 .005
Origin
Belgian=reference
E.U. .0040 .0835 .0832 .962
Non-E.U. -.2163 .1155 .1180 .066
Educational Attainment
No education -.0678 -.0107 .1210 .575
Primary -.1216 -.0254 .0832 .144
Lower sec. -.0453 -.0103 .0567 .425
Upper sec. .0004 .0001 .0433 .992
Tertiary = ref.
Household Income .1720 .1219 .0254 .000
Highest ISEI in HH .0075 .0772 .0019 .000
Single Person Household -.0926 -.0252 .0499 .063
Rural-Urban typology
Urban Aglomeration -.2372 -.0676 .1357 .082
Suburban -.4976 -.1197 .1721 .005
Commuters' Zone -.2759 -.0716 .1198 .022
Outer Zone = reference
Unemployment -.0139 -.0602 .0080 .085
Owner .1846 .0140 .6074 .761
RANDOM
a
ʍ 2 e .5892 .7676
ʍ2u0 1.5407 1.2413 .000
ʍ2u00 .3221 .5676 .000
ʌHH 62.8%
ʌMUNI 13.1%
MODEL FIT
a
Deviance 32941.47
ȴ Est. parameters 11
X
2
697.87 .000
a
Estimation Procedure = Full Maximum Liklihood
Model2
Model without 1e level effects
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 8.3.3 Mobilized childcare 
Our last model analysis rural-urban differences in the odds of mobilizing social capital for 
childcare. The analysis is only applied to households with at least one child of 13 years of 
age or less. From the 1495 households in 205 municipalities, 63 households and 3 munici-
palities were lost due to item non-response. This left us with a total number of 1432 first 
level and 202 second level observations. 
The results of the analysis can be found in Table 47. Because the response is a binary 
variable, we used logistic regression analysis instead of linear regression. As a conse-
quence the table with the results looks somewhat different from the tables we presented 
before. First of all, in the random part there is no indication of household level variance 
(that variance is not estimated in this kind of models). As a consequence the second level 
variance cannot be expressed as a percentage of the total variance. The regression pa-
rameters now express a change in the logarithm of the odds of mobilizing social capital for 
childcare versus not mobilizing social capital for childcare. These parameters are then 
converted to odds ratios. For categorical variables these odds ratios express the ratio of 
the odds of mobilizing versus not mobilizing social capital for a given category versus the 
odds of mobilizing versus not mobilizing social capital for the reference category. For con-
tinuous variables they express the ratio of the odds of mobilizing versus not mobilizing for 
someone with a score that is 1 point higher on the odds of mobilizing versus not mobilizing 
for someone with a score that is 1 point lower.  
Because odds and odds ratios are often hard to interpret, we translated them to differ-
ences in probabilities. Because the latter can be expressed in percentage point differences 
they can be interpreted much more intuitively. In order to calculate the percentage differ-
ence we used the method of Alba (1987). We first calculated the overall odds for mobiliz-
ing social capital for childcare versus not mobilizing social capital for childcare, which was 
equal to 0.34 (cf. heading 8.1.2E.2). In the case of a categorical predictor, these odds 
were assigned to the reference category and the expected odds for the other categories 
were found by multiplying the average odds by the odds ratio of the specific category. 
Assigned and expected probabilities (percentages) were calculated by dividing the odds by 
the odds plus one. By simply subtracting the percentage of the reference category from 
the specific category, we found the percentage difference. Analogously, for continuous 
variables the assigned odds ratio were found by multiplying the overall odds by the odds 
ratio of the predictor.  
What is also different from earlier models, is that our dependent variable is situated at the 
household level instead of the individual level. As a consequence only household and mu-
nicipality level variables could be used as controls. At the level of the household we used 
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 the disposable income variable, the highest status in the household and the ethnic origin 
of the household (cf. supra). The composition of the household is of course not used be-
cause all of the households in the model are households with children and can therefore 
not be single person households. At the municipality level the unemployment rate and the 
proportion of owner-occupiers was used as control variables. Introducing the other second 
level variables did not change the interpretation of our results. Also, no interaction effects 
proved to be significant, therefore they were excluded from the final model. 
In Table 47 we can see that the introduction of the second level predictors significantly 
reduced the deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ʹͷǤͶͶ with ܦ݂ ൌ ͷ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ). However, the analysis does 
not reveal significant differences between the categories of the rural-urban typology. The 
probability that households in urban agglomerations mobilize social capital for childcare is 
1.1 percentage point higher as compared to the households from the outer zone. House-
holds in the commuter belt or the suburban municipalities are less likely to mobilize social 
capital than households in the outer zone. To be exact, the probability that suburban 
households will mobilize social capital is 6.3 percentage points lower than the probability 
that households from the outer zone will mobilize social capital. The probability of house-
holds from the commuters’ zone to mobilize childcare is 4.5 percentage points lower. The-
se differences are, however, not statistically significant. Only one municipality level control 
variables showed a significant effect, i.e. the unemployment rate seemed to negatively 
influence the probability of households to mobilize childcare (a change of one percentage 
point in unemployment rate is responsible for a change of 0.9 percentage points in the 
probability of mobilizing social capital for childcare). 
Adding the household level variables in model 2 also results in a significant reduction of 
the deviance (ܺଶ ൌ ͵͸Ǥͷͺ with ݂݀ ൌ Ͷ and ݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͲͳ). Household income has a significant 
positive effect: an increase of in equivalent household income with 10 000 euro (on a 
yearly basis) is responsible for an increase of the probability of mobilizing social capital 
with 2.1 percentage points. The highest social status in the family did not seem to exert a 
significant influence. There were significant differences between households with a differ-
ent ethnic composition. Household with at least one member born in the E.U. and no 
members born outside of the E.U. were about half as likely to mobilize their network for 
childcare as compared to fully native households (their probability was 9.6 percentage 
points lower as compared to completely native households). Households with at least one 
member born outside of the E.U. were almost three times less likely than completely na-
tive Belgian households to mobilize social capital for childcare (their probability was 15.1 
percentage points lower). The introduction of the first level variables only marginally influ-
enced the odds ratio’s for the rural-urban categories.  
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 To have a better idea about the effect size, we can convert the log odds ratio (which is in 
fact the logistic regression parameter) to Cohens’ d using the formula39 of Hasselblad and 
Hedges (1995). The biggest difference was the one between the suburban municipalities 
and the rural municipalities. The logarithm of the odds ratio or the logistic regression pa-
rameter was equal to 0.3925. Converted to Cohens’ d, this was equal to 0.22. 
Turning to our hypotheses now, the results of the analysis seems rather lean. Since no 
significant interaction effects were found and since no significant difference between more 
rural and more urban categories could be found, no hypotheses has found support. How-
ever, in the interpretation of our results we must keep in mind that the power of our anal-
ysis is much lower for this last model as compared to our earlier models. Although the 
effect we have found here was smaller as compared to the effect on the social capital from 
others-scale, it was for instance equally large as the effect on the RG-scale in the students 
barometer dataset. In other words, although they were not statistically significant, the 
differences we observed in the probability of mobilizing social capital for childcare were 
more or less in line with what we found when we analyses perceived access to social capi-
tal: especially the suburban municipalities seemed to be relatively deprived of social capi-
tal, whereas the differences between the municipalities from the outer zone and the cen-
tral agglomerations were rather limited or even non-existent. The consequences of these 
findings will be further discussed in the final part of our dissertation. 
                                                    
39 ݀ ൌ ܮܱܴ כ ξଷ
గ
ൌ ܮܱܴ כ ͲǤͷͷ
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 Chapter 9
Conclusion and discussion 
9.1 INVESTIGATING URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In the beginning of this dissertation we made clear that our work wants to add to the 
knowledge on the question whether living in a rural versus urban environment constitutes 
certain constraints and opportunities for individual goal attainment. Because the scope of 
this topic is very broad (it is about such different things as access to education, income, 
political influence, etc.), we decided to focused on differences in the opportunity to accu-
mulate social capital. 
Social capital is a very popular but also a very controversial concept. As we showed in 
Chapter 2, two main lines of thought have developed throughout its conceptual history. 
The first one is strongly associated with the work of Robert Putnam who defines social 
capital as made up out of a mixture of attitudes, behavior and structures that facilitate 
cooperation and therefore help overcome problems of collective action. In general, in the 
tradition of this collective school the concept is rather vaguely defined and undertheorized. 
This sharply contrast with the other view that defines social capital as resources invested 
in social relations aimed at generating a return. The basic idea of this individual school is 
that just as people invest in material production factors and schooling, people can invest in 
their social relations. Through these investments they accumulate credit slips towards their 
network partners (i.e. the right to ask help from the network partners in an hour of need). 
The credit slips can be regarded as the return on social capital investments. Pierre Bour-
dieu and Nan Lin are the most important contributors to this school. They developed a 
well-defined concept that is strongly embedded in theory. Their conceptualization of social 
capital provides us with an ideal tool to investigate rural-urban inequalities. First of all, 
because it is an important route to mobilizing valuable resources. And second, because 
social capital transactions are not governed by binding contracts that can be legally en-
forced, but rest completely on trust and social control – two main variables in the classic 
critique on urban society. 
In our literature study we identified three different theoretical models making predictions 
about urban-rural differences in social capital. The classic critique on urban society, which 
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 we have called the isolation theory, states that the diversity and scale of the city under-
mines social control and therefore makes reciprocity less likely. Moreover, the stimulus 
overload caused by the business and crowdedness of urban life disturbs the urbanites 
mental equilibrium. Restoring the equilibrium can only be done by partly withdrawing from 
social life, further attenuating opportunities for accumulating social capital. The liberaliza-
tion theory rejects this vision, mainly arguing that the increased freedom of choice in the 
city will lead to networks of higher quality, providing more access to social capital. Finally, 
a number of theorist predict that, at least in contemporary society, differences in social 
capital between urban and rural areas no longer exist.  
In order to test these theories we had to both assess the value of a stock of social capital 
and draw the boundaries of rural and urban areas. Because the value of capital in general 
is determined by its capacity to generate returns, the value of social capital must be de-
termined in a similar way, i.e. by the degree to which it can give access to social re-
sources. Three measurement instruments for assessing that value were described in the 
second chapter, all of which have been applied in our empirical research. The first instru-
ment is the position generator that maps the socio-economic status of the network part-
ners of a certain individual. With this instrument an estimation of the average socio-
economic status and the status diversity of a respondent’s network can be made. The 
second is the resource generator that presents a list of social resources to respondents 
that can indicate whether they have access to it or not. With a scaling technique such as 
Rash analysis, a more direct indicator of access to social capital resources can be con-
strued. Finally, counting resources within a single domain is another option. In our case, 
information on mobilizing social capital for childcare was used. 
Although the conceptualization of urban is rather straightforward (it is the relatively large 
and permanent concentration of people in a bounded area) working out a delimitation of 
rural and urban areas is much more complicated. Fortunately, the idea of the functional 
urban area, identifying different spaces within an urban area based on residential concen-
tration and daily mobility, constitutes a good starting ground. The implementation of this 
idea to Belgian municipalities by Luyten and Van Hecke provides us with the best tool 
available to test our ideas in our own country. However, we argued that limiting our tests 
to Belgium alone could be problematic because of the very peculiar urban structure of the 
country. The combination of relatively small and very dispersed cities with a densely popu-
lated countryside reduces the morphological distinction between rural and urban areas, 
making it more difficult to detect the effects of urban (rural) life. We therefore decided to 
replicate our study in another country were the morphological differences between rural 
and urban areas are much larger. Because in Spain there is a lot of sparsely populated 
countryside ánd there are a large number of big and dense cities, the country constitutes 
such an ideal contrasting case. 
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 Data to test our hypotheses came from a number of different sources. First of all, we 
made use of the Students Barometer, an online survey administered to the students of 
Ghent University. This dataset contained a high quality resource generator and a position 
generator. The survey was replicated at the University of Granada in Spain. Second, we 
used data from the Belgian part of the European Union Statistiscs on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). These data, gathered in face-to-face interviews with a sample of 10 
000 Belgians of 16 years or older, contained a small resource generator and information 
on the mobilization of social capital for childcare. These data were connected to data on 
municipalities provided by the statistical authorities of Belgium and Spain.  
9.2 SUMMING UP THE FINDINGS 
The dependent variable of the first model was a scale derived trough Rash analysis of the 
resource generator items that were included in the student barometer questionnaire ad-
ministered to Ghent University students. Students from the outer zone municipalities re-
ported significantly less access to social capital as compared to those from the other mu-
nicipalities. Students from suburban municipalities reported having the least access. Intro-
ducing the individual level variables made the observed differences increase. No significant 
interaction effects could be found. Results of the analysis on the UGR-data were quite 
similar. Students from the most rural municipalities reported more access to social capital 
as compared to those from more urban municipalities. Also, introducing the second level 
control variables lead to an increase in the estimated difference between the municipalities 
and no significant interaction effects could be found. The most important difference con-
cerned the category that reported to have the least access to social capital. In the Belgian 
sample it  concerned the suburban municipalities, while in Spain it were the metropolitan 
core municipalities. Another important finding was that the estimated differences were 
larger in Spain as they were in Belgium. 
For the Ugent-dataset average prestige levels of the students’ networks were the highest 
in the urban agglomeration and the lowest in the outer zone. It is however especially the 
urban agglomeration that sets itself apart from the other municipalities. Controlling at the 
individual level marginally increased the estimated differences and no interaction effects 
were significant. Again the picture was quite similar in the UGR-sample: the general pic-
ture was that in the metropolitan core municipalities the average prestige level of the 
students’ networks were higher as compared the other groups of municipalities. 
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 Also, urban-rural differences did increase after control for individual level variables and no 
significant interaction effects could be found. Finally, the difference in Spain between the 
metropolitan core municipalities on the one hand and the rural municipalities on the other 
was about equally large as the difference between the central agglomeration and the outer 
zone in Belgium. 
The last dependent variable from the student barometers data was the standard deviation 
of accessed prestige. Again, results were similar for Belgium and Spain. This time, no 
differences between rural and urban areas could be found, neither were there any signifi-
cant interaction effects. 
The first two dependent variables in the analysis of the SILC-dataset were two scales de-
rived through Rash analysis of the resource generator items in the questionnaire. The first 
scale concerned access to social resources from relatives, while the second scale measured 
access to social resources from other network members. For social capital from relatives, 
no significant difference between rural and urban areas could be found, but for social capi-
tal from others the findings were in line with what we observed in the students data: in the 
outer zone respondents report most access to social resources, in the suburban municipali-
ties they report the least access. No significant interaction effects were found. 
Finally, when analyzing the odds of mobilizing social capital for childcare, we saw that the 
odds were the lowest in the suburban municipalities. However, the difference was not 
significant (although they were about equally large as the differences in the RG-scale in 
the students barometer dataset but the power of the analysis was lower). Also, the odds 
were about equally large in the urban agglomeration as they were in the outer zone. 
Again, no significant interaction effects were found. 
9.3 CONFRONTING FINDINGS AND THEORIES 
9.3.1 Isolation theory 
The theory of the isolating city is mainly negative about the consequences of urban life, an 
assertion that is based on both a structural an a psychological argument. The structural 
argument states that when a large amount of people live in the same place, local society 
becomes more anonymous. The lack of overlap of social roles undermines the effective-
ness of social control, making it less likely that favors will be returned and thus leading to 
less social capital exchanges. The psychological argument departs from the crowdedness 
and busyness of everyday life in an urban setting. This is supposed to lead to a mental 
overload that can only be addressed by a partial withdrawal from social life, cutting of 
207
 some important routes to social capital accumulation (e.g. Tönnies [1887] 1970, Wirth 
1938). 
Isolation theory predicts that urbanites will have less access to social capital and will mobi-
lize less social capital. The results of our research generated partial support for this hy-
pothesis. Rural dwellers had the highest score on the scale derived from the resource 
generator items, both in the Belgian as in the Spanish sample. The same goes for the 
scale derived from the items in the SILC measuring access to resources from non-
relatives. For access to resources from relatives rural dwellers also had the highest score, 
although the difference was not significant. In the sample of the Spanish students, the 
metropolitan core had the lowest score, followed by the non-metropolitan cities, the rest of 
the metropolitan area and the rural centers. This sequence is completely in line with the 
expectations of the theory. However, that was not the case in the sample of the Belgian 
students, were the suburban municipalities had the lowest score. This observation is most 
probably not the consequence of a coincidence since the same thing was found in the SILC 
data: suburbanites had the lowest score for access to resources from others and had the 
lowest odds of mobilizing childcare (although the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant).  
The fact that suburban municipalities are the least favorable for social capital is challeng-
ing for social isolation theory because it contradicts the psychological argument. The sub-
urbs are clearly less crowded and less dense than the central agglomerations. They should 
therefore give less rise to the so called stimulus overload as do the central agglomera-
tions. On the other hand, the finding is less challenging for the structural argument. Social 
differentiation, or the lack of overlap of social roles, is probably equally present in the 
suburban areas as it is in the urban areas. Since many suburbanites work in the city, they 
have an equally low chance that their co-workers are also their neighbors. Moreover, the 
proximity of the city makes it likely that a large part of non-work related social activities 
are situated in the city making it also not very likely that these neighbors are members of 
the same club or go out in the same places. However, the fact that urban and suburban 
areas are equally socially diversified still does not explain why suburban areas seem to be 
less fertile ground for social capital accumulation as compared to urban areas. Moreover, 
the structural argument is confronted with yet another problem. After all, in a large urban 
settlement relatives in most cases only have the role of ‘relatives’ and are therefore easier 
lost as routes to resource mobilization. On the contrary, in a small rural village the chance 
that relatives also have other roles (neighbors, classmates, colleagues, etc.) is much high-
er. If the main explanation for rural-urban differences is that the greater overlap of social 
roles in the countryside makes social control more effective and therefore reciprocity more 
likely, then we would expect to find that difference especially for mobilization of social 
capital from relatives. This was however not the case. Urbanites did report less access to 
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 resources as did rural dwellers, but the difference was rather small and not statistically 
significant. 
Isolation theory also predicts that the diversity of networks will be greater on the country-
side as compared to the city because people enclose themselves in their own social world. 
That hypotheses did not find any support, not in the Belgian nor in the Spanish sample. 
Neither could the thesis that an urban environment stimulates inequality (or in other 
words that in the city the effect of the socio-economic background will be larger as com-
pared to the countryside) find any support in the data. 
To sum up, the isolation theory is only partly supported by the data. Rural areas in general 
seem to be the most fertile grounds for accumulating and mobilizing social capital. Howev-
er, the observation that suburban areas seem to be worse places for social capital accu-
mulation as compared to urban areas in Belgium undermines the psychological argument 
of the theory whereas the finding that urban-rural differences in social capital from rela-
tives is much smaller than urban-rural differences in social capital from others undermines 
the structural argument. Finally, the observations that no difference in social status diver-
sity could be found and that the effects of the socio-economic background variables were 
not stronger in the city as compared to the countryside reject the idea that urbanites en-
close themselves more in their own social world.  
9.3.2 Liberalization theory 
The theory of the liberating city points to the positive effect of living in a large urban set-
tlement. A greater pool of people out of which network partners can be selected and a 
more permissive environment increases ego’s freedom for constructing his own network at 
his own wishes. As a consequence, better networks will be construed creating a more 
favorable environment for social capital accumulation (e.g. Fisher 1982).  
The liberalization theory predicts that urban dwellers will have more access to and will 
mobilize more social capital. This hypothesis is clearly refuted. In the Spanish sample, 
students from the most urban category reported less access to social capital as compared 
to those from the most rural category. In the Belgian sample, students from urban loca-
tions had the second lowest score (only students from the suburban municipalities had a 
lower score). Also in the general population, urban dwellers reported less access to social 
resources with again only suburbanites reporting even lower access. Only the odds for 
mobilizing social capital for childcare were just a little larger in the central agglomerations 
as they were in the outer zone. In other words, the idea that the scale of the city leads to 
increased freedom for network formation and therefore to increased access to social re-
sources is not correct. This could mean two things. One: a city environment does not lead 
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 to more freedom and/or two: that more freedom does not lead to more access to social 
resources.  
Before answering that question it is interesting to take a look at the results of the analysis 
of the position generator measures. After all, liberalization theory doesn’t only predict that 
access to and mobilization of social capital will be higher in the city, it also predicts that in 
an urban environment networks will have a higher average prestige level. Significant high-
er prestige levels were found in the most urban municipalities as compared to the more 
rural municipalities, both in Belgium as in Spain. Because we know from previous research 
(Laumann, 1966) that people prefer network partners with slightly higher statuses, we 
interpret this as evidence for the greater freedom in network formation that is present in 
cities. Importantly, the differences we found were not very large. This does however not 
contradict our expectation. After all, people do not want to network with others that have 
much higher statuses, but with others having slightly higher statuses. A small effect is 
therefore completely in line with our expectations. 
As a consequence, we conclude that an urban environment does lead to more freedom in 
network formation, but that more freedom does not lead to more social capital exchanges. 
9.3.3 City equals countryside 
Finally, a number of important theorists have rejected the idea that the rural-urban divide 
does not have an influence on people’s social life. Some argue that the content and struc-
ture of social life has never been influenced by the scale and diversity of a settlement. 
Others assert that owing to the development of fast and cheap means of communication 
and transportation the differences that existed in the past have now completely been 
whipped out (e.g. Friedland 1982). 
These theorists predict that no difference will be found, or that differences will disappear 
after control for (the right) individual level variables. This hypothesis must be rejected. 
Only for two dependent variables no significant differences could be found, i.e. for social 
capital from relatives in the Belgian SILC-dataset and for standard deviation of accessed 
prestige in the Students Barometer datasets. For the other dependent variables there were 
significant differences, also after control for individual level variables. Of course, one could 
always argue that we have not controlled for the right individual level variables and there-
fore still erroneously conclude that differences in access to social capital between munici-
palities can be explained by their rural or urban character while actually it are individual 
level characteristics that create the difference. However, in every analysis the researcher 
must make a decision which variables to include in the model and which to leave out. Our 
own choice was based on a combination of knowledge from the literature and availability 
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 of the data. Almost all the variables that are indicated to be important in the literature 
could be included in our models: indicators of access to private resources (financial re-
sources, education, status, …), age, sex, ethnic background and household composition. 
Therefore we can argue that we have controlled for a wide range of relevant factors which 
definitely contributes to the robustness of our findings. However, there is one potentially 
important factor for which we were not able to control, that is the respondents personality 
characteristics (the reason is that no information on personal traits such as sociability, 
openness, etc. was available in the datasets). This is unfortunate since it is not implausible 
that rural and urban environments attract people with different personality characteristics. 
Future researchers on the topic that are able to collect their own data should definitely 
consider gathering such information. 
The systemic model of Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), which we have classified under the 
category of city-equals-countryside theories, predicted that differences between country-
side and the city would disappear (or at least decrease) after control for individual level 
characteristics. The idea is that the city and the countryside attract different kinds of peo-
ple which would explain differences in statistical averages. In our analysis of the resource 
generator scales and of the childcare-variable the opposite was true: differences went up 
(a little) after control for individual variables. This means that people with individual char-
acteristics favorable for having more access to social capital (higher education, …) are 
more present in urban areas as compared to rural areas. But because urban areas are less 
favorable for access to social resources both mechanism counteract each other. The effect 
of living in an urban versus rural environment therefore becomes more clear after control 
for individual level variables. For the AAP-variable differences decreased in Spain while in 
Belgium the changes were somewhat ambiguous. In Spain, people with individual charac-
teristics favorable for having higher average network statuses (higher prestige, higher 
educational level, …) are more present in the cities as compared to the countryside. Be-
cause the city now exerts a positive effect on the dependent variable, the difference de-
creases after control for the individual level variable. Although the findings in Spain offer 
some support for the systemic model, it’s main idea (i.e. that rural-urban differences are 
only the result of a selection process) must be rejected. 
Finally, this is probably a good place to reflect on the magnitude of the differences we 
have discovered. In Cohen’s terms, the effect of the rural-urban typology should be cate-
gorized as rather small. However, there are some things we must keep in mind while in-
terpreting the effect size. First of all, and as we have already discussed in this conclusion, 
the effect on the average accessed prestige-measure was expected to be rather small. A 
mall effect is therefore not in contradiction to the theory and should not lead us to think 
that the effect on people’s life is rather small. Second, assessing differences between rural 
and urban areas is not self-evident because the frontiers between the different areas are 
rather blurred which probably leads to an underestimation of the effect. Finally, the fact 
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 that the differences in the RG-scale we observed in Spain were about twice as large as 
those in Belgium strengthens us in our conviction that we are in fact underestimating the 
effects in Belgium (cf. infra). 
To sum up, the main ideas of the theorists predicting no differences between city and 
countryside must be rejected. Although not every model produced statistically significant 
rural-urban differences, the general conclusion is that reported access to social capital is 
lower in urban environments (and in Belgium especially in suburban environments) than in 
rural environments, while urban environments seem to give people the possibility to build 
networks with slightly higher statuses. The magnitude of the effect is not overwhelming, 
but it is real. 
9.3.4 Belgium and Spain 
As we tried to point out in section 5.3, performing our analyses simultaneously in both 
Belgium and Spain was in first place aimed at assessing the robustness of our findings. In 
Belgium, the spatial or morphological differences between the most urban and the most 
rural environments are limited in international perspective because our cities are not that 
large and very dispersed while the countryside is densely populated. As a consequence, in 
Belgium we are only observing a limited part of the real range of rural-urban differences 
which would lead us to underestimate the effect. Therefore we wanted to replicate our 
work in a country in which the observable part of that real range was larger. Because in 
Spain cities are very dense and the countryside is very sparsely populated, we believed it 
would be the ideal country to implement that replication. 
In general we must say that the results in the Spanish sample very closely resemble those 
in the Belgian sample. In both cases, rural areas are the ones in which there is most ac-
cess to social capital and urban areas are the ones in which the average social statuses of 
the networks are the highest. Also in both cases no difference in status diversity could be 
found. As such, the replication adds considerably to the confidence we can have in our 
general conclusions. 
There are however also a number of differences observed between both countries that 
merit our attention. First of all there is the somewhat disturbing element that the conclu-
sions about the suburbs are different in Belgium and Spain. The category rest of the met-
ropolitan area in Spain is supposed to be more or less equivalent to the category suburban 
municipalities in Belgium. However, in Belgium the suburban category is the one in which 
respondents consistently report the least access to social capital, while in Spain access to 
social capital in suburban municipalities is more or less at the same level of access to so-
cial capital in the rural municipalities. We believe that the most likely explanation for this 
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 phenomenon is that suburbanization is a much more recent and far less developed process 
in Spain as it is in Belgium. In the Spanish case, the suburbanization process might still 
have to generate its full effects, whereas these effects have already fully materialized in 
our own country. If the suburbanization process should continue at its pre-crisis pace, than 
in the future we would expect to see the same effect on social capital in Spain as we have 
observed here in Belgium. 
Another element is the difference in effect size observed between both countries. As we 
had expected, the rural-urban difference in the RG-scale is larger in Spain as compared to 
Belgium (to be exact, it is about twice as large). This is in line with our expectations: be-
cause the spatial or morphological difference between the most rural and the most urban 
municipalities is larger in Spain as it is in Belgium, we expect to find bigger rural-urban 
differences in access to social capital in the first country as compared to the latter. Howev-
er, the rural-urban differences in average accessed prestige are more or less equally large 
in Belgium as they are in Spain. Why that is so is rather hard to grasp. It might have 
something to do with the fact that differences in average prestige between rural and urban 
areas will always be small because people only aim at making friends that have slightly 
higher statuses. Maybe once social control has passes a certain threshold of effectiveness, 
people rapidly lose their possibility to improve the average status of their networks. Once 
the threshold is passes the fact that social control gets even more strict (like in the small 
villages of rural Spain) might then no longer yield any effect on the average social status 
of a network. 
Finally, there is the different effect of the owner-occupier variable in the model of average 
accessed prestige. In the Belgian sample, the proportion of owner-occupiers in the munici-
pality exerted a significant negative effect on the average accessed prestige of the stu-
dents’ networks. We interpreted that finding as being in line with the expectations of the 
liberalization theory. We argued that the variable should be considered an indicator of 
residential stability. Because we can assume that municipalities with high residential sta-
bility are municipalities in which there is more social control and in which relationship 
patterns are more conservative, we believe that a high level of residential stability will be 
associated with less freedom for network formation. Yet, in the Spanish sample this varia-
ble did not seem to exert any significant influence. However, we must consider the point 
that the indicator represents a different socio-economic realty in both countries. While in 
Belgium in 2008 almost 75% of people lived in an owner-occupied house, that number 
approximates almost 90% in Spain (Dol & Haffner, 2010), which means that not much 
variability in homeownership rates is left. Another important difference is that in Spain a 
very important part of the housing stock exists out of second homes (Módenes & López-
Colás, 2007) that are in most cases also the property of the tenant. Al together this makes 
the percentage of owner-occupiers not such a good indicator of residential stability in 
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 Spain as it is in Belgium which probably explains why it is not significantly associated with 
average accessed prestige in that country. 
9.4 TOWARDS AN ADAPTATION OF THE THEORETICAL 
MODELS 
Is it now possible to formulate an answer to our central question? That is, do we now know 
whether living in an urban versus a rural environment represents constraints or opportuni-
ties for social capital accumulation? After carefully examining the empirical results we can 
say with some confidence that living in a rural versus an urban environment does make a 
difference for accumulating social capital. This finding may be considered rather robust: it 
was established in two very different countries (at least as far as the morphological struc-
ture of their urbanization is concerned), in a sample of students and in a sample of the 
entire population, for access to social resources as well as mobilization of those resources, 
and using different measurement instruments. That difference should be defined in such a 
way that urban environments seem to provide more room for individual freedom of choice 
in building one’s own network, while rural networks seem to provide more access to social 
resources. 
We can also conclude that none of the theoretical models described in Chapter 4 provide 
us on their own with a fully satisfactory explanation of why and how a rural or urban envi-
ronment matters. Obviously, theories predicting no difference between city and country-
side must be rejected. Liberalization theory is right in predicting more freedom of choice in 
tie formation (as we deduced from the higher average status levels of urban-based stu-
dents), but that freedom does not seem to lead to more accumulated social capital (as was 
evident from the results of the different resource generators). Isolation theory is right in 
predicting that in rural areas people have the most access to social capital. However, the 
fact that suburbanites have less access to social capital as urbanites contradicts the psy-
chological argument and can neither be explained by the structural argument. Moreover, 
the structural argument is also challenged by the observation that rural-urban differences 
in access to social capital from relatives are much smaller than the differences in social 
capital from other network members.  
We believe that an important reason why the theories we outlined above do not account 
very well for our observations is that they start from a yield-only perspective on social 
capital. That is, the underlying idea in the literature is that having more access to social 
capital is always better. From a perspective that only takes the yield of the social capital 
accumulation process in account, that is undeniably true: people who can potentially mobi-
lize more resources have a higher chance they will be able to achieve whatever goals they 
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 want to achieve. Such a situation must, ceteris paribus, always be regarded as something 
positive for the individual. However, this perspective does not take into account that social 
capital must be produced. During the production process resources are invested, and if 
these resources are non-durable goods (such as time), they cannot be used for other pur-
poses. In other words, while investing in his social ties, the individual loses access to a 
certain amount of resources. In a situation in which the investment process is not very 
productive, that is, if the yield is not much higher or even lower than the investment costs, 
then having accumulated a lot of social capital means that you have invested a lot in an 
unproductive process. Such a situation might for instance occur when a person has already 
invested a lot in social capital. The law of diminishing marginal returns predicts that addi-
tional investments will not yield much profit. In such a situation, a person having accumu-
lated a lot of social capital might have been better off if he would have invested his re-
sources differently. To conclude, taking both the investment in and the yield of social capi-
tal into account might increase our capacity to fully grasp the mechanisms behind the 
rural-urban differences in social capital. 
Starting from such an investment-and-yield perspective, we argue that there are two ex-
planations possible why an increased freedom for network formation does not lead to an 
increase in access to social capital. One explanation is that the investments urbanites 
make in social capital are less productive than the investments made by rural dwellers, or 
that the investments of rural dwellers are more productive than the investments of urban 
dwellers. That is in fact a different formulation of the structural argument from the isola-
tion theory. In small rural settings there is more overlap of social roles which makes social 
control more effective. An effective social control makes reciprocity more likely and there-
fore social capital investments less risky. As a consequence, the investments of rural 
dwellers will generate more return, which explains why they accumulate more access to 
social capital as compared to their urban counterparts. 
There is however also another explanation possible. It might be that urbanites simply 
invest less in social capital, although the investments they make are equally productive. 
Important for this argument is the observation that urban dwellers are only deprived in 
relative terms, they are not completely bereft of helpful social relations. Therefore, it 
might be a conscious choice of urban dwellers to invest less in their social relations as do 
rural dwellers. Maybe urban dwellers experience less need for social assistance because 
they have more access to institutionalized forms of help. Or argued from the point of rural 
dwellers: country dwellers invest that much in their relationships because they are more or 
less forced to. Because the different spheres of life are much more interwoven in a rural 
environment, people are somewhat caught in an all or nothing game. They have to invest 
in relationships that are not that rewarding because if they don’t, they risk to also harm 
the more rewarding social ties. Let us take as an example the people one invites for a 
wedding party. We can imagine rural dwellers in general inviting more people to the party 
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 than urbanites. Next to their close friends and family, they also invite more distant family 
members, their neighbors and a lot of acquaintances from the village. In order not to of-
fend anyone and prevent starting negative gossip, they invite more people than they 
would when their network would be less tightly knit. The idea is that the additional in-
vestments in social capital that rural dwellers make but urbanites don’t do lead to addi-
tional access to social capital. However, they require that much extra investment that from 
a rational point of view these investments are in first instance a burden and from a more 
sentimental point of view might also feel as a burden to the marrying couple. 
The models above still do not explain why suburban municipalities seem to be less fertile 
grounds for social capital accumulation as are urban municipalities. We think that next to 
the mechanisms described above, there is something else going on. Remember that the 
liberalization theory argues that urban environments allow for more individual freedom in 
network formation because a weaker social control makes individuals experience less pres-
sure to include or exclude certain potential network partners and the immediate presence 
of a large amount of different people increases the chance of meeting the exact kind of 
people one finds the most interesting as network partners. However, there is also a more 
prosaic advantage to cities that has not been considered before, and that is the proximity 
of network partners and of meeting places. When two network partners live in the city, it 
is much easier to meet each other. Distances are smaller and the public transportation 
system is more closely knit. Moreover, the places where people meet for socializing (pubs, 
theaters, cinema, restaurants, …) tend to be situated in the city centers rather than in the 
suburban areas. The extra time one has to invest in order to meet others might discourage 
suburbanites more often to meet their network partners, resulting in a social capital disad-
vantage towards their urban counterparts. This theses is also in line with the ideas of 
some scholars arguing that living in a suburban environment makes people loose time 
they could otherwise use for socializing (e.g. Putnam 2005). 
Figure 50: The liberal model 
The two theoretical models we described above have something in common. They both 
state that the big difference between urban and rural environments has to do with social 
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 control. The first model regards a more severe form of social control as a positive thing: it 
leads to an environment with a higher level of reciprocity making social capital invest-
ments more productive. The other model is more negative about social control: it leads to 
an environment in which people are more or less forced to invest in social ties that are not 
very productive and in which they would not invest when they would be more free to 
choose.
The first and the second model also give a different response to our central research ques-
tion, i.e. whether rural or urban environments present constraints or opportunities for 
social capital accumulation. From the first model we would argue that rural environments 
present better opportunities for social capital accumulation than urban environments be-
cause social control is more efficient and therefore social capital investments are more 
effective. The second model argues that urban environments present better opportunities 
for social capital accumulation because they make it easier to escape from the pressure to 
invest in unproductive social ties. As such we arrive at two new rivalry models, as is ap-
parent from Figure 50 and Figure 51. Our first model is in fact an extension of the struc-
tural argument from isolation theory, while the second model is a more vigorous adapta-
tion of the liberalization theory. It is important to notice that these models are not just old 
wine in new bottles. They are adaptations of the former theories that are informed by the 
results of our empirical research that take scientific knowledge on the matter just one step 
further. However, as was the case with the isolation and liberalization theory, we can say 
that both models have different philosophical foundations. The first one is based on what 
we could call a communitarian view, expressing a preference for a society in which individ-
uals are strongly imbedded in community. We shall call it therefore the communitarian 
model. The second one is based on a liberal view expressing a preference for a society in 
which possibilities for self-fulfillment are maximized – we shall call this one the liberal 
model.
Figure 51: The communautarian model 
Despite their differential philosophical underpinning, it is possible in future research to 
construct empirical tests that confront both theories. However, it is also clear that the 
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 tests must be done differently from the ones used in our own empirical research. The key 
difference between both models is not about the level of access to social capital they ex-
pect rural or urban dwellers to have, but about the effectiveness of their investments in 
social capital. Therefore, future research will have to determine the productivity of social 
capital investments in rural and urban areas. Determining that productivity means that the 
researcher not only has to determine the value of the stock of social capital an individual 
has accumulated, but also the value of the resources he or she invested in his or her social 
ties. Such a strategy represents an important new challenge and might require completely 
new measurement strategies. We could think for instance of using time diaries as an in-
strument. Such an instrument would allow us to estimate the amount of time people invest 
in their social relationships and the benefits they get from it. Since time is arguably one of 
the most important resources one invests in his social relationships, such an endeavor, 
although very expensive, could constitute a good critical test of these two models. 
9.5 SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
9.5.1 About some underlying assumptions 
The theoretical reasoning that we develop throughout this dissertation ascribes a place to 
both structure and agency in the explanation of differences in social capital accumulation. 
At the center of the analysis are the agents that invest in their ties with other agents, and 
in so doing they enjoy some discretionary power. However, their freedom of movement is 
limited by the boundaries of structural constraints. They are for one thing constrained by 
the existing unequal distribution of private resources in society, but also, for instance, by 
the degree to which norms of reciprocity prevail40. The degree to which individual action is 
determined by either agency or structure is in our opinion an empirical matter. Moreover, 
it is a matter than can differ over time, between places and between social groups. The 
hypothesis of the liberal model brought forward in the conclusion is based on this last 
assumption: it expects that more room for individual agency is present in an urban envi-
ronment as compared to a rural environment. The structures that constrain the action of 
the actors are believed to be at the same time the product of individual action. That is for 
instance apparent when we discuss why social control can be expected to be more effec-
tive in small communities: individual actors are more willing to go by the rules because 
when they have a conflict in one sphere of life that can also have effects on another 
sphere of life (or in other words: they have more to loose). As the reader may already 
have noticed, our conception of society is largely in line with Anthony Giddens’ structu-
                                                    
40 Our idea of structure follows Hays’ (1994) proposition that culture (that is the aggregate of shared 
meanings) is an integral part of the structure of society. 
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 ration theory (Giddens, 1984) and with the point of view taken by Nan Lin in his theory of 
social capital (2001b). 
Another assumption we make is that the actors in our theoretical models act rational – at 
least within the boundaries of the structural constraints we outline. Some readers might 
even have felt uneasy with the rational way we have theorized about the formation of 
social ties. We are not used to think about friendship ties or the relationships with our 
beloved ones in terms of costs and benefits – but rather in terms of caring and altruism. 
However, the rational actor paradigm must in first instance be considered a handy tool 
that allows us to think about social reality in a systematic way, and to arrive at testable 
hypotheses about social phenomena. Nonetheless, we are convinced that it also corre-
sponds to reality in the sense that an actor’s social ties do present costs and benefits for 
him and that these cost and benefits are important in constraining his goals. This does not 
mean that we exclude the possibility that other motives can drive people’s actions. First of 
all, the roll of shared norms and values is not excluded from our model since they are 
included in the structural constraints that determine the boundaries of individual agency. 
Second, we follow Goldthorpe (1998) in his claim that “the model of the actor to be used 
[…] does not, however, have to be one that is capable of capturing all the particular fea-
tures – all the idiosyncrasies – of the actions of the flesh-and-blood individuals involved, 
but only the ‘central tendencies’ in their action that are seen as relevant to the explanation 
that is being sought. Thus, if a RAT [Rational Action Theory] approach is adopted, it need 
not be claimed that all actors at all times act in an entirely rational way: only that the 
tendency to act rationally (however this may be construed) is the most important common 
– i.e. non-idiosyncratic – factor at work”. 
Finally, we like to point to the fact that we adhere to some kind of methodological individ-
ualism. This does not mean, as should be apparent from the above, that we believe all 
social phenomena should be explained only in terms of individual action or that structural 
variables should always be considered endogenous variables in theoretical models. Instead 
we mean that, in order to achieve causal depth, we believe that macro level correlations 
should always be understood in terms of their micro foundations, i.e. in terms of “individu-
als, their physical and psychic states, actions, interactions, social situation and physical 
environment” (Udehn, 2002, p. 499). 
9.5.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
We believe the most important merit of this dissertation is that through empirical research 
we have been able to falsify two hypothesis from the scientific literature. First of all, we 
have provided evidence against the idea that rural-urban differences are unimportant for 
social capital (Dewey, 1960; Friedland, 1982, 2002). Second, based on the results of our 
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 inquiry, the hypothesis from liberalization theory that urban environments lead to in-
creased individual agency for network formation and therefore to better networks in terms 
of social capital (as authors such as Fischer and Wellman seem to suggest) must also be 
refuted. Moreover, that falsification is not based on just one case study (which is the base 
for the bulk of the empirical work in the literature), but on a different number of analysis 
on both a student sample and a population-wide sample, in two different countries, and 
using a sophisticated delimitation of rural and urban areas combined with well-developed 
measurement instruments. 
Our major strength is however also linked to an important weakness. Because we wanted 
to perform an elaborate analysis of rural-urban differences in social capital, we had to 
work with secondary data analysis (and additionally a replication of an earlier study). Alt-
hough the datasets we worked with all had the advantage to comprise information on a lot 
of different municipalities, they also all had their own drawbacks. The informative value of 
an analysis on student data for the entire population is of course limited, definitely when 
the response rate of the surveys are very low. As far as the SILC-questionnaire is con-
cerned, there were only a very limited number of questions that could be used for building 
a resource generator, making the instrument less valid as an indicator for general social 
capital. We tried to overcome these problems by using a combination of datasets. We do 
acknowledge that collecting a big dataset containing all the information desired for our 
analysis would have been a better situation. Unfortunately, collecting data is a very expen-
sive business, definitely when they must be collected from a random sample of the entire 
population of a country. Because we lacked the necessary resources to execute such a 
high quality data collection ourselves, working with secondary data seemed to be the best 
option available. 
Another consequence of working with secondary data analysis was that it was not possible 
to design the data collection to our own wishes. That is the reason why we have not be 
able to take the role of personality characteristics into account - although they might po-
tentially have had a major impact on our conclusion. Future research that does have the 
opportunity to collect its own data should definitely consider the option of including ques-
tions on personality characteristics. 
Another weakness is that although our theoretical efforts aim at grasping the mechanisms 
behind the rural-urban differences in social capital, what we did in our empirical work was 
much more superficial. In the end, we only established an association (albeit controlled for 
the influence of third variables at two or three levels) between two variables, i.e. the ur-
ban-rural typology on the one hand and social capital on the other .There are two reasons 
why we did this. One is that in the literature it was not yet established whether or not 
there is in fact an effect of the rural-urban divide on social capital. Second, we lacked the 
necessary data for making the different steps in the mechanisms we proposed operational. 
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 That is, for applying causal modeling we would have to measure concepts such as social 
control and social differentiation. Unfortunately such data were not available to us. Future 
researchers that have the ability of collecting their own data might consider to use causal 
modeling for further tests of the theories mentioned in this dissertation. 
Finally, our empirical work has only taken the yield of social capital into account, although 
in the conclusion we pointed to the fact that assessing the investment in social capital 
might have given more insight in the phenomenon we studied. The most important reason 
is that the full potential of such an approach only became clear to us when we were trying 
to make sense of the results of our analysis. However, when we would have taught of it 
earlier, it would still have been a difficult issue to address. In most of the literature on 
social capital not much attention has been given to social capital investments (the work of 
Hofferth and Iceland being a rare exception), no datasets are readily available that contain 
such information. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, no measurement instruments are 
developed yet to assess the magnitude of social capital investments. This also presents an 
interesting gap in the literature for future researchers. 
9.5.3 Social relevance 
The goal of the research project of which this text constitutes the report is in first instance 
to add to the scientific knowledge on the question whether rural versus urban environ-
ments represent constraints and opportunities for individual goal attainment. As such we 
wanted to make a contribution to the body of scientific literature on the community ques-
tion. Our study should in first instance be described as theory-oriented or fundamental 
research. There is no immediate direct applicability of our findings in public policy or the 
commercial world, but it should serve, in the long run, as input to more practice oriented 
research. We are strongly convinced that such theoretical research is indispensable for the 
advancement of scientific knowledge and therefore for the advancement of science as a 
whole.  
Moreover, many examples of practice oriented research that could apply our insights could 
be taught of. One example is research that wants to help policy makers in their attempt to 
stimulate urban living. A lot of policy makers, such as the Flemish Government (Van den 
Bossche, 2009) have formulated policy goals aimed at fighting urban flight. They want to 
stimulate their citizens to go living in the city, for instance because urban life is considered 
to be more environmentally friendly and because they want to preserve the open space on 
the countryside. Policy advisers should have a good understanding of visible and invisible 
consequences of urban life on people. Far too often analysis is limited to the immediate 
financial consequences of moving in or out of the city (cf. a recent article in Knack on 
August 3, 2012: “Wat mag het kosten om u naar de stad te lokken?”). The consequences 
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 on the ability to access social resources could also be important in people’s decision were 
to live. Our research could therefore inspire more applied researchers to explore the ques-
tion whether the search for a supportive network influences the decision about residential 
choice. If so, policy makers might consider improving such things as day-care facilities in 
order to make urban life easier. 
Another example might be the policy goal of strengthening informale carring, which could 
be seen as a part of the larger concept of social capital. Policy-oriented research on infor-
mal caring draws heavily on insights from the literature. When decisions have to be made 
on where to orient the policy efforts to, reliable information on rural-urban differences in 
support networks might be inevitable. 
Finally, although our results as such are not ready-to-use for policy planners, they should 
give some input into the public debate about the desirability of certain policies. Is it a good 
idea to make our city centers become more dense than they were before? Should urban 
planning be oriented at growth of the existing larger cities or should that growth be dis-
persed over big and smaller centers? Suggestions about the social consequences of urban 
living are often used as arguments in these debates. From our research we can decide that 
on the one hand, a city environment seems to provide some kind of emancipation from 
social control, or in other words it provides more room for individual agency in the consti-
tution of a personal network. That is exactly the message of the song of M83 of which the 
lyrics are printed in the beginning of this dissertation and it is also the idea that is behind 
the picture we used on the cover. On the other hand urbanites, and especially suburban-
ites, seem to have less access to help from others. Whether or not that is the result of a 
deliberate choice or of an attenuation of the prevailing norms of reciprocity is a question 
that, unfortunately, we are not able to answer yet. However One thing we can be confi-
dent of, that is that the choice for urban or rural living is not without consequences for 
people’s social life. 
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